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Winding up a radio interview in Berlin that never aired, I 
relented in my scouring of German history – the Trump presi-
dency was already upon us – and allowed that there was “der 
andere Patient,” “the other patient,” namely, the United States, 
a patient, however, still finding protection in denial, the protec-
tion denied Germany in the world at large. This volume did 
not become “The Other Patient,” although one of its overrid-
ing themes, the wish for fame, can be considered a symptom of 
American culture and its ubiquitous reach for the stars. 
I saved up Edmund Bergler, another analyst in the canon of 
the psychopathology and poetics of the daydream, to read and 
perform the symptom picture featured in this volume. His obses-
sive theorizing makes him candidate or casualty of the wish that 
he sees underlying all neurosis, all fantasy. Staggered by a relay 
of defenses and defenses against defenses, the wish to be denied, 
the bottom line according to Bergler, wasn’t a candidate for 
integration in my Phantasiermaschine. But like Gilles Deleuze’s 
philosophy of masochism, in which Bergler was assured a place, 
the theorization of the wish to be refused can match a specific 
work, in particular if its abiding focus is on the fantasy of never-
lasting fame.
In Palm Springs, I learned that there is “the desert version” of 
everything “Hollywood,” beginning with the lookalikes of the 
named stars on Hollywood Boulevard’s Walk of Fame stamped 
into the sidewalks along Palm Drive. But it’s not the same names, 
not the same stars. At dinner our waiter confirmed what we 
thought we saw in the large poster up against the wall that he 
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had indeed been on “Dancing with the Stars.” Then his col-
league added from across the room – it was like an exchange in a 
sitcom – but it was only “the desert version.” A leftover from the 
time when Palm Springs was, at least for a season, Hollywood in 
the desert, the pairing up like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza 
of the realized or deluded fulfillment of the wish for fame with 
the locally more accessible version of falling short would be 
truly utopian. In childhood any little one could grow up to be a 
star. But then you just keep getting older – way older than your 
promise. The striving for fame is the very measure, measured in 
reverse, of the abyssal falling away of the recognition values that 
make up our continuity in memory. 
“Hollywood” and “the desert version” don’t sum up the wish 
for fame, its fulfillments and unfulfillments. I offer instead by way 
of intro a work by Samuel R. Delany in which the best intended 
content together with a consummate mastery of form cannot 
outfly the denial of originality. To finance his first trip to Europe, 
Delany, a New Yorker, wrote Empire Star in 1965, a novella that’s 
also arguably a Bildungsroman. Thinking about Europe and that 
means German history and Kultur, Delany composed within the 
borderlands of fantasy and science fiction an allegory of the East 
Coast’s recent past as the future curse upon the universe. 
It’s on a backwater planet boasting a relocated or replicated 
Brooklyn Bridge, in other words out West, that the bildungsro-
man opens, tying a boy’s development to the mission he accepts 
or which befalls him, the mission to journey to Empire Star and 
deliver an unknown message. The protagonist, the boy named 
Comet Jo, is a blond beauty straddling both coasts, Germany and 
California. 
Self-reflexivity, German literature’s romance with itself, enters 
the looping of sci-fi’s variation on doubling, time travel. When a 
spaceship crashes nearby and he goes to check it out, “it was only 
when Comet Jo was kneeling and the figure was panting in his 
arms that he realized it was his double.” 1 The double-thing melts 
and then there was Jewel: “The thing was multicolored, multi-
faceted, multiplexed, and me. I’m Jewel” (6). He’s the omniscient 
1 Samuel R. Delany, Empire Star (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 5. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text. 
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narrator and a character in the story, a multiple-thing coextensive 
with the looping novella. To protect the transmission of the mes-
sage, Jewel crystallizes on the spot, which means he becomes “just 
a point of view” (8). Jo pockets Jewel, the POV accompanying 
him on his Bildungs-journey.
The novella’s emphasis in the course of Jo’s education and for-
mation appears to be on harvesting strong emotion, even if the 
harrow is made up not of wishes but the defenses against them. 
Delany introduces the universal enslavement of the Lll through 
a division in the belaboring of affect whereby unbearable grief is 
the unremitting lot of the slave owners. Because the Lll alone can 
rebuild entire planetary civilizations (including their ethical sys-
tems) in the aftermath of total wars, they are under the empire’s 
protection. Any contact with them leads without exception to 
extreme grief, which is not what they are feeling, but which is the 
gist of their defense.
“Why don’t they turn ’em loose?” Jo asked, and the sentence 
became a cry halfway through.
“Economics,” Ron said.
“How can ya think ’bout economics feelin’ like … this?”
“Not many people can,” Ron said. “That’s the Lll’s protec-
tion.” (27)
Along his yellow brick road, Jo meets Lump, a linguistic ubiqui-
tous multiplex, “built by a dying Lll to house its disassociating 
consciousness” (44). But because Lump is half-machine the 
other half forfeits the protection and Jo doesn’t feel the grief. 
Communicating through an idiom of allusions to American 
popular culture, Lump makes it clear that the Lll stand for 
the heirs to enslavement in US history. When Jo invites Lump 
to come along, the sort-of computer warns that if found out a 
half-Lll free agent is free game. Jo shrugs it off, saying that Lump 
should identify as a computer. “Like I said, I wouldn’t have 
known if you hadn’t said anything.” And Lump responds defi-
antly: “I do not intend to pass” (44).  Looking at photographs of 
Delany, it appears he qualified for the caste of blender idols like 
Lena Horne or Adrienne Piper, and faced passing as unintended 
option.
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When the poet Ni Ty visits Lump and Jo, doubling and loop-
ing displace the Bildungs-ideal of empathizing with the Lll. Ni 
Ty was apprenticed to an older Lll poet who was his same-sex 
amour. Then he safe-deposited this chapter inside Lump. Now 
that his better half is gay Black American, the computer half of 
Lump’s blender idol status travels both the no passing and the 
passing lanes in Delany’s 1965 bio. 
More twist-off than twist, doubling stays in the lead to the 
finish line. Ni Ty’s gay apprenticeship lies outside Jo’s biography 
to date. But everything else that happened in his life has also hap-
pened to Ni Ty. Jo can feel the curse of doubling seizing his life, 
which in a bildungsroman counts as a work, one that has thus 
been plagiarized.
He felt as if something in him had been raped and outraged. 
“You can’t steal my life!”
Suddenly Ni pushed him, Jo slipped to the deck, and the 
poet stood over him, shaking now. “What the hell makes you 
think it’s yours? Maybe you stole it from me. How come I 
never get to finish anything out? How come any time I get 
a job, fall in love, have a child, suddenly I’m jerked away and 
flung into another dung heap where I have to start the same 
mess all over again? Are you doing that to me? Are you jerk-
ing me away from what’s mine, picking up for yourself the 
thousand beautiful lives I’ve started?” (62)
In Delany’s novel, plagiarism isn’t a transitive transaction but 
a trauma that befalls innocent bystanders. Even the omniscient 
narrator or author Jewel was recognizing his own lines in what 
Ni Ty was saying (60). Comet Jo is only starting out on his 
journey of becoming-who-he-is, which transposed to the logic of 
the loop means becoming his doubles, catching up, for instance, 
with his life as Ni Ty. 
Towards the close, befitting a course of Bildung, Jo arrives at 
a more adult and tempered understanding of the doubling going 
through him and the poet: “He lets you know how much of your 
life is yours and how much belongs to history” (87). What follows 
the apprenticeship phase of Bildung is the phase of renunciation 
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or fitting in, but not for the author, not for Goethe, whose name 
was heard to resonate nearer to God. 
In 2017, Delany named Alfred Bester and Theodore Sturgeon 
his precursors, submitting writing well as the literary ticket.2 
This volume of Critique of Fantasy opens with Bester’s two tele-
novels, followed by analysis of the masochistic wish underlying 
writer’s block, illuminating an impasse that Bester struggled to 
breach. We’ve already touched on the case of Sturgeon, who 
enjoyed a second career as laugh-track cameo in Kurt Vonnegut’s 
psy-fi satires, which P.J. Farmer carried forward. Sturgeon’s fix-it 
masterpiece More Than Human is ready for its closeup reading 
at the close of this volume. That at one point its author was the 
most anthologized English-language author is, however, another 
way of saying the he was hard pressed to break free of the short 
form. 
Delany brings up these precursors in the course of dismissing 
P.K. Dick’s growing literary reputation (he might have included 
J.G. Ballard’s renown as well). He refers to the eccentricity of 
his reading practice, in other words, his apparent immunity to 
trends. But what underlies this errant path is his remarkable 
acumen in recognizing the motive force and shortfall of the wish 
for fame.  Delany attributes the recent phenomenon of Dick’s 
acclaim to the import of politics, if not for Dick then certainly 
for American academics wishing upon their own stardom. 
2 Adam Fitzgerald, “Samuel Delany: ‘If You’re Going to Write Anything, 
Try to Take It Seriously.’ Part Two of Adam Fitzgerald’s Conversation 







No Wish Is Free
Wishamatic Futures
The streamlining of telepathy against the reign of ghostliness 
in Arthur C. Clarke’s Childhood’s End, which I interpreted as 
pivotal to the psychoanalysis of the Devil in Notebook Ten of 
The Devil’s Notebooks, is administered by alien overlords (Devil-
lookalikes), who reduce the occult arc of human consciousness 
to live transmission among the children, who undergo the 
mutation/transcendence for the species. The overlords see to it 
that the supernatural associations with mourning, like belief in 
ghosts, are excised from the future and left behind with the rest 
of humankind, which can now disappear. The fused-together 
generation of tele-children, however, is awarded the distinction 
in extinction of raising up/erasing the future by ultimately merg-
ing with the divinity from outer space: the Overmind. 
From the same era of science fiction as Childhood’s End, but 
belonging to the US contingent, which for Gotthard Günther 
already makes a new world of difference, Alfred Bester pub-
lished two novels, The Demolished Man (1953) and The Stars 
My Destination (1957), which treat telepathy and teleportation, 
respectively and exhaustively, as the two bookends of a future 
integration of occult capacities. 
Because The Demolished Man is basically a novel of detec-
tion, albeit set in the distant future, the characters are all lodged 
inside the mystery-genre midlife milieu. In keeping with all the 
intrigue, the setting is organized around the difference between 
two castes: the Espers endowed with tele-abilities or ESP, who 
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belong to the Esper Guild, and are in turn broken down, in 
descending order, into class 1, 2, and 3 telepaths, and the normals, 
comparable, we are advised, to deaf-mutes in the era prior to 
advances in surgery.1 
The mystery that the detective, Lincoln Powell, a top-level 
Esper, must solve is that of the criminal’s motive. In other words, 
this work of detection means bringing the complete picture of 
the wish and its fulfillment into view. Like the reader, Powell 
knows that Ben Reich murdered D’Courtney. For the duration 
of the novel, however, Powell must find the missing motive if 
he wants to make the case against Reich stick, while Reich must 
outwit the detective in order to avoid the ominous sentence of 
“Demolition.” Reich, a normal, takes advantage of the popular 
bias that the telepaths, berated as “peepers,” are a kind of illumi-
nati club and conspiracy. Dreading that the readable mind is an 
open book, Powell’s antagonist purchases a homonymous man-
tra to defend against peeping. Like an advertising jingle, it junks 
up his brain, rendering it impenetrable: “Tenser, said the Tensor. 
Tenser, said the Tensor. Tension, apprehension, and dissension 
have begun” (120). It’s a short circuit of thought transference on 
the page of language.2 
The utopian goal of the Esper Guild is to extend telepathic 
prowess throughout the population (26) and by raising literacy to 
the power of peeping surmount speech and its analogue media.3 
But utopia is another word for off-limits. In his detective work, 
Powell must observe a longer list of ethical guidelines than what’s 
1 Alfred Bester, The Demolished Man (London: Gollancz, 2004), 23. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
2 As the pages turn, Bester cathects typography, naming his characters, 
for example, ¼maine and @kins. While in the US the “at” sign was 
chosen to link and separate proper names and computing domains 
because it was hardly ever otherwise used, in the UK it was deployed 
regularly as a commercial icon on the page. Although Bester wrote the 
second novel in Europe, he composed both in ear or eyeshot of foreign 
place names and typography.
3 In teaching potential peepers to develop their residual ESP, the instruc-
tor repeats: “Words are not necessary. Think. Remember to break the 
speech reflex. Repeat the first rule after me. […] And the class chanted: 
‘Eliminate the Larynx!’” (97).
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programmed into Asimov’s robots. Powell can’t use telekinesis 
to kill, for example, but must keep it on stun.
The detective is a scion of philosophical ethics and bears wit-
ness to the injunction turning on his first name to control his 
impulse to lie (32). He must keep on separating “dishonest Abe” 
from the honest one responsible for the work of detection that 
goes by the book. In the past, we are given a hint, but everyone 
in the novel seems to know it. Powell stole the weather, a refer-
ence, in my books, to the Werther Effect of adolescence. All that 
belongs to a past wherefrom the criminal named Reich hails.
The light of a distant future burns brightest in the twilight of 
our media-technical Sensurround, once it is history and scrapped 
for junk. The phone is an oldie that is still in use by the normals 
for the “protection” if affords them “from mind readers,” since 
it doesn’t transmit the “Telepathic Pattern” (22). Analogy with 
recording devices can be used to illustrate the inaccessibility 
(ultimately to ESP) of the psyche of the daughter of the murder 
victim, who witnessed the crime, but can only relive, not remem-
ber, the terrifying moment upon hearing the “key word ‘help.’”
Conceive of a camera with a lens distorted into wild astigma-
tism so that it can only photograph the same picture over and 
over – the scene that twisted it into shock. Conceive of a bit 
of recording crystal, traumatically warped so that it can only 
reproduce the same fragment of music over and over, the one 
terrifying phrase it cannot forget. (127)
The therapies from the vintage era of mental illness are still 
available when they cut closer to wish power, which is where 
we thrive and shrive in the future. In observation of the divide 
between peepers and normals, between crime and motive, 
therapy addresses wish fantasy alone. 
We witness two brief sessions in which a psychiatrist addresses 
the pivotal wish. Upon examining a woman patient on the TP 
level, the psychiatrist summarizes: “You’re delighted with your-
self because you’re a woman. […] It’s your substitute for living. 
It’s your phantasy. […] ‘He desires me. It’s enough to know that 
thousands of men could have me if I’d let them. That makes me 
real.’ Nonsense!” (135). 
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Though these sessions are imbued with comic relief, such 
doodling caricature is a mode of familiarity and identifica-
tion, which is another way of conveying just how immersed in 
psychoanalysis this future culture is (or rather the present one 
from which it is extrapolated). The psychiatrist forgets his cli-
ent’s name and misnames him, which prompts the client to offer 
the correct name. “And that’s your whole trouble […]. Semantic 
escape […]. You live in terms of the label, not the object. It’s your 
escape from reality” (134).
Because the tele-scan of the unconscious of the victim’s 
daughter isn’t retrieving from her broken-down apparatus use-
ful, identifiable information, the psychiatrist reaches further 
back in history to induce “artificial Déjà Éprouvé,” his updating 
of a nineteenth-century therapy technique that brings about 
rebirth through wish-fulfillment: 
We make the catatonic wish to escape come true. […] We 
dissociate the mind from the lower levels, send it back to 
the womb, and let it pretend it’s being born to a new life all 
over again. […] Infancy, childhood, adolescence, and finally 
maturity. […] By the time she catches up with herself, she’ll 
be ready to accept the reality she’s trying to escape. She’ll have 
grown up to it, so to speak. (128–29)
What Reich doesn’t consciously realize is that he murdered his 
own father. Powell: “He discharged his hatred. But his Super-ego 
[…] could not permit him to go unpunished for such a horrible 
crime. […] That was the meaning of Reich’s nightmare image” 
(241). Before committing the crime, Reich was already beset by 
the nightmare image of the “Man With No Face.” It is the seal of 
Reich’s repression impressed upon the knowledge that the man 
he wants dead is the father who rejected him. He was convinced 
instead that his motive was economic gain, incorporation of the 
victim’s corporation. Reich didn’t register, or, rather, he fore-
closed, that D’Courtney had already acquiesced in the takeover. 
Powell’s strategy is to wield the castrated mirror image against 
Reich to corral his inimical strivings within the small world after 
all of his wish fantasying. 
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But first he must obtain from the Esper Guild the permission 
to enter a state of Mass Cathexis, which will raise in him a power 
comparable to what charges the Galactic Observer in A.E. van 
Vogt’s “Asylum” (and the novelizations and adaptations that fol-
lowed) to counter the threat of vampires from outer space. His 
pitch to the Guild is that Reich is “the deadly enemy” of human-
kind’s “entire future” (200). The complex of Oedipus must not 
be mythically reinstated. “Reich is about to become a Galactic 
focal point […] he will become immune to our reality, invulner-
able to our attack, and the deadly enemy of Galactic reason and 
reality” (207). 
As “human canal for the Capitalized energy” (206), Powell 
can project Reich inside a solipsistic vacuum and evacuate the 
stars, the planets, the sun, as well as the corporations that Reich 
was counting on incorporating from the reality that he shares 
with all others. Like a therapist, then, but on a cosmic scale, 
Powell builds for Reich “a common neurotic concept, the illu-
sion that he alone in the world was real” (242), which is “one 
of the run-of-the-mill escape patterns. When life gets tough you 
tend to take refuge in the idea that it’s all make-believe” (243). 
The trap is sprung by Reich’s own sense of his import after it 
looks like he’s gotten away with the murder: he avows that his 
dreams will be the world’s dreams (205).
The threat of demolition makes its deadline, which is punch-
line and happy end at once for the “German” history on the same 
page with Reich’s name. Rebirth within a year into a corrective 
identity follows demolition of the former psycho-pattern. The 
energy or industry that indwells psychopathic violence must be 
reassigned. It proves incumbent to “straighten him out and turn 
him into a plus value” (249). If (the) Reich had awakened “to the 
wrong reality” (208), he would have held a “position of power to 
rock the solar system”: “He was one of those rare World-Shakers, 
whose compulsions might have torn down our society and irre-
vocably committed us to his own psychotic pattern” (241–42).
The future post-war world does not punish Reich but inte-
grates him instead. In one year’s time, Reich will undergo psychic 
destruction, dissociation, and pain, or more explicitly, mourning 
without end: “The mind bids an eternity of farewells; it mourns 
at an endless funeral” (248). Like his traumatized younger half-
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sister, who was the witness, the psycho Reich crawls to be born/
borne by growing on Powell. In the future world of detection 
there are only midlifers, like Powell, whose favorite phrase is 
“Here’s thinking at you.” There is one exception, Reich’s half-
sister, the traumatized witness to his murder of their father, and 
the first to undergo rebirth therapy. The only libidinal outlet for 
smiles grows on Powell until they march down the aisle of cou-
pling. As in the world of James Bond upon the introduction of 
SPECTRE, the future at the end of the novel fits an adult profile 
of mourning. 
But what is the evacuation/isolation of adolescence doing 
in the postwar worlds of American science fiction? There was 
Alfred Bester and then Philip K. Dick, who did it better. Dick’s 
novels promoting the empathy test in future post-war worlds, 
in which the main coordinates on the map of recognition are 
“California” and “Germany,” address the integration of psycho-
pathic violence within a Teen Age, which the Nazis sacrificed to 
youth’s elevation to the position of superego. Dick’s post-war 
worlds doubly wrap the German flunk-you failure in a renew-
able milieu of immunization with and against the outer limits of 
psychic reality. 
The second Bester novel sets The Count of Monte Christo 
on science fiction. But there is a mystery too to solve: who was 
responsible for ignoring Gully Foyle’s SOS? He only has leads, 
which draw him onward. What’s more, how did he make it from 
the stranded spaceship to the first station he remembers? The 
organizing and determining capacity of this future world is tele-
portation. Since outer space transport, however, remains “closed 
to teleportation,”4 Folyle’s forgetting of the scene of abandon-
ment orbits an epistemological limit. 
It was to survive a sudden fire in his lab that Mr. Jaunte 
looked around for the fire extinguisher, saw that it was haplessly 
in a remote corner, and suddenly found himself standing next 
to it (3). This instance of teleportation was the first to be wit-
nessed by professional observers, his colleagues in the laboratory. 
Experiments ensued, claiming the lives of the majority of the test 
4 Alfred Bester, The Stars My Destination (London: Gollancz, 2004), 8. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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subjects, until jaunting could be secured for a safe means of move-
ment. “Transportation of oneself from one locality to another by 
the effort of the mind alone” is tied to a Ding an Sicht, the limit 
that allows nature to be overcome in second nature. “Jaunting is 
like seeing; it is a natural aptitude of almost every human organ-
ism, but it can only be developed by training and experience” (5). 
“Any man was capable of jaunting provided he developed two 
faculties, visualization and concentration” (6). He must focus on 
his point of arrival, visualize it completely, and “concentrate the 
latent energy of his mind into a single thrust to get him there” 
(ibid.). None of this sounds all that easy.
While telepathy is a specialty item in this future world,5 “tele-
communication systems were virtually extinct – when it was far 
easier to jaunte directly to a man’s office for a discussion than to 
telephone or telegraph” (35). The ultimate luxury lies therefore in 
the self-conscious use of collectible communications devices. As 
goes the genealogy of media so, too, goes history, in other words 
the recent past, in its subservience to pageantry. While reference 
to the recent past in the 1953 novel is lost in the enormity of the 
demolition/integration of an antagonist named Reich, here ref-
erence to this past indwells details illuminating gaps in the spe-
cifics of techno-history. One detail almost outflies repression by 
summoning the German science fiction going into Fritz Lang’s 
films prior to the traumatic era of realization of their high points. 
Among the leaders in business decked out for historical costume 
balls in attire that name-brands them according to their main 
commodities there are also the “daring Peenemundes (Rockets 
and Reactors), dating from the 1920s,” who “wore tuxedos, 
and their women unashamedly revealed legs, arms, and necks” 
(126). Lang already popularized the conjunction of telepathy and 
media in his 1922 film Mabuse, der Spieler (Mabuse, the Player). 
On location and at closer range, Hans Dominik, the forgotten 
leader of German science fiction in the 1920s and 1930s, lifted the 
conceit for his “technological utopian” novels.6 
5 Telepathy can suit a candidate for certain “glamorous careers,” but if 
barred because only a “telesend, a one-way telepath,” then a teaching 
career is still possible (28). There is only one full telepath on Mars (182).
6 See my Nazi Psychoanalysis, Vol. 3: Psy Fi (Minneapolis: University of 
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In the first Bester novel, a related German deposit, “Ye New 
Neu Babblesberg” (162), remained nonspecific. It belongs to 
Spaceland, a resort that’s also a cemetery that’s also a mixed-
media Globe Theater (158–65), all of which stirs associations with 
the Perry-Como cubism that’s at play in Dick’s novels. Consider 
the sports clothes that are de rigueur in Spaceland: “spray-gun-
tights” (162). But in the course of Foyle’s progress we stop over 
in stations that can count truly as styling with cyberpunk avant 
la lettre. From the masquerade processions of commodities 
already mentioned, in which Foyle, at the top of his game, pres-
ents himself as Geoffrey Fourmyle, impresario of his own Four 
Mile Circus (111), backtracking through the lightless prison with 
its “whisper line” across displaced tangents, all the way to the 
first stop of survival, a meteorite McEnhanced with the debris 
of space wrecks, we seem already on the good ship cyberpunk 
anticipating what post-machinic digital mediation holds in store. 
PyrE was the treasure encrypted in the forgotten scene of 
Foyle’s abandonment in space, which he carried forward by 
interrogating unto death all suspects or witnesses. This ultimate 
secret weapon, he is instructed, is the force of wish fantasying 
going way beyond its harnessing for jaunting. “As the original 
energy was generated in the beginning of time” (200), its untold 
force of destruction is waiting to be released for the wanting 
“through Will and Idea” (ibid.). “PyrE can only be exploded 
by psycho kinesis. Its energy can only be released by thought. It 
must be willed to explode and the thought directed at it” (ibid.). 
But we’re at loose ends with this relocation of wish fantasy to the 
intergalactic suicide drive. 
There’s a second secret now revealed upon turning around 
to face the crypt: the body memory of Foyle, who to get out of 
his scuttled ship “space-jaunted […] six hundred thousand miles 
through the void” (207). The mind trained upon the first secret, 
the way in which “the Will and the Idea” succeed in “searching 
out, touching and tripping the delicate subatomic trigger of 
PyrE” (210), is the mind of Foyle recycling back after two years 
to the ultimate secret, his innate ability to space jaunte. Pulling 
Minnesota Press, 2002) for an extensive plotting of Dominik’s oeuvre 
by the compass of its repressibility.
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himself together out of “synesthesia,” “the kaleidoscope of his 
own cross-senses,” Foyle re-realizes “the miracle of two years 
ago;” by “a magnificent act of imagination,” then, Foyle can 
stand “in the door to nowhere” (218). 
But he can’t outfly what rebounds from the Zeitmarke 
grounding the arc of willing and wishing in the present. “His 
wild beatings into the unknown sent him stumbling up geodesic 
space-time lines that inevitably brought him back to the Now 
he was trying to escape, for in the inverted saddle curve of space-
time his Now was the deepest depression in the curve” (221). He 
is counseled that he can go further in fantasy control, that he 
can learn “how to hold on,” “how to turn any Now into reality” 
(226). But by the limit concept of the Zeitmarke he holds back 
introducing a new weapon and forgoes the techno-evolutionary 
strategy for redrawing the map. 
We return to the enigmatic force of PyrE for the novel’s con-
clusion. Foyle ignores all counsel, taking inspiration instead from 
the robot bartender. “Foyle turned to the others. ‘That’s me. […] 
That’s all of us. We prattle about free will, but we’re nothing but 
response’” (228). Since not himself a robot, Foyle identifies him-
self as “a freak of the universe […], a thinking animal” (231). But 
this merits the robot’s tender affirmation: “Life is a freak. That’s 
its hope and glory” (233). Foyle’s closing act is to release PyrE and 
all information about it to the holder of its datemark, a postwar 
cosmic public that will itself be able to know and decide (ibid.).
The Wish to Be Refused
In The Writer and Psychoanalysis, Edmund Bergler reroutes 
Sigmund Freud’s argument about the adulteration and pub-
lication of omnipotent wish fantasy that yields Dichtung by 
considering only unconscious wishing and the multiple defenses 
to which it gives rise. Bergler’s polemical issue is with the “confu-
sion between wish and defense” that characterizes the analytic 
understanding of creative writing and can, in clinical practice, 
lead “into tragic therapeutic errors.”7 The alterations going into 
7 Edmund Bergler, The Writer and Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Doubleday, 1950), 37. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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the private daydream en route to Dichtung were already carried 
out by the relay of defenses rising up against the deeply unten-
able wish underlying all “neurotic” fantasying. 
The written work is another defense in the series. When you 
scratch the surface and glimpse inside the sublimation process, 
it is not a wish that is revealed but a defense against the defense 
against a conflict that remains hidden. The agon is loaded with 
“pseudo aggression” serving the “tendency to keep above the 
masochistic waters” (35). What the writer repeats “in later life 
unconsciously” is “not the direct continuation of the baby’s 
parasitic wish to get, but the masochistic reversal of this, the wish 
to be disappointed” (47). 
This is as close as Bergler gets to Freud’s fort/da staging in 
childhood of what can later become the pathogenic death wish 
in maturity. In American, if you are well received by people 
you’ve just met, you might claim they really get you. Which can 
also mean, coming ‘round the bend of a mood swing, that they 
are against you, indeed going to get you. Freud is the sore spot 
that Bergler must wash out from the double distance of getting 
close. Bergler’s training analysis was with Wilhelm Reich. The 
only serious kudo his work received since the rise and fall of his 
fame was from Gilles Deleuze.8
Writers belong to the character-type of “injustice collectors,” 
who “run unconsciously not after the wish to get, but to be 
refused” (60). They provoke the situation of refusal and denial, 
but repress their initial provocation and see only the malignancy 
of the refuser against whom they turn in righteous indignation, 
another show of pseudo-aggression. Reveling in self-pity, they 
enjoy unconsciously once more psychic masochism (61). 
There is a “specific twist,” however, that is unique to “creative 
artists,” which “consists of a negation of masochistic dependence 
by unconsciously pretending that the disappointing mother (the 
first object of attachment) never existed” (68). This defense, 
which “is fashioned after the juridical principle of ‘no body, no 
evidence’” (ibid.), makes over the creative artist as “autarchic and 
fully self-sufficient” (69). Thus, the creative writer’s masochism 
8 Gilles Deleuze and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, Masochism: Coldness 
and Cruelty and Venus in Furs (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 55.
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“results in productivity. He acts, unconsciously, both roles – that 
of the corrected giving mother and the recipient child” (ibid.). 
In this setting, the writer “does not simply give expression to 
his unconscious wishes. My belief is that he expresses, exclusively, 
secondary defenses against these wishes” (77). But each defense 
is in fact a “substitute wish” that’s “not chosen arbitrarily”: “It 
corresponds to an unconscious tendency of the specific writer, 
but is, however, at the specific time, dynamically less important. 
Therefore it can be used as a defense” (ibid.).
To avoid the overwhelming mother of babyhood, a male 
writer might regress to feminine identification (the back-end 
deal of the negative Oedipus complex) and thus dislodge the 
witch by the body switch to receive the powerful father. Guilt 
feelings and sublimation follow letting the writing flow but the 
development and adjustment are faux. The unblocked writer can 
achieve an apparent self-cure of a targeted pressing inner conflict 
in simulation of sublimation. But the psychic masochism isn’t 
represented – nor the defense against this untenable wish fan-
tasy. We witness only the defense against the defense (85). 
The writer cannot shake the “basic ‘conflict,’ undigested 
masochistic passivity connected with the giant of the nursery – 
Mother. Simplified, one can state that the writer writes to furnish 
inner alibis to his tormenting inner conscience” (81). Alibi num-
ber one follows the indictment: “You want to be masochistically 
refused (milk, love, tenderness) by the image of the pre-oedipal 
mother.” The alibi: “That’s impossible, – I want to get; Mother 
does not even exist. Hence she cannot refuse” (81). The success-
ful writer, as already noted, acts both roles – that of the giving 
mother and the receiving child all on his own person (80–81).
What exactly is the “undigested aggressive conflict” that the 
“orally regressed psychic masochist” suffers in early babyhood? 
When his omnipotence is too severely hit, he is unable to take 
the unavoidable or fantasied libidinal frustrations. The resulting 
fury can only be mishandled and miscarry. “Instead of choosing 
the normal way out – shifting and later sublimation –,” the psy-
chic masochist “derives unconscious pleasure” “by libidinizing 
punishment, moral reproach, guilt” (82). “And the only pleasure 
one can derive from displeasure is to make that displeasure a plea-
sure” (ibid.). 
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Because the superego denounces this conclusion of the infan-
tile conflict, secondary defenses follow. Bergler refers to “the 
triad of the mechanism of orality” (ibid.). Act I, as he calls it, 
is provocation of the situation of refusal, the next Act focuses 
on the malice of the other, giving rise to righteous indignation 
in self-defense against the enemy’s malice. All this qualifies for 
what Bergler terms pseudo aggression. Act III follows defeat 
with self-commiseration. In this concluding Act, the self-pity 
is conscious (in agreement with Hanns Sachs’s view of the day-
dream of self-pity), while the psychic masochistic enjoyment is 
unconscious (83). The three-act drama presents “the wish to get, 
though historically real,” as, clinically, the later development: it is 
but “a defense against the wish to be refused” (ibid.).
For Bergler, then, the bottom line that no one must cross 
leads inside the primal scene of original masochism. To draw 
the line, he intervenes in Freud’s transformative reversal (with 
which Deleuze also takes issue regarding sadism and masoch-
ism9) between voyeurism and exhibitionism. “Every writer fights 
a never-ending battle with his peeping (voyeuristic) tendencies,” 
which begin when a baby finds pleasure in the displeasure of 
being refused (90). The banned masochistic pleasure of peeping, 
so close to the prep work going into fashioning a fictional world, 
must be disowned in the court of conscience to allow productiv-
ity to flow or follow (91). 
Bergler speaks of the writer’s “imagination” as the successor 
to infantile peeping, which, according to the Freudian poetics, 
folds out of fantasying or daydreaming (ibid.). It is only when 
the writer succeeds, unconsciously, in convincing his conscience 
(= superego) that his “creative imagination” – a.k.a. omnipotent 
fantasy – no longer constitutes peeping, that his “imagination” 
works. The peeper fantasying undergoes a shift, a change, and 
crosses over into the social relation of productivity (ibid.). That 
readers then buy the work means they buy and buy into its 
unconscious content (90). The author’s guilt is thus shared and 
the burden lightened. 
9 See Gilles Deleuze, Présentation de Sacher-Masoch (Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1967), ch. 9 “Le froid et le cruel.”
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Here Bergler cites his immediate precursors in the poet-
ics of daydreaming, Otto Rank and Sachs, but challenges the 
analytic understanding of creative activity. What is submitted 
for approval is only a chain link of defenses (ibid.). Bergler cites 
Freud’s reading of Hamlet at length (97–98). The childhood wish 
fantasy represented like in a night dream on the stage of classical 
antiquity (the stage, according to Sachs, of primary narcissism) 
has undergone progress in repression (the entry upon secondary 
narcissism) and become the blocked untenable unconscious wish 
fantasy under the Elizabethan arch. Situated within Bergler’s 
reading, Freud’s reference to Timon of Athens as the bottom line 
of the author’s share in the significance of Hamlet’s epic fail, the 
signatory suicide of the tragedy, admits the Berglerian conclu-
sion that writer’s block is writing, that is, the ongoing attempt 
to circumvent it. In the forum of Shakespeare, reading between 
the lines of Freud’s diagnosis, Bergler finds a concatenation of 
defenses against the masochistic wish to be refused.
The primal solution of the infantile conflict requires that 
the writer ward off reproaches of conscience. “When the writer 
cannot convince his Super-Ego of the ‘harmlessness’ of his imagi-
nation, he has no idea at all” (93). Conscience makes blocked 
writers of us all. “Alibis are needed to disprove the charges, and 
thus a kind of inner reversible conveyor belt for the mass produc-
tion of alibis is installed” (46). The faux secret or “moral alibi” 
of scandalous self-revelation, for example, is the exhibitionism 
that can more likely be confessed than one’s immersion in the 
masochism of voyeurism (93). 
Alfred Bester published a non-science-fiction novel at the 
same time as The Demolished Man titled Who He? Although 
it earned him a good amount of money, largely through film 
options that were never realized, it was a unique effort. It might 
count, by Bergler’s terms, too close to the “oral” masochistic wish. 
Upon awakening from an alcoholic blackout, the protagonist, a 
TV variety show writer, recognizes that someone is out to destroy 
him. The pseudo-aggression is not far enough away from the 
masochistic pleasure. Bergler: “Writer’s block sets in the moment 
the inner conscience rejects the alibi and substitute alibi” and hits 
“the Hurdle of ‘Too Little Distance’ between Wish and Defense” 
(113). Bester took the money and ran with his wife to Europe to 
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write his second science-fiction novel. But then for more than 
ten years he worked as journalist and TV scriptwriter. Peeping, 
the term used for telepathy in The Demolished Man, the extra-
sensory capacity organizing its future world, gives way before the 
exclusive tele-capacity in the next future work and world, The 
Stars My Destination. Following out the arc of his own flight, 
Bester addresses teleportation or jaunting, a form of flaunting: 
exhibitionism. 
To project the future and split the present, Bester’s novels 
unleash wish fantasying, which skips inner reality for a reality 
amped up by omnipotence. Ben Reich in The Demolished Man 
and Gully Foyle in The Stars My Destination pass through the 
alternation between oblivion and omnipotence, depression and 
elation that on a tighter schedule is so close to “wishful drinking” 
(to borrow the title of the celebrity memoir by the actress forever 
tied to the role of Princess Leia). Behind the distance of science 
fiction in Bester’s work there is an inner reality that is locked up 
on a “morals charge” within a relay of defenses. It is the categori-
cal imperative to obtain pleasure from being disappointed that 
gets tendered at the bar. In his last will and testament, Bester left 
his literary estate to his then favorite bartender.  
Bergler specialized in successful treatment of writer’s block 
together with the, for him, intimately related disorders of homo-
sexuality, gambling, and alcoholism. Bergler kept pushing his 
masochism notion, especially in the sensational incarnation of 
homosexual deviation, up against the frontiers of publicity and 
fame. But he couldn’t make the contact hold, couldn’t transform 
the Now he shared with Foyle or Bester into explosive realization. 
Bergler’s kernels of truth must be pried loose from the 
broadsides of his proprietary frenzy shoring up his fame claim. 
He hitched his reputation to a specialization in treating homo-
sexuality as curable illness and reacted badly, as seen on TV, to 
any evidence of a trend toward integration of homosexuals. 
He regularly attacked the research behind the Kinsey report. 
Although the hierarchy of the unconscious masochistic wish in 
his theory disallows influences later in life, which are only occa-
sions for alibis and bouts of pseudo-aggression, Bergler at one 
point even charged that the published claim that 37% of the male 
population had engaged in same-sex activity was an ideal recruit-
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ment tool. The statistical proof could be used to tear down the 
scruples of not a few candidates for homosexuality. You can’t 
argue against 37% of the whole population.10 
The stage of recruitment is set free from the hierarchy estab-
lished in childhood and set going by those who are teenagers 
at heart. But Bergler shares with Bester the strategic evacuation 
of adolescence. The sense of the death wish is, bottom line for 
Freud, the transitive reflex of omnipotence in thought already in 
early childhood. Its suicidal reformulation, which went into the 
saying “to have a death wish,” traverses the haunted Hamletian 
stage of adolescence. The difference between childhood playing 
and adolescent fantasying is that the teenager is physically able 
to realize the death wish and its consequences (like haunting). 
Bergler discounts a separate phase that not only recharges the 
earliest death wishes but also embodies them as inoculum against 
psychopathic violence: “Puberty is comparable to the bringing of 
one’s case, lost in lower courts, before the highest authority, the 
Supreme Court. Experience and statistics show that the higher 
courts all too frequently confirm the decisions of the lower” (67). 
Sachs’s English was so good that the works that appeared 
later in the US are not translations of their earlier iterations in 
German but often completely new versions. In the 1924 mono-
graph Gemeinsame Tagträume (Mutual Daydreams), the first 
part, which is on daydreams in common, and moreover based 
on a 1920 lecture, Sachs identifies the other exceptional day-
dream, that of self-pity, as the “masochistic” daydream.11 Given 
the care Sachs took to ambiguate “masochistic” in The Creative 
Unconscious over a decade later, we must see this anticipation of a 
Berglerian formulation as being in error, like another elaboration 
that doesn’t make it into his English-language book. 
At age five, Sachs’s patient added to the other boy’s direc-
tion of the fantasy scene with the machine in the pond that he 
would emerge from the initiation not only in India but like a 
10 Edmund Bergler, Divorce Won’t Help (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1948), 66.
11 Hanns Sachs, Gemeinsame Tagträume (Leipzig: Internationaler 
Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1924), 6. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text.
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doll without genitals. Sachs fills in the five-year-old’s distaste for 
sexual difference with the castration threat the father delivered to 
curtail masturbation. However, the boy’s alleged enactment of a 
so-called “deferred obedience” (15) matches Sachs’s own fealty to 
Freud, who urged a focus on the sexual problem to counter the 
drift into occultism. On the same page, separated by a full para-
graph, in which his patient’s failed attempt face down in the local 
pond is recounted, Sachs introjects another parenthetical aside:
(I would like to point out by the way the striking resemblance 
of the myth of Osiris to this fantasy of two five-year-olds. 
Osiris is also thrown into the water, dismembered, and 
reborn without phallus. It cannot be ruled out that a piece 
of the myth became known to both little fantasts through the 
mediation of a children’s fairy tale, but in essence its immortal 
content originating in the unconscious “materialized” here 
again.) (15)
Before his patient remembered the mutual daydream of going 
to India at age five, the analysis was centered on his guilty efforts 
on behalf of a younger brother, who was trouble; he had to 
protect him and make amends for his misbehavior. In early 
childhood he had wished the new sibling dead. The body of 
Osiris, dismembered by his brother and reassembled by Isis, his 
sister-bride, lacked one body part, the penis, which Isis replaced 
with the phallus she fashioned to inseminate herself with aveng-
ing offspring. Osiris in turn became the god of the underworld 
and his myth the model for funerary practices that aimed for the 
deceased’s resurrection. 
The resurrected body of Osiris sets the scene of recognition 
of a living dead who, like angels and dolls, continues without the 
genital centering of reproduction. To repair the wish that kills – 
you become the returning dead. Sachs sees the Osiris connection 
in the childhood recollection of his suicidal patient, which he 
interprets via the patient’s history of overprotecting the younger 
brother since adolescence. Sachs belabors a dangerous game of 
climbing where the wish that the brother fall must have crossed 
his patient’s mind. But do you need a real scenario to suggest the 
wish that the brother go? Melanie Klein, the first analyst to work 
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with young children, extended the death-wish scenario of sibling 
rivalry to include the not-yet born. Every young child wants to 
be an only child. Actual siblings are bad enough, but one can 
also wish away future siblings, keep them from being born, an 
impasse that by guilty recoil animates the unborn as a variety of 
undead.12 The missing siblings are such dolls brought back by the 
other wish for their reparative resurrection.
Looking back on the various mutual daydreams he has 
recounted and analyzed, Sachs singles out the fantasy shared by 
the two five-year-olds going to India. It has gone the furthest 
toward the transformation of private narcissism into the social 
relation of art. 
It is not possible to overlook in this case that condensation, 
which we know is a typical accompanying effect of the advance 
of unconscious psychic material, thoroughly discharged its 
duties. […] Given this acute condensation together with the 
copious use of symbolism, the mutual daydream goes beyond 
the basics of the simple daydream and draws nearer to the 
night dream. (24–25)
In The Creative Unconscious, Sachs settles the arrears in his first 
account of the two mutually daydreaming boys, who as poets 
who don’t know it are out from under the analytic purview blin-
dered by the castrating father. Sachs had to realize the potency of 
the death wish alone before making lasting formulations of the 
social relation of art evolving out of mutations inside the simple 
daydream. The equation between the daydream of self-pity and 
a masochistic daydream could also no longer hold. Sachs was able 
to make these adjustments and reparations because he never lost 
sight of daydreaming as fundamentally adolescent. “The wish to 
be a poet arises for the first time as ideal and goal in adolescence, 
at a time when daydreams flourish abundantly, although in the 
great majority of cases it declines as quickly as it emerged, like the 
childhood ideals of the security guard and the train conductor” 
12 Klein elaborates this notion in “On Identification” and “The Sense of 
Loneliness,” both in Envy and Gratitude and Other Works: 1946–1963 
(New York: The Free Press, 1984). 
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(3). Through the interpretation of night dreams, the mysterious 
power that fantasy wields over psychic life could be explained 
by making connections in the depths with the repressed and the 
unconscious (3–4). But the upward arc of the question how the 
daydream becomes an artwork tends to be neglected because not 
grounded like the unconscious wish in childhood (4). 
Wish fulfillment in adolescence means there is no longer 
any delay in the recoil and repercussion of an untenable wish. 
This dynamic isn’t, at least for a longer spell, unconscious. The 
embarrassment of the riches of an inner life in adolescence is the 
basis for the wish to be a poet, which, in German culture at least, 
or at least back then, was the wish for fame. In giving form to 
the omnipotence delivered from private fantasy the poet reaches 
back into the play factory of childhood. 
Where he fails to appreciate the bottom line of the death wish 
skewering together childhood and adolescence, Bergler loses 
violence control in the close quarters of analogies that are unana-
lyzed, rolling, as we’ll see, in the fantasy fallout from the atom 
bombs dropped in history. Bergler submits that the unconscious 
wish to be refused, which is as unrelenting as Hitler’s will against 
the concentration camp inmates (15), locks us down in early 
childhood. The child “would seem confronted by a problem 
of greater proportions than the one that faced the atomic scien-
tists” working in contest with Hitler’s will: “The child, like the 
scientists, succeeds in conquering the problem and producing a 
bomb – in his case, the internal atomic bomb of psychic masoch-
ism, which means: unconscious pleasure derived from displeasure” 
(45).13 The bomb that the child builds is directed against himself. 
“In psychic masochism the individual uses himself, and not the 
enemy, as the target for his ‘atomic bomb’” (46).
Intrigue
In preparing for his interpretation of the allegory going into 
the Baroque mourning play as harbinger of a secularized world 
in which inert Christian symbols were repurposed to fit the 
13 Please note how the Zeitmarke presses through the very page 
numbered 45.
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prospect of reorientation in a new world of free will or wish 
and mortality without redress, Walter Benjamin was reading 
Freud closely, the analysis of Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of 
My Nervous Illness as well as, like so many thinkers at the time, 
notably Heidegger, the essay on the uncanny. The latter was easy 
to appropriate because here too Freud pulled up short before 
religion and philosophy, a lack the reader-author could start 
filling out, thus yanking the thought experiment into his court 
of inquiry. In Origin of the German Mourning Play, Benjamin 
relies on the archive of Christianity in making his claim that the 
original allegorist was the Devil, who demarcated and decorated 
a realm of his own through demonization of the leftovers of 
antiquity. Allegory first aimed at revising the evidence of clas-
sical antiquity. The naked pagan body was transferred to the 
account of the creature, with the Devil at the front of the line. 
“The […] most important impulses in the origin of western 
allegory are non-antique, anti-antique: the gods project into the 
alien world, they become evil, and they become creatures. […] 
This is the basis […] for the survival of fabulous creatures like the 
faun, centaur, siren and harpy as allegorical figures in the circle 
of Christian hell.”14 In the field of Christian representation, the 
pagan gods lingered on, then, in an infernal setting or, in effect, 
within a fantasy habitat. 
In illuminating J.R.R. Tolkien’s Shire we already had occa-
sion, in the first volume of Critique of Fantasy, to distinguish 
Christianization from secularization, the former going into 
fantasy, the latter into modern allegory and science fiction. 
Christianization is an ongoing process that at the same time 
tolerates traffic with a fairy-tale world that is of heathen prov-
enance. Beginning in the Renaissance and passing through the 
Enlightenment all the way to the new world, secularization, by 
contrast, showcases continuities with Greek and Roman antiq-
uity, which must first, however, be cleansed of the demonization. 
This secular setting is therefore not at home in Tolkien’s Shire, 
14 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John 
Osborne (London: Verso, 2009), 225–26. Subsequent page references 
are given in the text. I have brought the title closer to Trauerspiel.
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which partakes instead of a continuous northern European 
medievalist tradition.
At the close of Origin of the German Mourning Play, 
Benjamin gives the surprise twist-off that there is a half-life to the 
modern allegorical mode of reading, which lies in allegory’s ori-
gin. Through the Devil, original allegory’s poster boy, Benjamin 
projects a turn or return, which by restoring the Christian 
context would extinguish in the light of redemption the finite 
recording surface of remembrance. Transitoriness, which is not 
so much signified as displayed in modern allegory, thus swings 
around into the allegory of resurrection (232). “Allegory, of 
course, thereby loses everything that was most peculiar to it; the 
secret, privileged knowledge, the arbitrary rule in the realm of 
dead objects, the supposed infinity of a world without hope. All 
this vanishes with this one about-turn” (ibid.). 
Benjamin allows that in a secular setting the abyssal con-
templation of evil can trigger the return. I followed this out in 
The Psycho Records. In a split-off corner of mass psychology, 
the Psycho Effect coursing for decades through countless slasher 
films denied and defied the ongoing failure in the interpretation 
of psychopathic violence. Upon conclusion of the termination 
phase of the cathartic film therapy, we witnessed the horror 
screen of B-pictures turn to the conceit of a compact with the 
Devil. 
The jumpstarting of psycho horror at the end of the 1990s 
through the import of infernal instruction in the Saw franchise 
adumbrated the contemplation of evil not as a turn away from 
the secular figuration of violence on the screen of psycho horror 
but as another station in the mourning process awaiting integra-
tion. This B-picture vantage is syntonic with Benjamin’s own 
emendation of his sense of a Christian ending of modern allegory 
in the closing evocation of the German Trauerspiel as a ruin that 
tells all you need to know about the complete edifice. 
“The inadequacy of the German Trauerspiel is rooted in 
the deficient development of the intrigue,” at which Calderón 
excelled on the Baroque stage. The Spanish dramatist’s deploy-
ment of intrigue circumscribes the German Trauerspiel’s status 
as incomplete substitute or ruin that supplies the allegorical cap-
tion to a complete result. 
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The intrigue alone would have been able to bring about that 
allegorical totality of scenic organization, thanks to which 
one of the images of the sequence stands out, in the image 
of the apotheosis, as different in kind, and gives mourning at 
one and the same time the cue for its entry and its exit. The 
powerful design of this form should be thought through to its 
conclusion; only under this condition is it possible to discuss 
the idea of the German Trauerspiel. (235) 
The German exponent extrapolates from the setting of its failure 
the prospect of successful mourning looping through simultane-
ity to vouchsafe the intricate innovations of survival.
That success and succession in mourning are a wreck wait-
ing to happen reflects the vantage of the undead prolonging 
the opening season of mourning following the first death. The 
second death stands outside this advantage, different in kind 
and kindred. The zombie epidemic, a crude form but just the 
same another forum for intrigue, staves off redemption by taking 
mourning through the second death. The interlude of undeath 
opens the caption of legibility, which the zombie frenzy enacts.
The German Trauerspiel through which Benjamin stages 
the allegorical reading of ruins is, then, another ruin speaking 
more plainly of the idea of the plan than do buildings that are 
well preserved. From its vanishing point of redemption in the 
Devil’s train, the Trauerspiel looks the other way upon the plan 
of intrigue, which it outlines in reverse.
Does the intrigue that rescues allegory partake of the “encap-
sulation” Benjamin attributed to Schreber’s delusional system?15 
Yes. It corresponds to Freud’s identification of endopsychic per-
ception in the delusional system basic to Schreber’s recovery in a 
relational world of his own making.16 Schreber fictionalized the 
15 Walter Benjamin, “Bücher von Geisteskranken: Aus meiner 
Sammlung,” in Gesammelte Schriften, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and 
Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1972–1989), 4:616.
16 Sigmund Freud, “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
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new world in place of the one he lost to repression via intergalac-
tic intrigue and science fiction. For all the theocratic trappings 
of the delusion, the intrigue saves a secular endopsychic allegory 
from the precipitating soul murder, which Schreber associated 
with the Devil.
Andrzej Żuławski’s 1981 film Possession follows the rise and 
fall of allegory in infernal precincts, but then, via the intrigue of 
Cold-War secret agency, pulls up short before allegory’s damna-
tion to redemption. Mark returns from a secret mission to his 
wife Anna and young son Bob in West Berlin. But the marriage 
doesn’t live there anymore. Anna (Isabelle Adjani) is a classic 
collectible hysteric; but the curtains closed long time ago on the 
theater of hysteria and she might be more readily identified on 
the streets as psychotic. At the same time, she exhibits symptoms 
of infernal possession. 
Anna announces that she has two sisters, Chance and Faith. 
In an underground passage, she undergoes a hysterical-psychotic 
paroxysm that she calls a miscarriage but to which she awards 
the emblem: the death of Sister Faith. Anna must care for and 
carry her forward – unto extinction and preservation. Thus, she 
supplies the allegorical caption to the creaturely relationship that 
will forsake all others.
We know that in the recent past there were intermediary 
stages to the marital crisis, like Anna’s affair with Heinrich, a 
yogic sex mystic who is the prosthesis of his mother. But if her 
dissatisfaction with her marriage leads Anna into the environs of 
a maternal relationship, then she is only spinning circles inside 
the Oedipal foundation of the sacrament. In the meantime, how-
ever, she has moved on and entered a relationship with her own 
creaturely ectoplasm. Heinrich ends up the third victim of the 
tentacled gastrointestinal gargoyle that Anna keeps and protects 
in an apartment right up against the Berlin wall. 
Heinrich’s mother tells Mark that she is looking for Heinrich, 
not for his body, which she already identified at the morgue, but 
Freud, Vol. XII (1911–1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique 
and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1958), 79. 
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for his soul. Her suicide upholds the nihilistically transvalued 
sacrament of the Liebestod.
At the start of the film, Mark announced that he was leaving 
the secret service. But by the end we know it didn’t let go. The 
intrigue that is greater than the two of them catches up with him 
and Anna. In the shootout that’s escalating by the metonymy 
between espionage and world affairs unto the end of the world, 
they die together, a union that sure looks like the Liebestod. Just 
before the denouement, however, Anna introduced Mark and us 
to her fully transformed creature. It is Mark’s Doppelgänger, who 
survives (together with Bob’s teacher, a double of Anna, though 
she doesn’t know it). In the final scene, Bob is in the teacher’s 
care. The last stand of reproduction and death begs her not 
to answer the door when the Doppelgänger comes a knocking. 
When she ignores his childish fears, the future that reproduction 
secured assumes in the bathtub the dead-boy-floating position. 
The mother’s double catches a green gleam in her eyes and opens 
the household and economy of the holy family to doubling. 
Beginning in German Romanticism, doubling was the 
uncanny harbinger of death because the wish for replication 
(on the human side) could not be fulfilled. Instead, the close 
of Possession is modern science fiction, which skips the negative 
theology of the Liebestod and lets the doubling go through. The 
double was a limit concept in the regional civilizations that hailed 
from the east and made it as far west as Faustian Europe. But 
when it crossed over from Gothic letters to film and psychoanaly-
sis (and became what it was, science fiction) the double inherited 
the artificial redistribution of processes of reflection across man 
and machine. Human-I and human-you can be pushed together 
on one side, while the man-made mechanism takes up the other 
side as the new Doppelgänger. Doubling is bigger than the two of 
us, not only because the double is the unacknowledged in one-
self but also because, released from mourning and unmourning 
duties, it heralds a multiplicity like all the iterations of the same 
moment in the science fiction of time travel, each one qualifying 
as unique and binding as the first moment.
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Creaturely Innocence
John Bock told me that he had not in fact seen Żuławski’s film at 
the time he made Kreatürliche Unschuld (Creaturely Innocence, 
2012/2015) and was instead thinking of Pier Paolo Pasolini’s 
Teorema (1968). The role of the Visitor goes to the maid, 
Rebecca, the third person rocking the couple in Bock’s film. Early 
on, the husband enters the maid’s room and stereotypes her as 
the other woman. During their prolonged embrace the camera 
circles repeatedly above them and exhausts a recognizable conceit 
of cinema. 
Rebecca finds her calling not as the husband’s other woman 
or mother but in concert with a creaturely, parasitic mutation 
organ. Like Odradek, the care or concern of the father of the 
house in Franz Kafka’s story, the organ creature is introduced 
into the household by its head, a surgeon. He unpacks and 
manipulates the “summary mutation organ” or “nanogenic 
mutation” to make it regular, keep the blood circulating, and get 
it ready to bite.17 Like a demonic curse it cannot be undone but 
only passed on. 
Rebecca adopts and adapts the creature until it fills out her 
room and she has her fill of it: “it crawls inside you and fills 
you fully” (1125). In time she seduces the wife, who follows her. 
Rebecca instructs her that “the overturning of the great mother 
ground” must follow (1128): “My flesh is a fallow field. It must be 
prepared ripe-fruitful for the planting” (1127). Rebecca animates 
the organ creature and presses its missing link inside her. The cli-
max of infernal film images that the depressed link releases stops 
short of redemption or damnation. The surgeon dumps what’s 
left, her inert body, into a box (one of the props of Rebecca’s 
big scene). He is reassured that with her removal the household 
has been restored. But when he restarts their interrupted status 
quo, his wife is elsewhere: “I am in the body […] in nothingness” 
(1130). 
17 John Bock, Meechfieber: Gesammelte Texte 1992–2013 (Cologne: Walter 
König, 2013), 1122–23. Subsequent page references to the screenplay are 
to this collection and are given in the text.
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Creaturely Innocence is scatter-shot throughout with precise 
and exaggerated references, associations, and ideas, which the 
artist brings together and juxtaposes through heightened cin-
ematography, special effects, and improvisation. The film illu-
minates a writerly screenplay composed in a language that Bock 
devised like the patois in Clockwork Orange, mixing, however, 
Northern German dialects raised in the course of the nineteenth 
century to the power of literature by the likes of Theodor Storm 
and Theodor Fontane. Into the mix he adds the stock of mad 
science. Between the midlifer mastermind and the teen maid, 
the antisocial sensibility reflected in horror B-pictures rebounds 
but buffered through an accessibility befitting the play area of 
childhood.
In Creaturely Innocence, the relationship to a creature beck-
oning from the dark side of adolescence (and its midlife reprisal) 
enters the open display of child’s play. Bock stitches playfulness 
into the borders of scenes of transgression, horror, and ecstasy. In 
the domestic space, Rebecca sews grapes upon the stockings of 
her lady. In the “crucifixion” scene the wife in turn inserts playful 
variations on bodily violation. She attaches edibles to Rebecca’s 
Passion and accompanies the height of the performance on a 
diminutive scale with hand puppets. Another way to identify 
the vantage point for mixing what Freud kept separate in “The 
Poet and Daydreaming” is that the momentum of fantasy gath-
ering in the digital relation overshoots the opposition that sets 
adolescence apart as the living proof of Fallen Man. “All the 
names in history” is no longer the cry before the psychotic break 
as end of the world but describes the digital archive’s best offer. 
Every entry is a returning return divested of the former setting 
on opposition.
Creaturely Innocence was filmed in the Hindelooper Room, 
a period-room exhibit in the Fries Museum in Leeuwarden, 
Netherlands – in alternation with one other film set identified 
as the maid’s chamber but in effect the special-effects stage for a 
cite-specific phantasmagoria of film references. When the head 
of the household in full period costume pulls out a typewriter 
from his antique desk the scene is not entirely site-nonspecific. 
The Hindelooper Room was a late-nineteenth-century recon-
struction of what was considered a typical local interior dating 
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back to the seventeenth century and continuing on as typical for 
another century or so. It was originally one of many display cases 
comprising a vaster historical exhibition that in 1877 aspired to 
the new format of the world’s fair. 
The Hindelooper Room was delivered from the condemned 
site of the exhaustive exhibition and became transportable like 
a commodity or, as the Fries Museum’s website puts it, like 
promotional material. It is today the portal to an eclectic docu-
mentation of the history of Friesland. The room in the original 
exhibition was a huge success and reopened in the first Fries 
Museum in 1881.
Two years earlier, this room – almost identical in every way 
– had been exhibited in Paris, where it was so well received 
that other cities and even collectors too wanted a similar 
room: Hindeloopen (1881), Amsterdam (1883), Düsseldorf 
(1885), Dordrecht (1896), Berlin (1898), Nuremberg (1902) 
and Arnhem (1919).
The Hindelooper Room in the Fries Museum is, in effect, 
the mother of all Hindelooper rooms, even those that can 
be seen in Hindeloopen! The room that was installed tem-
porarily in Hindeloopen in 1881 is the same as the one in 
Berlin in 1898. The room that has been installed in Museum 
Hindeloopen since 1964 is the same room that was made for 
Düsseldorf in 1885.18
Simultaneity, Benjamin advised in Origin of the German 
Mourning Play, is the secularization of time, making it present 
in space.19 And if we no longer transport a period made to fit a 
room then let’s make a science fiction of it. 
That we can feel at home in Bock’s Hinde-loop we owe to 
the prep work of the clairvoyant subjects of Mesmerism car-
ried forward by the hysterical patients in the opening season 
of psychoanalysis. In the Hinde-loop, we take a turn through 
the magnetic treatment of Auguste Müller in Karlsruhe, which 
18 “The Hindelooper Room,” Fries Museum, https://www.fries-
museum.nl/en/collection/icons/the-hindelooper-room/.
19 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 370.
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the first volume of Critique of Fantasy visited in the setting of 
Schopenhauer’s investigation of waking fantasy states from the 
protocols of Mesmerism. It’s not just that the sessions with 
Müller could be imagined taking place in this period room. 
When the treatment discloses her own clairvoyant talent, Müller 
finds a steadying setting upheld by the intrigue of differences 
between those who believe (and obey) her and those who doubt 
her role as medium.
The solitude and emptiness that can befall us while we await 
transport into outer space must be met by the related challenge 
of making inner space habitable. Borrowed from Futureworld 
(1976) and Supergirl (1984), the term “inner space” addresses 
the issue of consolidation or stability pressing at the outer lim-
its of psychic reality. Staying a steady course between delusion 
and therapeutic containment describes a certain artistic practice 
within the modern history of performance.
On the list of contemporary artistic practices that Yayoi 
Kusama began checking off in 1957, there were performances 
and happenings, notably “Walking Piece” and “Grand Orgy to 
Awaken the Dead” (in 1966 and 1969 respectively). She followed 
the bouncing polka dot from her hallucinations already in child-
hood to her signature style.20 The dotting of the I is the extinc-
tion of distinction before the prospect of the cosmos. In science 
fiction, we are regularly given to understand that the outer 
space to be colonized for the survival of the species is psychosis, 
which must be delivered from its status as outer-limit concept 
or condemned site and opened up for frontier or “borderline” 
settlement. 
To become part of the environment, as Kusama underscored, 
one’s own body had first to be obliterated/liberated by polka 
dots. And yet the orgy of polka dots keeps a wake for the dead. 
Kusama returned to Japan following the death of her partner 
Joseph Cornell and, following her father’s death, consolidated 
her long history of intermittent treatment by taking up perma-
20 See Grady Turner’s 1999 interview with Kusama in Theories and 
Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artists’ Writings, 
eds. Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz, 2nd. edn. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2012), 111–13.
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nent residence in Seiwa Hospital for the Mentally Ill. The hos-
pital environment provided the best conditions for her to work. 
That it was a transportable setting that allowed her on occasion 
to travel puts through the performance connection with the 
therapeutic immersion in or micromanagement of a new world. 
Brian Wilson, the lead Beach Boy, hated the beach and was 
afraid of the ocean.21 He broke down in an airplane during a tight 
tour schedule. As client of Eugene Landy’s 24-hour milieu ther-
apy, which he entered following his father’s death in 1973, Wilson 
was later able to travel through his abyssal fear of flying (en route 
to another containment of his stage fright) in a section of the 
plane set aside for his treatment apparatus and its administra-
tors. The abuse charge Landy landed for his boundary blending 
with Wilson misses the point (at which point the family system 
reasserted control but without, thanks to Landy’s treatment, 
incapacitating the identified patient). 
The normal-to-neurotic Everyman in psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy is an afterthought, a byproduct of the stabiliza-
tion of the psychotic borderline at the outset of modern therapy. 
D.W. Winnicott overturned the centrality of the construct and 
returned to the original momentum of treatment. But he was 
also overlooking (in both senses) Freud’s introduction of the 
second system upon contact with the shell shock epidemic of 
World War One. Freud declared that shell shock opened up a 
new frontier forging ahead within the former off-limits concept 
of psychosis. The battlefield of the theory and therapy of shell 
shock also reopened the concession stand of eclecticism within 
psychoanalysis.
To illustrate the repetition compulsion in the serial dreaming 
of shell-shocked soldiers, Freud cited the case of a woman who 
was over and again the merry widow of each new husband.22 By 
21 To prepare for my stint as talking head in Christopher Dreher’s 
documentary Pop Odyssee – Die Beach Boys und der Satan (1997), 
I did a great deal of research on the Beach Boys, on which I base this 
account. 
22 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” In The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 
XVIII (1920–1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology, 
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its own serial momentum, the repetition compulsion, which 
rises up with the obliteration of the anxiety defense, grows into 
the outside world a protuberance of its own disordering, a new 
foundation for intrigue or preparedness. Winnicott’s famous line 
that the fear of going insane was just another way of admitting 
that a breakdown had already occurred was his roundabout way 
of addressing the way mental illness can go out of itself, casting 
out borderlines that net a structure on the inside out.23 
Wish Capital
In The Devil Notebooks, I offered close commentary on Vilém 
Flusser’s reading of our infernal relation in terms of a metabolic 
cycle for which the mortal sins serve as stations, and which I 
applied to the momentum of hesitation guiding Freud’s specula-
tions on the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. An 
error in Rodrigo Maltez Novaes’s translation of Flusser’s study, 
History of the Devil, enters into this performance and inscribes 
the death-wish increments of Freud’s larger hesitation. A brain-
twister in English, the fragile hierarchy of “substitution” depends 
entirely on either “for” or “by” – a distinction as muddled and 
bypassed in the meantime as the split-infinitive rule. When we 
read that “magic formulas are being substituted for more math-
ematical formulas” in the context of an argument about the 
“progressive scientification of the world” we must hesitate over 
an undertow of reversal of the intended meaning.24 Successful 
mourning would shore up the limping distinction and make the 
decision for living on via the upgrade of substitution. But the 
shaky foundation for this decision-making reflects the greater 
likelihood of what we might term unmourning, the ultimate 
and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1964), 22.
23 D.W. Winnicott, “Fear of Breakdown,” International Review of Psycho-
analysis 1 (1974): 103–7.
24 Vilém Flusser, The History of the Devil, ed. Siegfried Zielinski, trans. 
Rodrigo Maltez Novaes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2014), 103. Novaes translated the second version of the study, which 
Flusser wrote or rewrote in Portuguese.
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inhibition that must be abandoned by those who sign up with 
the Devil and his Christian frame of reference.
The 2010 staging at the Berlin State Opera of Igor Stravinsky’s 
The Rake’s Progress (1951) under the direction of Krzysztof 
Warlikowski was another wrap of Flusser’s reading of the Devil. 
Inspired by William Hogarth’s cycle of paintings, Stravinsky 
commissioned W.H. Auden to write the libretto for the opera 
he had in mind (Auden brought along Chester Kallman as his 
collaborator). It is immediately quite an intervention to add 
the Devil to Hogarth’s resolutely secular tableaux, which rep-
resented, like storyboards before their time, complete scenes in 
the narrative of a spendthrift’s decline unto madness. Shadowed 
all the while by his abandoned but steadfast true love, he is 
installed at Bedlam and doesn’t go to Hell. At the end of the 
Auden/Stravinsky version, the Devil, Nick Shadow, can’t con-
vince protagonist Tom Rakewell to kill himself. So, he makes 
a bet, which is how Goethe’s Mephistopheles bound his Faust 
to the terms of a compact. Tom is able to guess the cards Nick 
draws and the Devil withdraws directly to Hell without collect-
ing a soul. When the departing sponsor of Tom’s rise and fall just 
the same places the curse of madness upon him, the delusional 
system that results – in which Tom is Adonis and his abandoned 
beloved Anne Trulove his Venus – preserves the love relation he 
denied but which, like the Eternal Feminine in Faust II, saves 
him. 
When the job that his prospective father-in-law, Mr. Trulove, 
offers him isn’t good enough, since he aims to be rich not busy 
(and honest), Tom wishes for money, and Nick Shadow arrives to 
fulfill this wish. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud stages an 
allegory of the wish in fantasying, which then returns in the case 
study of Dora (Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria) 
as follows: 
A daytime thought may very well play the part of entrepre-
neur for a dream; but the entrepreneur, who, as people say, 
has the idea and the initiative to carry it out, can do nothing 
without capital; he needs a capitalist who can afford the out-
lay, and the capitalist who provides the psychical outlay for 
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the dream is invariably and indisputably, whatever may be the 
thoughts of the previous day, a wish from the unconscious.25 
What underlies the wish for free money is masked by the free-
floating fulfillment that Nick offers; Tom has inherited a fortune 
from an unknown uncle. The money he comes into, inherited 
from an unidentified dying object, implies and denies a relation-
ship to the dead and Dad. Freud speculates that an infantile 
relationship to the father inscribed in the unconscious through 
prohibition and repression of masturbation backs the fantasying 
that determines Dora’s symptomatic relations. 
This fragment of a case is famous for the import it first won 
for the transference in Freud’s assessment of what went wrong 
and right in the sessions with Dora. What went wrong with Herr 
K. went wrong with Dora’s father and so on. Freud came to an 
appreciation of the transference in his effort to render intelligible 
the benefits the analysis did bestow on the patient after all and 
despite the botched termination. The transference that was left 
implicit and anticipated in the sessions with Freud caught up 
with the plotting of her symptoms, putting it all to rest. That it 
was a wrap became clear when she visited the K. couple to offer 
her condolences on the not unanticipated death of one of their 
children. It was as though nothing had happened and Herr and 
Frau K. spoke plain text. It was really over. 
A transference interpretation that happens in session, Freud 
decided, was more cost-effective than the construction of such 
an auto-analytical roundabout. It was easier said and done that 
their relationship in the setting of the sessions was the current 
funding opportunity for the unconscious capitalist otherwise 
backing her double-dealing relations with Herr K. and with her 
father in prehistory. The only parent on the stage of The Rake’s 
Progress is Mr. Trulove. His daughter Anne seems, like Dora, to 
25 Sigmund Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,” 
in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol. VII (1901–1905): A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays 
on Sexuality and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with 
Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953), 87. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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be just one step ahead of old incest fantasies, which the father’s 
proximity, at least in Warlikowki’s staging, brings home. When 
toward the end of the Berlin production she arrives on stage with 
a baby, an accessory imported from the Hogarth paintings, one 
must wonder if Tom or her father sired the offspring. Her loyalty 
to Tom would be, then, her adaptation to reality – a prospect as 
pressing and remote as Dora’s attachment to Herr K. 
Tom’s laziness, which is how Mr. Trulove faults the unwill-
ingness to look for a job, gives rise to the wish for narcissistic 
supplies. The infernal impresario of wish fulfillment who arrives 
to initiate Tom into Lust wears an Andy Warhol wig through-
out Warlikowski’s interpretation of the opera. The alignment 
is made evident when Nick, seated at the table in front of the 
screening of the film in which Andy demonstrates how he eats 
a hamburger, follows suit. Flusser sets up Lust and Sloth as the 
framing supports of our relationship to the world through or 
according to the Devil. All the sins between could be seen as 
aspects of Lust, to which sin Flusser dedicates the longest chapter 
by far. His exegesis of Lust ranges widely but subtly, and extends 
to the attachment to the mother tongue and the paroxysms of 
nationalism. 
The Warhol identification applies a touch of perversion 
to Tom’s initiation. Flusser, like Freud, emphasizes that the 
human sex drive is constitutively non-reproductive, technically 
perverse, still in thrall to the replicational sex of cells. In The 
Rake’s Progress, the first stopover in Tom’s full entry into Lust is 
a house of prostitution named (in keeping with the ancestry of 
the fantasy genre) Mother Goose. To obviate the introspection 
of dissipation, Nick proposes Tom’s marriage to Baba the Turk, 
a Medusoid sideshow attraction that everyone loves to dread. In 
Flusser’s metabolic cycle, Lust, doubled by infantile Wrath and 
Gluttony, is conjugated with power via the more Oedipal sins 
of Greed, Envy, and, ultimately, Pride. Nick reroutes the sense 
or direction of matrimony by brokering this alliance, which is 
Tom’s short cut to prestige. As the bearded lady’s consort, Tom 
would proudly stand above the two defining limits of Everyman, 
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mere desire for the sexy and adaptive mores (in other words: ado-
lescence and its midlife criticism).26
Sloth (or “sorrow of the heart”) is Tom’s intermittent con-
dition, which he escapes through wish fantasy. What the Devil 
must circumvent, according to Flusser, is contrition. To this end 
the Devil bestows on Tom a machine that purportedly turns 
stones into loaves of bread. By turning the backlot of mankind 
into a utopia, Tom hopes to make reparation. The singular 
machine, multiplied down the assembly line into gadgets for 
sale, will ensure free bread for all. But since the machine is but 
a magician’s trick everyone who invests, backers and consumers 
alike, is soon out of money. In the Berlin production, it is the 
fantasy genre that folds out of the Devil’s technology. At the auc-
tion following the bankruptcy of Tom’s breadwinning scheme, 
Minnie Mouse, Darth Vader, and two superheroes are among 
the properties for sale. 
The footnotes to Dora’s second dream are addenda that came 
up in the course of free association in session. The second adden-
dum in the footnote underworld concerns the out-of-placement 
of a question mark. In Dora’s telling of her dream what follows 
the news imparted by her mother in a letter, “Now he is dead,” 
is the fragment-phrase, “and if you like you can come.” A ques-
tion mark cut short the phrase and gave emphasis to “like” (95). 
Every increment in the lexicon of what the English and French 
reception of psychoanalysis might call “desire,” is marked in 
the original language by willing and wishing: “Und wenn Du 
willst?” She recalls the question mark upon recognizing that her 
mother’s dream sentence cites a note she received from Frau K.: 
“If you would like to come?” This was the note she followed to 
the lakeside setting where the breakdown of her relations with 
the K. couple led to her sessions with Freud. As Freud notes, 
the analysis was subsequently broken off in connection with the 
content of this dream (95), which, aggravated by his own inatten-
tion to the transference, triggered his patient’s acting out. 
The death wish can be devastating prep work for the other’s 
death. His analysis of Dora’s second dream leads Freud to recog-
26 We recall that Hannah Arendt, the author of “the banality of evil,” 
turned down Auden’s marriage proposal.
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nize in the somatic symptoms he earlier dismissed as history his 
patient’s susceptibility to melancholic identification. The death 
of Dora’s aunt triggered a series of identifications (notably with 
two cousins), which by the light of her second dream revealed 
the foundation of her subsequent hysterical symptom picture. 
In Dora’s second dream, her father is gone, though not yet in 
her waking lifetime. The dream goner goes back to her earliest 
wish that he should get lost, out of the way of her infantile sex. 
A multi-layered topography of wishing opens up around the 
dream news of the father’s death. A dream, as Freud advises, 
circumvents repression to give a measure of representation to 
wishes that, in Dora’s case, the dreamer in her waking state must 
actively unfulfill. Freud admits that Dora walked out on the 
analysis because he had not recognized that he was transferen-
tially synonymous with Herr K. and therefore bound to receive 
the rebound of her revenge against them both (117–18). Freud 
wagered that the negative transferential aspect that Herr K. trig-
gered, also in Dora’s relationship to him and to the analysis, most 
likely turned on money (119).
Nick Shadow’s granting of Tom’s wish for free money in the 
form of inheritance from the unidentified dead steps closer to 
what is at the same time manically denied. It is the other’s death 
that splits into shares the omnipotence of wishing (or the equa-
tion Flusser draws between the will and Pride). Because the 
other goes first, a departure we inevitably wished upon, there is 
a ghostly remainder or return, the goner’s share in the omnipo-
tence that the death wish flexed, on which we speculate. 
In the final analysis, Flusser gives a powerful reading of the 
very span of hesitation Freud applied to his formulation of 
the death drive. Freud is surely able, as he writes in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, to throw himself “into a line of thought and 
to follow it wherever it leads out of simple scientific curiosity, 
or, if the reader prefers, as an advocatus diaboli, who is not on 
that account himself sold to the devil.”27 When Freud earlier for-
mulated the hypothesis that the goal of life is death he still had 
to account for the instincts of self-preservation. In this specula-
tive setting, however, they can be seen as issuing the guarantee 
27 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” 59.
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that the organism will follow its own path to its proper death 
and not die in a random way. This is the Devil’s best offer: an 
uninterrupted span of quality time that concludes on schedule 
at the certain deadline. But Freud interrupts himself (“let us 
pause for a moment and reflect”) and counters that the sexual 
instincts reintroduce “potential immortality” after all (39–40). 
In performing a deferral at close quarters of the deadline, Freud’s 
hesitation leaves room for mourning and melancholia. Flusser 
follows Freud in disbanding a fantasy scenario but in lieu of 
mourning constructs a loop. In 1987, as we saw, Flusser publishes 
an alternate history that resituates the ends of fantasy within a 
dystopic science fiction.
Playing Bank
Like the impostor who inspires love and admiration for the sake 
of narcissistic face saving and then provokes his own downfall 
often in a criminal manner,28 the gambler, as Bergler argues at 
length in The Psychology of Gambling, reduces the giving mother 
to absurdity, pulling up short before this defense against his 
unconscious pleasure in her refusal. In gambling, losing is already 
the moral alibi. Gambling is an accepted way to lose, which also 
holds the player back from the scene of his being refused, of 
being a loser, which spurs him on libidinally.29
Gambling, like fetishism according to Freud, is never brought 
to analysis as a presenting problem but always only slips out 
from behind the client’s alcoholism or sexual problems, includ-
ing homosexuality. In libidinal company, the psychic masochism 
underlying gambling flexes sexual feeling, which is not of the 
genital type. Instead what is sought is “a feeling of being pas-
sively overwhelmed.” That’s why we watch “mystery thrillers.” 
28 Edmund Bergler, “Psychopathology of Impostors,” in Selected Papers 
of Edmund Bergler, ed. Marianne Bergler (New York: Grune & 
Stratton, 1969), 725–41.
29 Edmund Bergler, The Psychology of Gambling (New York: 
International Universities Press, 1957), 27–28. Subsequent page refer-
ences are given in the text.
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We identify with “the victims, and thereby enjoy the thrill of 
being overwhelmed” (29). 
The argument of one of Bergler’s patients was that “com-
pared to kleptomania, gambling is a socially acceptable way of 
getting money” (102–3). Another patient who presented with 
homosexuality and alcoholism, was taking masochistic revenge 
on his mother (106). Drinking proves that you can fill up with 
as much fluid as you want. His homosexuality proved that you 
don’t need the breast for the fulfillment that he was refused and 
now chug a lugs. He fills the mother with poison before he takes 
his fill from his improvement upon her. His homosexuality “sup-
posedly began as an episode” (109). Seduced or rather recruited 
at age fourteen by an acquaintance of his parents, he got used to 
it, getting more and more enjoyment out of it (105). But blaming 
“his perversion on the seduction” was a defense (110). He also 
claimed that his gambling began as a solitary occurrence, a first, 
chance instance – a seduction (112). The pseudo-aggression of his 
gambling added syntax to the semantics of being at a loss that the 
presenting problems accounted for. Through gambling he was 
defending against his masochistic attachment to the fantasy of a 
bad, depriving, and refusing mother (107).
When Bergler considers the type of gambler motivated 
by unconscious guilt, he gets in touch with Freud’s reading of 
gambling in the case of Fyodor Dostoevsky. But the precursor 
gets lost within the elaboration of the cover-up of the underlying 
problem: “In this type, inner guilt originating in psychic masoch-
ism is shifted to later masturbatory fantasies that have an Oedipal 
content. Here again Oedipal fantasies are used to conceal a guilt 
that is more deeply repressed” (96).
Freud passed along the enigmatic stumbling block of the 
unconscious sense of guilt, which Melanie Klein elaborated in 
terms of envy, and Bergler identifies as “always related to psychic 
masochism and the omnipotence wish” (ibid.). Encountered in 
session as resistance, Freud argued, the analyst interprets it in the 
usual way, but then “even after allowance has been made for an 
attitude of defiance towards the physician and for fixation to the 
various forms of gain from illness, the greater part of it is still left 
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over; and this reveals itself as the most powerful of all obstacles 
to recovery.”30 
In a long footnote Freud details a variation on this uncon-
scious sense, one that is in theory available for treatment. The 
“borrowed” unconscious sense of guilt belongs to the environs 
of melancholia. “A sense of guilt that has been adopted in this 
way is often the sole remaining trace of the abandoned love-
relation and not at all easy to recognize as such.”31
It depends principally on the intensity of the sense of guilt; 
there is often no counteracting force of a similar order of 
strength which the treatment can oppose to it. Perhaps it may 
depend, too, on whether the personality of the analyst allows 
of the patient’s putting him in the place of the ego ideal, and 
this involves a temptation for the analyst to play the part of 
prophet, saviour and redeemer to the patient.32
In Bergler’s world, there are normal children who can cope 
with early megalomania and let it go when running up against 
its limits. What’s out of the world is a childhood wish that gets 
tested and becomes pathogenic beginning in adolescence. In the 
normal-enough world where Winnicott installed the transitional 
object, the adolescent can act out asocially the consequences of a 
flaw in the earlier installation. Certainly for Sachs in The Creative 
Unconscious the crisis point in the feeling of uncanniness is 
reached in the adolescent setting of sculptures of ephebes and 
rotoscoped princes and princesses. 
According to Bergler, the neurotic child always already can’t 
cope: “he is constantly faced with the fact that every ‘forbidden’ 
wish is paralleled by painful punishment, reproach, and feelings 
of guilt” (25). This is the pay-back plan of inner guilt. The only 
way out is “to make the best of it,” meaning produce pleasure 
30 Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id,” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIX (1923–1925): 
The Ego and the Id and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey 
with Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), 49. 
31 Ibid., 50n1.
32 Ibid.
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out of “displeasure” (ibid.). “Psychic masochism is an ingenious 
device for the nullification of punishment: when punishment 
becomes pleasure, punishment itself is reduced to absurdity” 
(25–26). 
Bergler stages his alternate universal of psychic masochism for 
all neurotics as a drama in three acts. First the subject enters cen-
ter stage provoking or misusing the situation in which he must 
then be defeated. In the second act, he strikes out in righteous 
indignation. The third act is devoted to self-pity. While the first 
act is entirely unconscious, the second and third acts are equally 
conscious – with the exception of the pleasure quotient in self 
pity, which remains unconscious. 
That Bergler doesn’t use unpleasure as his contrast to pleasure 
but always the wrong term, displeasure, beckons unconsciously 
toward the scene he’s stuck on, a scene of refusal and humiliation 
by the displeased parent, which comes to be libidinally charged. 
The BDSM scenarios of displeasure, which can culminate in 
the fantasy of male birth, “are, after all,” Freud writes in “The 
Economic Problem of Masochism,” “only a carrying-out of the 
fantasies in play.”33 “The masochist wants to be treated like a 
small and helpless child, but, particularly, like a naughty child” 
(162). We are inside the laboratory where the love potion mixes 
with the death potion, and the wishbone connects to the resur-
rection bone: “If pain and unpleasure can be not simply warn-
ings but actually aims, the pleasure principle is paralysed – it is as 
though the watchman over our mental life were put out of action 
by a drug” (159).
The centerpiece of his psychology of gambling is the feeling 
of uncanniness, which results when “reaffirmation of the aggres-
sive content of omnipotence, the first human fantasy,” loops 
through “its later masochistic elaboration” (41). Freud theorized 
the aggressive reflex of this return, the first act. The second act of 
the return, the later history of omnipotence fantasy, is its mas-
ochistic end that Bergler’s precursor overlooked. The first act is 
33 Sigmund Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism (1924),” in 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XIX, 159–70.
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overplayed, overstressed, fessed up to, in short order to disguise 
the more serious offense. 
 For the new sense and direction of uncanniness, Bergler finds 
his own E.T.A. Hoffmann story to belabor: “Spieler-Glück” 
(“Gambler’s Luck,” 1820). Spielen means to play or, as we’ve 
seen, act on stage. It also means to gamble; a casino is a Spielbank, 
not consciously in the sense of “playing bank.” Glück in German 
means equally luck and happiness. Spiel also means “game,” a 
form of playing. “The gamelike quality adds a touch of reassur-
ance to the masochistic enjoyment: ‘It’s only child’s play’” (41). 
Not a confrontation with myth, the feeling of uncanniness 
“is a condensed record of what happened to infantile megalo-
mania” (ibid.). That psychic masochism holds the bottom line 
in the defile of gambling means that it is Bergler’s last word on 
the return of infantile megalomania, which flexes the “feeling 
of uncanniness.” That this feeling is the strongest fear “explains 
why uncanniness is so frequently enjoyed in game form: in 
motion pictures, plays, books, magazine articles, and – spiritual-
ism” (40). 
The intensity of the feeling is heightened and buffered by the 
brevity. What happens to the “shock” sure sounds like it enters 
the shot of inoculation “as if the whole tragic fate of infantile 
omnipotence were unconsciously recapitulated in a fraction of 
a second” (ibid.). The short form of the feeling of uncanniness 
spares the subject the long-haul recollection of anguish at the 
destruction of the first fantasy (41). 
The protagonist of Hoffmann’s story is a happy-go-lucky 
gent who is inured to speculation but finds out that his milieu 
misunderstands his lack of interest in gambling and deems him 
a tightwad. To put an end to the talk of the town he goes to the 
casino hoping to lose so as to get it over with already. Instead 
he wins and wins. One day he meets the stare of an old man 
standing across from him day after day. At last losing his cool, he 
berates him and drives him out. His rage was disproportionate 
he soon feels and wishes to make amends. Promptly, he crosses 
the man’s path and begs his forgiveness. 
The old man tells the protagonist a story, which is also about 
a balefully staring old man shadowing a certain Chevalier who is 
also on a winning streak, on which he stumbled by chance and 
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a dare, but which now stokes his endless greed. This old man 
starts placing bets and losing to the winning Chevalier, until he 
loses everything he owns, which was to be his beloved daughter’s 
inheritance. He begs for a small loan drawn on the vast sum the 
Chevalier has won from him – for the sake of his daughter. To 
plead his case he tells his story. He was a recovering gambler liv-
ing for his wife and then, when she died in childbirth, for their 
daughter. When he heard about the nonstop winner in town he 
went to the casino to stop or warn him by losing before his eyes. 
The crescendo of his begging and wailing in the name of his 
daughter summons the beauty, who enters the scene left by the 
family fortune. The greedy winner can no longer say no when 
he sees the daughter, especially when she flaunts the true love 
between her and her father – way more valuable, she underscores 
and scorns, than his wealth and his loneliness. Now he’s a recov-
ering gambler. In time she’s won over, and the father sees that 
the possessions he legally lost, but which the repentant gambler 
didn’t claim, would now be his daughter’s again by marriage. 
Then there’s an end in the happy end: the old man dies, but 
in his dying hours he’s back in his element, hallucinating that 
he’s betting and winning. That the wish is shown to be stronger 
than desire or love brings about a relapse in the son-in-law, which 
tests the marriage. His wife realizes that it was the recovery that 
diverted her love meant for the boy next door who was just then 
marching off to the war. Everyone bides their time. The husband 
comes to his senses again but then there’s a new gambler in town, 
a soldier back from the war, who challenges him. The Chevalier 
loses again and again. When the winner goes home with him to 
claim the goods, including the wife (that’s right, he’s that true 
love from next door) they find her dead in bed. The cursor of 
the wish leads all the characters in the stories within the stories 
to find the end in inner reality’s dead end, but it’s where the dead 
are. 
As in Robert A. Heinlein’s story “By His Bootstraps,” when 
the doubles of older versions of the self return unrecognized the 
pause for second thoughts is busted. Doubling in the moment is 
the missed opportunity to say what you feel or mean. Doubling 
belonging to the future eclipses all second chances. It’s recovery 
and reparation, second thoughts and second chances that are 
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shown up and thrown away as delusional in the stricken world 
of Hoffmann’s story, which follows more closely than Bergler’s 
gloss the uncanny wish to be refused. 
This is one of those Hoffmann stories further framed by the 
collection’s greater narrative in which there is storytelling among 
friends. It turns out, a friend points out, that the storyteller never 
gambles. But when he goes on and on sharing an anecdote from 
his life that inspired the fictional story they just heard the others 
can’t take it any more. They snatch at a non sequitur to get them 
out of the infinite regress of denial. They ask instead for a story 
about the eccentric figure described at the start of the anecdote, 
who frames and packages the view of a burning church tower 
in the manner of aesthetic entertainment with comestibles and 
drink. As we saw in the case of Alfred Bester, Bergler’s wish to be 
refused fits the tight spot of addiction to wishful drinking, which 
Hoffmann visits upon the happiness of the player. We know that 
Hoffmann wrote with the ink of drink. But we owe the whole of 
their Kultur, according to Friedrich Nietzsche, to the Germans 
rolling 24/7 in a buzz and a blur. 
Among the Dead
Freud’s reading of Wilhelm Jensen’s Gradiva, which was com-
posed back to back with “The Poet and Daydreaming,” was his 
premier demo of psychoanalytic interpretation of the symptom 
picture of literature.34 “Dreams and Delusion in Jensen’s Gradiva” 
was a text that commanded a following in letters and, in particu-
lar, on the screen. The media-technological reception brought 
up the arrears in a one-sided accounting of what Freud double 
booked as the truth in delusion alternating between archaeology 
and the machine age (as he spelled it out later on in his reading of 
Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness). For it is the archaeo-
logical nimbus of protagonist Norbert Hanold’s “Pompeiian 
34 Sigmund Freud, “Dreams and Delusion in Jensen’s Gradiva,” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. IX (1906–1909): Jensen’s ‘Gradiva,’ and Other Works, ed. 
and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1959). Subsequent page references are given in the text. 
the block of fame
62
Fantasy” that alone is endopsychic in this reading (51). “There 
is, in fact, no better analogy for repression, by which something 
in the mind is at once made inaccessible and preserved, than 
burial of the sort to which Pompeii fell a victim and from which 
it could emerge once more through the work of spades” (40). In 
Norbert’s dissociated fantasy, archaeology houses the repressed 
and supplies the means of repression. The underlying opposi-
tion between eros and repression enters a season of “unrest” (52) 
that coincides with the onset of the narrative. Unrest gives rise to 
a new lease on fantasying that extends and varies the archaeologi-
cal delusion until it no longer coincides with both the purpose 
and the means of repression (52). Fantasying a find, which turns 
out to be a re-finding, he travels to Pompeii. 
Norbert Hanold’s delusion doesn’t need to work toward 
admitting a stabilizing diplomatic relationship to reality, as did 
Schreber’s delusional system in the interface of the zero-people. 
As Freud stipulates in a footnote, it’s a hysterical delusion in the 
case of the young archaeologist, not the psychotic kind (45n1). 
Hanold’s delusion began by zeroing in on zeroing out the reality 
of one person only, his love object from childhood, Zoë Bertgang. 
Her surname supplies what Norbert has yet to recognize again as 
her own trait, the “gait” (Gang) that in the ancient bas-relief of a 
girl walking propels him into his Pompeian fantasy. Zoë happens 
to have traveled to Pompeii, too, to tend to her scientist father, 
who’s conducting his all-consuming research there. 
Once she realizes that the figment Gradiva is her placeholder, 
Zoë enters the dissociation as the ghost of the Pompeian girl. 
Working from the inside she can bring down the delusion, which 
began, she says, as “negative hallucination” (67). At the onset 
of puberty, even the happy memory of their child’s play, which 
came complete with the innocent erotic undertow of the wish 
for Big Time, was vacuumed up and away. Adolescent fantasying 
was squashed. The foot fetishism balances on the cusp of this 
foreclosed fantasying. 
When the negative hallucination comes tumbling down, 
sounds and sights penetrate to Norbert’s ground zero and he 
starts daydreaming in the environs of archaeology. He starts fan-
tasying the fantasy, unlocking its dissociation. The triggers are fig-
ments of repressed wishes torn away from their setting in buried 
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memory. He begins to dream again in Pompeii and remembers a 
night dream, which lends coherence to his delusion, bringing it 
closer to the specific situation of his missing affect. 
The dream confirms that Gradiva belongs to the Pompeiian 
past and that she died during the volcanic eruption long time 
ago. “Melancholy feelings accompanied this extension of the 
delusional structure, like an echo of the anxiety which had filled 
the dream” (57). The anxiety rebounds from the stirrings of 
the erotic life in puberty, which the negative hallucination had 
packed away but was now on its way back following in Gradiva’s 
footsteps. Norbert begins to sense a newfound “respect” for the 
honeymooners he had before disdained like flies to swat (26).
Zoë’s therapeutic inspiration in treating Norbert’s overvalu-
ation of archaeology comes from her loving relationship to her 
failed, maternalized father, who related to her through, even 
named her after, the living-creative body of his science. Freud 
underscores that Zoë first fell in love with Norbert when he 
followed her father and withdrew from her to embark on his all-
consuming career in archaeology. The amalgamation of her love 
for him and for her father is evident in the belittling caricature 
she finds for Norbert: “archaeopteryx,” a bird-creature belong-
ing equally to archaeology and zoology (33). Zoë was available 
for a new release of life from the incestuous milieu of neglect and 
unfulfillment. In the role of wife-to-be rescuing Norbert (and his 
proposal) from the depths of mother earth, Zoë represents the 
father function. That she enlightens Norbert in her new role of 
father is a benefit that also accrues to her. 
The clear text to which she restores him results from her 
deft understanding and use of double meanings. Freud points 
out that in the analytic session double meaning often provides 
a good sense of the wish fantasy hovering over a patient’s free 
association. A preponderance of double meanings promotes a 
sense of apparent absurdity. The absurdity charge is the favorite 
testimony submitted by those who scoff at the notion that the 
dream has the status of a psychic act or function (73). A tell-
ing resistance since the content we consider absurd means that 
strongly charged wishes are coming to the fore to be recognized. 
Among the typical absurd dreams that Freud considers in The 
Interpretation of Dreams three involve visitations by the dead. 
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The absurdity is reversed when Freud adds syntax to the dream-
er’s death wish. 
In his reading of Gradiva, Freud gives another example 
of a seeming absurdity: established scientists who are able to 
combine their allegiance to reason with the ghosts of modern 
spiritualism (71). But the opening season of the allegiance to 
reason, the Enlightenment, allotted more than one lifetime for 
the fulfillment of the Kantian duty of perfectibility. Extended 
finitude, however, can never equal everlasting life. Heir to the 
Enlightenment, modern spiritualism science-fictionalized the 
afterlife in much the same way the mechanical brain, in Günther’s 
argument, updated the double.
Zoë steps out of the shadow of haunting into the spotlight of 
an Enlightenment transmission. She can enlighten, illumine the 
dark spots in the narrative. The narrative as a whole partakes of 
the coherence that comes with Zoë’s intervention in Norbert’s 
delusion. Zoë enters the unstable site of negative hallucination 
in the guise of the ghost in the fantasy coupling and through her 
“Enlightenment” brings it back to reality under the aegis of the 
father function. She integrates the death wish, a fact of life that 
she learned about through Norbert’s delusional intrigue. She 
hadn’t known going into it that one must first die to come alive, 
to be loved (37). 
Freud states outright that fantasying is the harbinger of delu-
sion (58). And yet Norbert’s unscientific tendency to daydream, 
which culminated in the delusion, also offered a corrective to 
the repression. Coupling (in both the spousal and the analytic 
relationship) was inscribed in advance in the delusion. It allowed 
Zoë to make an effortless switch from analyst to wife. 
“Aufklärung und Heilung,” enlightenment and treatment,35 
coincide in Zoë’s therapy, leading to the awakening of affect. 
Love is liberated from the symptom’s compromise outlet. In 
the course of analysis, the love that returns for the patient finds 
its “first” object in the treating analyst, which opens up another 
35 Sigmund Freud, Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens “Gradiva,” 
ed. Bernd Urban (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 
2009), 118. 
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chapter of work on the transference.36 It amounts to a fantastic 
reversal of the analytic setting when in Gradiva the repressed love 
object is the treating analyst. 
Is the overcoming of the sojourn in the underworld that leads 
Norbert and Zoë down the aisle the ultimate fantasy in Wilhelm 
Jensen’s Gradiva? When Freud expands on the archaeology anal-
ogy in session with the Ratman, indicating that the unearthing 
of long-buried relics can trigger rapid decay, he must rush to 
reassure his stunned patient that everything was being done to 
reverse this side effect. The Ratman was carrying a girl encrypted 
inside him. The fantasy of the happy end in Gradiva coincides 
with a prime “construction” site in psychoanalysis. In the trans-
fer between the original Ratman case notes and the published 
study we can watch Freud “construct” mourning for the father 
as the treatable problem in the foreground of the analysis – as the 
inoculum that curtails the dominion of his patient’s legible but 
untreatable melancholia.37 
The emotion picture of funereal doubling that is extinguished 
in the light of Gradiva’s happy ending made it into pictures, 
beginning with Karl Freund’s The Mummy (1932), which turns 
on the analytic breakthrough and deliverance of Helen, Dr. 
Muller’s “favorite patient,” from psychotic burial alive with her 
dead mummy. Her safe harbor, however, is a libidinally limited 
marriage to someone more normal like Frank (who sees in her 
his dead mummy).38 Did the archaeologist Frank always have to 
open graves to fall in love with a woman, Helen like Zoë won-
ders? 
The novella Gradiva, which draws on Jensen’s own attach-
ment to a lost childhood sweetheart, was retold in terms of a 
melancholic’s manipulated stabilization through doubling in 
Pierre Boileau and Thomas Narcejac’s 1954 novel D’entre les 
36 Ibid., 90.
37 I explore the underworld of the Ratman case and Freud’s re-construc-
tion of the original record in Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on 
German Crypts (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988).
38 See my reading of The Mummy in its full endopsychic setting, includ-
ing the histories going into it, in the chapter on Artaud in Aberrations 
of Mourning.
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morts (Among the Dead), which Alfred Hitchcock adapted in 
Vertigo.39 The torment of Hitchcock’s Judy while grief-stuck 
Scotty is remaking her into the double of the lost object, 
Madeleine, finds a vestigial rehearsal in two photographs that 
Jensen cherished. The first one is the only image that was left of 
Jensen’s first sweetheart who died in childhood; the second one 
he composed like the first, thus setting the image of the other girl 
he (re)found later in life on the doubling and haunting of a dead 
ringer.40 The second girl’s lookalike status was alone in the eyes of 
the beholder. In his novella, however, Jensen proposed a way out 
of the encryptment by introducing the living “lost” object, Zoë 
Bertgang, into Hanold’s delusion of contact with the ghost of 
Gradiva. Jensen brings back his childhood love across the waste 
of repression, which only looks like death. 
In Alain Robbe-Grillet’s 2006 film C’est Gradiva qui vous 
appelle (It’s Gradiva Who’s Calling You), an English academic, 
John Locke, is in Morocco investigating Eugène Delacroix’s 
stay there. An antique dealer offers him the painter’s unknown 
sketchbooks, promising the prize of fame for the academic and 
his book. Sample pages on slides tempt Locke and the film begins 
getting the feel and fill of self-reflexivity. When critics cry surre-
alism, it means surrender before the enigmatic force of waking 
fantasy. 
The pages of the sketchbooks are erotic drawings. Their draw 
is Delacroix’s model back then, his lover and murder victim. 
Soon Locke sees her all over town. It’s Gradiva. Robbe-Grillet 
transforms Gradiva’s role as therapist into something a little less 
fantastic, the role of dominatrix who wields authority over his 
own authorship. In one scene, she’s writing the screenplay while 
it passes into and through the sight we behold. There’s always a 
lag, however, or a near miss in Robbe-Grillet’s rendition of the 
39 See my psychoanalysis of Vertigo in The Psycho Records (New York: 
Wallflower Press, 2016), 165. It is while busting the ghost on behalf of 
a new life in mourning and substitution that Scotty witnesses a real 
murder – second death. The better half of melancholia claims him. 
40 The biographical information was in the introductory material in the 
German double edition of Freud’s essay and Jensen’s story, from which 
I cited above. The two telltale photographs can be found online.
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Pompeiian fantasy, and when Locke locks steps with Gradiva 
she’s always just ahead. Following her lead he enters an under-
world of orientalist sado-masochistic fantasying.
Robbe-Grillet, on or off purpose, amplifies a detail in Jensen’s 
story and Freud’s close reading which belongs to the repressed 
past of Norbert Hanold’s and Zoë Bertgang’s childhood friend-
ship. There were bouts of roughhousing in their play together 
that heralded sexual awakening and which Norbert buried in 
the ash of negative hallucination. The upsurge returns from the 
repressed era when Norbert swats but misses a fly and instead 
hits Gradiva/Zoë’s hand. With one swipe we are given a more 
complete setting of the fetishism suggested by the lost object’s 
surviving trait. 
Locke whips up a storm and thinks he’s getting closer. Instead, 
the BDSM fantasying swaps over into his home, where his regular 
sexual outlet awaits. But the block is not in time. Gradiva isn’t a 
step ahead; she’s dead. When he ties the concubine to the BDSM 
fantasy, she’s no longer available. Locke cannot enter the spec-
tacle. The sado-masochistic elaboration of the wish fantasy pulls 
up before the dead body inside the doubling.
Robbe-Grillet’s parting shot, amped up by the endopsychic 
perceptions of archaeological and media-technological delusion, 
takes us back to his 1961 screenplay Last Year at Marienbad. 
The impact of Freud’s reading of Gradiva was already there in 
the manifest references to Orpheus and Euridice, redirecting the 
myth of love and death through the poetics of daydreaming. 
Citing Claudio Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo we lay claim to the myth as 
the primal scene of all opera. Barrie Kosky’s 2012 production at 
the Komische Oper Berlin remade the opera into the origin story 
of all “work” in columns A and B. But before we can get our fill 
of culture we must stand before the portal to the underworld 
and the fresh grave beside it.
In D’entre les morts, the detective stands there when he gives 
his lost-and-found object the nickname “little Euridice.”41 His 
41 Pierre Boileau and Thomas Narcejac, Vertigo, trans. Geoffrey Sainsbury 
(London: Pushkin Vertigo, 2015), 60. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text.
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Pompeiian fantasy rebounds from a screen memory illuminating 
the illustration of a book he cherished in childhood: 
At the age of twelve, under the shadow of that hill, he had 
read a translation of that unforgettable book of Kipling’s The 
Light that Failed. The frontispiece was a picture of a boy 
and a girl who were leaning over a revolver […]. The young 
girl, dressed in black, resembled Madeleine – he was sure of 
it now – and had made no less an impression on him. He had 
thought about her as he went to sleep and heard her footsteps 
in his dreams. (41) 
The schemer renamed Elster in Hitchcock’s Vertigo tells his friend, 
the acrophobic detective, the story of his wife and motivates the 
role the double will perform (9). He says, she suddenly relapses 
into silence and hardly hears what’s said to her. Or she stares at 
something in the middle distance as though seeing things invis-
ible to the rest of us. When she comes back to her normal self, 
she has a bewildered expression on her face, as though needing 
time to recognize her surroundings. The detective wants to 
know whether she has ever “dabbled in fortune-telling or any of 
that psychic stuff” (11). No, it’s something that happens to her: 
then, “all of a sudden you realize she’s somewhere else” (ibid.). 
The husband has the sense that she “feels the attack coming,” 
and that “she tries to ward it off” (ibid.). But if diversion fails, 
“she seems to go rigid and her eyes seem to be intently watching 
something which moves. […] Then for five minutes, ten perhaps, 
but rarely more, she’s for all the world like a sleep-walker” (12). 
But, he adds: “you don’t really get the impression she’s asleep. 
She’s absent-minded as though her body no longer belonged to 
her, as though she had become someone else” (ibid.). 
Outside, the story is set on the opening of war between France 
and Nazi Germany in 1939, a quiet for the storm of projections 
of French victory. The season of whether or not forecasting is 
as far as the half-dead (the dead and their mourners) regress in 
P.K. Dick’s Ubik. At once tragic irony and running gag in Ubik, 
in the novel by Boileau and Narcejac the scam, the psychopath’s 
manipulation of his symptomatic friend through fantasy, is in 
sync or swim with the forecast season. A major change from 
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what the screenplay adds follows. The detective splits the scene of 
Madeleine’s suicide rather than be caught in a recurring shameful 
act. He doesn’t deliver the role of witness. The intermission of 
France’s occupation brings an end to best-laid plans. The story 
restarts when the detective glimpses Madeleine’s double or ghost 
in a postwar newsreel.  
The incident that revealed the inspector’s fear of falling, 
which kept him from helping a colleague who took the fall, is a 
trauma he suspects is comparable to what Madeleine is hiding. 
His traumatic memory is lodged in his interior thoughts and 
fantasies about Madeleine. Early on he is anxious to rein in his 
tendency to let his “imagination run away with him” (26–27): 
“Perhaps he ought really to have been a novelist, with this host 
of images which so readily and of their own accord flooded his 
brain. They weren’t vague ones either: they had all the relief, the 
dramatic intensity of life” (27). He’s ready or not for the close-up 
of memory, which is the interruptus of his running imagining: 
“That roof, for instance – the shiny wet slates, the discoloured 
red-brick chimneys, the wisps of smoke all blowing the same way, 
the rumble of the traffic below, like a torrent at the bottom of a 
gorge. He wrung his hands” (ibid.).
In the Postscript to “Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression,” 
Jacques Derrida elaborates the words on Norbert Hanold’s 
mind in Jensen’s Gradiva, which Freud cites: “‘traces’ in a literal 
sense.”42 The reading of the words on the page returns Freud’s 
Gradiva to the citation or summons of the irreducible/irretriev-
able trace of the ghost’s passage in the ashes of Pompeii. But a lit-
eral trace on the page is on screen the special or visual effect, like 
the Dolly Zoom inspired by Scottie’s acrophobia.43 Hitchcock 
42 Jacques Derrida, “Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression,” trans. Eric 
Prenowitz, Diacritics 5, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 9–63. The Postscript is 
on pages 61–63.
43 Another entry into the thicket of influence by following the rebound-
ing special effect opens with Saul Bass’s instruction to Robert Abel to 
visit John Whitney Sr. Whitney was working on the swirling effect in 
the opening titles of Vertigo. Abel decided on the spot to apprentice 
himself. Under Whitney’s tutelage he learned how to use the slit-scan 
and motion control cameras (which informed celebrated effects in 
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ratchets up the import of the dread of falling with this literal 
trace. In the original language of psychoanalysis, Trauer, grief 
and mourning, is etymologically linked to a sense of falling.44 
In Hitchcock’s Vertigo, Scotty falls in love with Madeleine, his 
“patient” in distress. He must deliver her from the delusion of 
possession. He is clear-text-minded, like Zoë in Gradiva, like 
Clara in “The Sandman.” The film has been busy constructing 
her as ghost. 
The highpoint of Scotty’s first day of observing Madeleine 
comes in the museum when she sits in front of the portrait 
of Carlotta. The camera goes out of its way to construct the 
resemblances. Camera guidance underscores the sameness of the 
bouquet Madeleine brought with her to the one in the portrait, 
the sameness of the bun in each hairdo. The explanatory camera-
work is excessive. It’s like the camera is imparting the resemblance 
to another camera. The viewer is not addressed. Does the camera 
take us out of the interpersonals into the intrapsychic space of 
haunting, in which, whatever resemblance may be or signify, it 
first has the status of special effect? The hair bun in particular 
fits the Vertigo Effect, opening upon a trajectory of fetishism, a 
dissociation that allows one, as Freud makes clear, to know and 
not to know that the object is absent, dead. At the next stop, a 
hotel, Scottie watches Madeleine park her car, enter, and then 
open an upstairs window. But when he interrogates the hotel 
owner about her tenant, she says she didn’t come today. Where’s 
her car he asks as he opens the front door. What car? 
2001: A Space Odyssey and Star Wars). For the company he established 
in 1971, Abel purchased the leftover slit-scan equipment used for 
Kubrick’s film. Robert Abel & Associates skipped the alternate line 
of development, Star Wars, to work on the first Star Trek movie. To 
conclude this sampling along one family line, the son of Whitney, 
John Whitney Jr., while working for Triple-I urged together with Gary 
Demos that a newspaper-printer scanner be converted for motion-
picture work, which led to early demonstrations of CGI in Westworld, 
Futureworld, and Tron. I’ve culled this cascade of anecdotes from Tom 
Situ, Moving Innovation: The Early Days of Computer Animation 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).
44 The etymology counts stopovers in Old Saxon (driosan) and Old 
English (drēosan).
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In the novel and film, the rescue of Madeleine from drown-
ing means that the detective and Madeleine have met and can 
now be alone together on their wanderings through the city and 
environs. In the movie their trip to the Sequoia National Park is a 
therapy field trip. The ancient trees that surpass lifetime are fan-
tasy props that Scotty tries to historicize. Madeleine immediately 
reacts with what seems a non sequitur: the ancient trees remind 
her that she is going to die. The fit is made clear when he brings 
her before the cross section of a felled sequoia marked at each 
layer with another historical datemark. Her tree fantasy of fore-
boding he points out is a legible part of historical memory. But 
Madeleine outlines with her reading finger what goes unmarked 
in this history, the span of her (Carlotta’s) nineteenth-century 
lifetime. While Scotty keeps up his relentless questioning for the 
clear text of memory, he falls for the ghost between two deaths. 
After Madeleine makes her exit by faking the fall, Scotty looks 
for Madeleine’s double, her return once again from the dead. 
But then he encounters a woman on the street who bears a basic 
resemblance to Madeleine but is someone else. Given a chance 
at substitution, Scotty instead makes her over into the double. 
Only her language is different, slightly vulgar. She’s Judy from 
Kansas and Hitchcock updates the American fantasy epic. In his 
reading of Gradiva, Freud points out that “somewhere” can be 
used to hide that the exact location is in fact known45: what lies 
somewhere over the rainbow is the realm of the dead.
Judy carelessly wears the Carlotta necklace, and Scotty now 
knows for certain what he suspected earlier, which Hitchcock 
went to great lengths to show. While waiting in her room for 
Judy’s return from the beauty parlor he surveys the space with an 
anxious alertness that suggests he is reconstructing the evidence 
that his Madeleine never existed. The detective–therapist is back, 
now intent on clearing the false memory of the patient he him-
self is and surmounting once and for all, as though this had been 
the therapy goal all along, his acrophobia. They drive back to the 
tower. 
In contrast to the novel, Hitchcock allows Scottie to go scott-
free. He is not in fact responsible for his colleague’s fall. However, 
45 Freud, Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens “Gradiva,” 82.
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Hitchcock adds a court scene in which Scottie again cannot be 
charged but in which he is blamed, humiliated. How could he 
save someone this second time (from second death) if he can-
not tolerate scaling heights? After the hearing, the psychopath 
Elster takes him aside to side with him: we both know who killed 
Madeleine, i.e., Carlotta. That’s his only acquittal. 
Scotty climbs the tower behind Judy remade as Madeleine, the 
star of Elster’s show in which the detective unwittingly played 
the role of immobilized witness. Her performance was better 
under Elster’s direction, Scotty concludes. The whole film is a 
film within a film. Is that why Kim Novak never reported against 
the director? How could he act out within this mise-en-abyme 
staging of his predilection? 
In the novel, the acrophobe tries shaking sense into his serial 
ghost, when she reveals to him that she was never Madeleine and 
certainly not the ghost who allegedly possessed Madeleine. He 
tries shaking out of her this terrible denial but kills her. In the 
movie, Scotty makes it to the top this time. Judy pleads with 
him to take this chance. She’s the one he loved and she still loves 
him. In other words, she’s alive. But before the third chance can 
be sealed with a kiss, a nun enters abruptly, interrupts without 
warning, and Judy takes fright, steps back, and plummets. The 
nun crosses herself. For the Catholic boy, a nun is the feared 
and respected authority figure wielding justice like the Furies 
fate. Scotty looks down and is relieved of the special effect but 







The POV of the Daydreamer 
The wish alone can be self-fulfilling. Consider one of the exam-
ples Freud gives of the lasting impression made by a fortuneteller 
on his patient in the past, even though in the meantime it’s plain 
that the prophecy didn’t come true. In the forecast, the details 
of her mother’s marriage and childbirth were repeated: “The 
prophecy promised her the fulfillment of the identification with 
her mother which had been the secret of her childhood.”1 The 
fortuneteller thus touched on the fantasy his client had uncon-
sciously wished upon. That the fortuneteller, perhaps telepathi-
cally, came as close as the client’s ego would allow to fulfilling her 
wish for real left the lasting impression. Daydreaming can be its 
own reward by the proximity it keeps, but without realization, to 
an unconscious death wish that remains off limits. 
While the wish itself isn’t repressed, its fantasy elaboration, its 
fleeting, throwaway fixation, is hard to remember and only bears 
repeating. Only in the series in which it is an episode does the 
daydream begin to show staying power. When fantasying begins 
to organize itself like advertising or a so-called haunting melody 
in the mode of “to be continued,” then we enter upon a private 
1 Sigmund Freud, “Psycho-analysis and Telepathy,” in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 
XVIII (1920–1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology 
and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 187–89.
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theater. The production value of the show is low. Even when 
a night dream borrows the ready-made formulation of a day-
dream, Freud observes in The Interpretation of Dreams, the part 
on loan is “more fleeting than other parts of the same dream.”2 In 
The Psychology of Daydreaming (1921), J. Varendonck sought to 
develop waking fantasy as reality testing’s parallel universal and 
secure for daydreaming the mode of hypothesis (specifically, a 
creative process of hypothesis and rejoinder). But, example after 
example, we discern chains of thought pulling up short before 
memory. Daydreaming in its dependence on and incompatibil-
ity with memory is largely a fitful process of stops, restarts, and 
oblivion. 
In They Live (1988), aliens manipulate the psycho-economy 
of human servitude through fantasy. There isn’t a POV. You see 
manipulated reality in the film or, if the protagonists flip on the 
special shades, you see the truth or, more likely, the ultimate 
fantasy. At the start of They Live, there is a momentary glimpse 
of a name, a word, a message, loaded in a film bent on revealing 
all subliminals, but which, as Jonathan Lethem points out, is 
accidental or documentary rather than staged.3 We recognize that 
the logo on the train spells out Shock Control. The train bisects 
the path of the protagonist like Scapinelli’s carriage at the start 
of The Student of Prague, foreclosing background and context. 
In Stellan Rye’s 1913 film, the vehicle’s arrival serves to mark all 
that follows in the close quarters of doubling as illusion, even 
delusion. A train’s passage on screen is an internal simulacrum of 
the history of cinema. On the double tracks of train wreck and 
roller-coaster rides, Benjamin discerned in media, with film at 
the front of the line, a defense mechanism containing the shocks 
within shots of inoculation. 
2 Sigmund Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 
V (1900–1901): The Interpretation of Dreams (II) and On Dreams, ed. 
and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud ( London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1953), 493.
3 Jonathan Lethem, They Live: A Novel Approach to Cinema (New 
York: Soft Skull Press, 2010), 9–10.
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In the prehistory of mediatization, Benjamin argues in “The 
Storyteller,” the novel already supplied a form of immunizing 
containment.4 The novelty of the novel was the import of the 
protagonist’s happy ending in death. The protagonist becomes 
in the end a figure who died then and thus, whereby his entire 
life is held up in necrospect as meaningful – and, most impor-
tantly, contained, like an inoculum. These parting shots rendered 
uncanny and literally unhoused the prospect of death. No longer 
would there be rooms in the home still bearing the residue of an 
ancestor’s passing. Instead, the dying were to be kept out of sight 
in peripheral institutions. 
They Live introduces into our obsession with surveillance, 
which is largely a Christian comfort, the bogie of our alien 
manipulation by ten or so subliminal commandments. The 
caste from Outer Space reflects back the majority’s projection 
that members of the alien minority seduce by inducing the illu-
sion that they are beautiful. The agon seems rather specific to 
the Hollywood “industry.” Not all the rich (producers) are from 
Outer Space, but soon the threat is conveyed that the rich who 
are in control are all alien.
The subliminal veiling of perception in They Live closes a 
loop with the parting-shot inoculations administered by the 
novel (according to Benjamin). When the protagonist puts on 
the decoder sunglasses, he not only recognizes the command-
ments, but also sees that the aliens are the decayed, skeletal dead. 
Either they have or he has already died (once). He then kills as 
many aliens as he can on a guilt-free spree reminiscent of the 
thrill-a-kill consumerism of zombie movies. In horror films, as 
already, for example, in Phantom of the Opera, the mask of the 
psycho covers and resembles the skull-face, and the camera POV 
that assumes the mask (in John Carpenter’s Halloween) looks like 
it’s looking out of one. 
Before the shooting begins, the new heroes in They Live put 
on the glasses of detection to see through the cover-up and get 
4 See my reading of Benjamin’s “The Storyteller,” “Back to Frankfurt 
School,” in A Concise Companion to Psychoanalysis, Literature, and 
Culture, eds. Laura Marcus and Ankhi Mukherjee (Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2014), 66–81.
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to the truth (and the ultimate fantasy). Time to remember that, 
as Benjamin jotted down in The Arcades Project, the arrival 
of the detection genre coincided with the advent of modern 
spiritualism. Before Conan Doyle took the genre and ran with 
it on the one-way street leading to his celebrated championship 
of modern ghost-seeing, the origin of the genre was shared by 
Edgar Allan Poe on the cusp of communication with the other 
side and E.T.A. Hoffmann at the tail end of the episode of animal 
magnetism (and the vampire epidemic). 
In Whose Body? (1923) by Dorothy Sayers, a detection novel 
that Freud was reading while waiting for the move to London, a 
psy-fi conceit develops out of the unidentified body that opens 
the case: “Assigning a motive for the murder of a person without 
relations or antecedents or even clothes is like trying to visualize 
the fourth dimension – admirable exercise for the imagination, 
but arduous and inconclusive.”5 Sir Reuben Levy went missing 
at the time. But his resemblance to the body is a near miss. Could 
it be a test corpse from the nearby teaching hospital? At the 
inquest, Dr. Julian Freke, an expert surgeon in charge of educa-
tional dissection at the facility, rules out that any of his stiffs are 
missing. 
Dr. Julian Freke studies the brain as the body of the mind. 
When the police detective asks him whether he indeed consid-
ers the neuroses as physical he replies: “Undoubtedly. I am not 
ignorant of the rise of another school of thought, […] but its 
exponents are mostly charlatans or self-deceivers. ‘Sie haben sich 
so weit darin eingeheimnisst’ that, like Sludge the Medium, they 
are beginning to believe their own nonsense. I should like to have 
the exploring of some of their brains” (75). The prep work for 
such exploration is the wish his research denies. 
Lord Peter, the master sleuth, sees through Dr. Julian based 
on another of his PTSD flashbacks to the trauma of war service, 
the outbreak of his war neurosis, and the physical-only type 
on the military medical staff confounding his predicament. He 
recognizes in Dr. Julian the criminal mastermind, who killed his 
Jewish victim out of lingering, malingering jealousy, so hard to 
5 Dorothy L. Sayers, Whose Body? (Mineola: Dover, 2016), 54–55. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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reconcile with his view of the mind as surface symptom of the 
brain’s physical irritation. By making the switch with a body 
donated to the teaching facility, he diverted the investigation so 
that there would be enough time for the hated corpse to vanish 
in the course of studious dissection. By way of his own talking 
detection, Lord Peter wins one for the exponents of the other 
school of thought, whose brains Dr. Julian fantasied carving up: 
“Most people don’t associate anythin’ – their ideas just roll about 
like so many dry peas on a tray, makin’ a lot of noise and goin’ 
nowhere, but once you begin lettin’ ‘em string their peas into a 
necklace, it’s going to be strong enough to hang you, what?” (82).
In 1925, Siegfried Kracauer wrote a philosophical study of the 
detective novel at the same time that Benjamin was concluding 
his allegory book: Der Detektiv-Roman. Ein philosophischer 
Traktat (The Detective Novel: A Philosophical Treatise, a.k.a. 
Detective Novel). Theodor Adorno, who was the prize pupil 
that Benjamin and Kracauer each claimed as his own, suggested 
that Kracauer use the Errettung (rescue) of external reality in the 
subtitle of his Theory of Film. Whenever I read another piece 
on Benjamin by someone else, I’m struck by the waffling on the 
synonyms: salvation, saving, rescue, redemption. That Benjamin 
preferred to use Rettung (rescue) for the operations of modern 
allegory goes back to G.E. Lessing’s Enlightenment project of 
essays composed to rescue authors from misprision and obliv-
ion: Rettungen (1754). Yes, dead religion is our destiny and must 
be read. But that doesn’t mean that Messianism can eclipse the 
apotheosis of the intrigue that, in Benjamin’s argument, rescues 
modern allegory from re-Christianization through the Devil’s 
return. What rhymes with the intrigue is the work of detection 
in its reach beyond the rigid priest caste of police work and the 
seduction of doubling that the evil mastermind proposes. When 
Kracauer addresses G.K. Chesterton, who replaced the indepen-
dent detective with the priest, he gave by cautionary contrast 
with the Christian cop-out reinforcement to his view of the work 
of detection’s overall allegiance to a law of infinite interpretation, 
not to the contractual book by which the police are the law.
The “writing medium” from the hypothetical milieu of 
modern spiritualism provided William James with the model of 
“automatic writing” for study in his psychology laboratory. By 
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the import of communication with the subconscious or with a 
secondary personality (or with a ghost), automatic writing stag-
gered the “stream of consciousness” in proximity to fantasying. 
The test subject taking dictation would assume a trance state 
modeled on the “absence” into which a hysteric withdrew when 
continuing a fantasy. No longer committed to transmuting and 
covering its sources, A-culture followed suit and folded day-
dreaming inside the night dream of its Dichtung. 
Gertrude Stein took her writing lesson directly from James. 
Through repetition punctuated by rhyming Blood on the Dining 
Room Floor begins with an absence or the end – and the so-called 
interior monologue sinks in by circling around the drain of its 
streaming. Although Stein only tried this one time to write a 
detection novel, she followed throughout her writing the lead of 
its conceit: the detective story gets rid of human nature and the 
event, which belong to the era before the story begins. What fol-
lows from seeing what can happen when an unidentified (with) 
murder victim is all you have to start from results, for Stein, in 
the quintessentially modern novel form. Her attempt at com-
posing a detective story of her own, Stein writes in “Why I Like 
Detective Stories,” faltered because she was making reference to 
events that had occurred in her neighborhood: “after all a novel 
even if it is a detective story ought not to mix up what happened 
with what has happened, anything that has happened is exciting 
enough without any writing, tell it as often as you like but do 
not write it as a story.”6 What really happened, as Stein puts it, 
which kept her detection fiction from happening, intruded like a 
memory damming/damning the stream of daydream. What also 
really happened was that the attempt was enough. Writing down 
murder like a jab in her lyrical vein allowed her to break through 
the writer’s block, the wreckage brought on by the success of The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. 
While James studied in the writing medium the flow of 
consciousness, his colleague at Harvard, Hugo Münsterberg, 
introduced a cinematic model for the psychology of our second 
6 Gertrude Stein quoted in John Herbert Gill’s Afterword to Gertrude 




nature. In the theater, as Münsterberg argues in The Photoplay: 
A Psychological Study (1918), we supply on our own the associa-
tion between the overstimulation of adventure holding center 
stage and the earlier scene of a quieter time back home.7 This 
momentum of memory (as well as of the imagination) is pro-
jected into the motion pictures themselves: 
We see the jungle, we see the hero at the height of his danger; 
and suddenly there flashes upon the screen a picture of the 
past. […] When one deep breath is over we are stirred again 
by the event of the present. That home scene of the past flit-
ted by just as a hasty thought of bygone days darts through 
the mind. […] We have really an objectivation of our memory 
function. The case of the cut-back is there quite parallel to 
that of the close-up. In the one we recognize the mental act 
of attending, in the other we must recognize the mental act of 
remembering. (37–38) 
Imagination, which Münsterberg identifies as expectation con-
trolled by our feelings, is staggered in theater until the last act. 
That too is intercepted by film: “our imagination is projected on 
the screen” (38). What he calls photoplay observes the standard 
of theater. But what interests him is how the original peep shows 
and photographic playthings that shared the era of the advent of 
telegraphy could be extended to provide the shaky foundation 
of this public theater of wish-fulfillment fantasy. The faculties 
that he sees potentiated from stage to screen are skewered upon 
Freud’s arc of daydreaming. “It is as if reality has lost its own 
continuous connection and become shaped by the demands of our 
soul” (38). Münsterberg, thinking in German, uses the soul-word 
for psyche, like Freud. 
If consciousness loops through the movies, then is the wrap 
double or nothing? The first failure of film is in the art depart-
ment according to the same standard of mimesis that drama real-
izes more perfectly. It’s the difference between the wax museum 
7 Hugo Münsterberg, The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (New York 
& London: Appleton, 1916), 37. Subsequent page references are given 
in the text. 
the block of fame
80
and the collection of ancient Greek sculpture. “Our own atten-
tion and memory and imagination have shifted and remodeled 
the events until they look as nature could never show them. 
What we really see can hardly be called any longer an imitation 
of the world, such as the theater gives us” (53). What we see, as 
through the Traumorgan, is freed from direct dependency upon 
“the physical forms of space, time, and causality” (70). This risk 
that film takes is its bid for the status of a new art form.  
Experimental filmmaker Klaus Wyborny transposed the inte-
rior monologue in the first chapter of his (unpublished) novel 
to the voice-over of fantasying in his 2002 film Sulla. He trans-
planted the buffering of daydreaming to a medium that is a wrap 
with its throwaway satisfaction. Wearing his other hat as author 
of philosophies of film that draw on physics and psychoanalysis, 
Wyborny shows that when you watch a film what you see is what 
you forget. Using the projector as model, he singles out the gate 
as the present tense of projection, the take-up reel as the past, 
and the feed reel as the future. To illustrate the process between 
and within each tense he adds the metaphors: “picture particle,” 
“pool of impressions,” and “raft.”
Whenever a new shot gets into the gate, a “picture particle” 
is ejected from there. Reaching the brain it hits the pool of 
impressions with a big splash. Doing this it hits the raft float-
ing on top first. The raft (presenting our memory of the pre-
ceding shot) gets destroyed or it at least loses its distinctness, 
so that most of its structures disappear within a fraction of a 
second, while some remnants start sinking down. Meanwhile 
the present particle already works havoc in the memory-
liquid, where it modifies and destroys a considerable amount 
of the impressions deposited there. […] Having finished its 
destructive job […] the picture particle drifts up to the pool’s 
surface, forming a new raft there, which now floats on a “sea 
of changed impressions,” getting more and more structure 
within its remaining projection time – till the next picture 
particle will be in the gate, by which the present raft will also 
be destroyed and the pool modified anew. […] Somehow a 
pool of those impressions vaguely remains and when the film 
is over, the remaining pool plus the impressions of the last 
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shot […] is what you think you have seen, when you leave the 
cinema.8 
Sulla allegorizes the film medium’s fleeting oblivion and fixation 
on the now (you see it now you don’t) in terms of one man’s 
afternoon spent daydreaming. Whereas the literary stream 
of consciousness tends to be subsumed by poetic prose and 
epiphany (the Lacanian sinthome), in Sulla we overhear the 
private reserve and plain text of wish fantasy. A tension is upheld 
between constant wishing at the speed of thought and the his-
torical accomplishments of Sulla. The idiom of making thought 
concrete goes into this tension span. What we consider Roman 
architecture was distinguished by its early use of concrete, which 
the Roman general and consul Sulla introduced. The film covers 
one afternoon suffused with the audio tracking of daydream. 
Among his fantasying forecasts is a building in which he would 
commemorate his daydreams of sexual relations with a woman 
he recently met, which he fulfilled by masturbating three times 
that afternoon. But not all is spent since the allegory of the con-
crete promotes the film’s self-reflexivity, which is the last stand or 
understanding of remembered film. 
Out of introspection, his own film experiences, and media 
philosophy, Victor Burgin assembled a composite picture of the 
remembered film buoyed up by forgetting. He gives the run-
down of his reviewing of a scene he was stuck on from the movie 
Fire Down Below (1957):
The fragment I saw was all that was required to retrieve this 
narrative from the archive of the ‘already seen.’ But already, 
in memory, the obvious meaning of the film is giving way to 
obtuse meanings. The ‘already seen’ of the story hovers like 
an aura around the sequence of the farewell at the jetty, but 
already the narrative is fading. The jetty scene is itself decom-
posing into its component images. […] What was once a film 
in a movie theatre […] is now a kernel of psychical representa-
8 “Transcript of a Lecture by Klaus Wyborny at the Think:Film 
Congress,” Think:Film, http://www.thinkfilm.de/panel/spacetime-i-
theoretical-physics-and-film-klaus-wyborny.
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tions, a fleeting association of discreet elements. … The more 
the film is distanced in memory, the more the binding effect 
of the narrative is loosened. The sequence breaks apart. The 
fragments go adrift and enter into new combinations, more 
or less transitory, in the eddies of memory: memories of other 
films, and memories of real events. 9 
Burgin allows that our eidetic memories often emerge out of the 
flux of forgetting and disremembering the movies. Film about 
film lays the concrete for a relationship to the screening between 
fantasying and the interruption of memory. 
Unmournanimal
Freud wrapped the mortal limit of his corpus in the period lead-
ing up to the onset of World War Two by revisiting in Moses and 
Monotheism the fantasy saga of the primal father. At the time, 
the followers he had kept closest, Otto Rank and Hanns Sachs, 
were each pursuing the line and lineage of fantasy research that 
they spun out of Freud’s own 1907 reflections on the role of day-
dream wish fulfillment in cultural production. Coincident with 
the diagnosis of Freud’s cancer, Rank, however, struck out on his 
own. Rank’s earlier work on the myth of the hero’s birth looped 
the Oedipus complex through the storylines of mythology and 
legend by way of the typical daydream fantasy Freud named the 
family romance. 
In 1924, Das Trauma der Geburt (The Trauma of Birth) was 
Rank’s ticket out of the Oedipus complex of application. A year 
following its publication, Rank confided to Marie Bonaparte 
that his trauma theory had been hoisted by an unconscious 
wish to be born like Athena from his father’s head. The shock of 
hearing that his scientific father was suffering from an incurable 
disease delivered the theory in one swell swoop. Was he riding 
out the swings and sorrows of manic depression, as Ernest Jones 
claimed? 10 We might take down the history inscribed within the 
9 Victor Burgin, The Remembered Film (London: Reaktion Books, 
2004), 67–68.
10 Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, vol. III (New 
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word the adolescent Otto chose as replacement for his father’s 
name Rosenfeld. The name that stands tall like timber, or in 
formation like a military unit, also swings round the bend as 
copious and course growth. 
In his memoir, Freud: Meister und Freund (Freud: Mentor 
and Friend, 1945), Sachs described the stage left by Rank at the 
time of Freud’s closing act. Marie Bonaparte entered this stage in 
Rank’s place with a work that was a transference gift. 
Whenever Freud was unable to work with his analysands 
during this turbulent period, he dedicated his complete 
attention to another task. He was translating a small book 
by Princess Marie titled Topsy: The Golden-Haired Chow. In 
it she describes her change in attitude, her empathy and her 
growing tenderness for one of her chows, who was afflicted 
by cancer of the mouth and through a successful treatment 
could be saved.11 
In her 1980 preface to a new edition of Bonaparte’s book, Anna 
Freud recalled that what her father prized in dogs was their 
grace, devotion, and, above all, the absence of ambivalence in 
their psychic disposition.12 Addressing Topsy inside her narra-
tive, Bonaparte also turns up the contrast with the mix or mess 
of human emotional contact: “And then, above all, you do not 
know these all-too human conditions of mixed feelings, that one 
can love and at the same time be so hostile. You either hate […] 
deeply and without limit. Or you love, as you love me, waiting 
sadly in front of the door when I’ve gone away, and jumping for 
joy when I return.”13 
York: Basic Books, 1963), 73.
11 Hanns Sachs, Freud: Meister und Freund, trans. Emmy Sachs 
(Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1982), 164–65. See also Marie 
Bonaparte’s Topsy, chow-chow au poil d’or (Paris: Denoël et Steele, 
1937).
12 Anna Freud, “Vorwort zur Neuausgabe,” in Marie Bonaparte, Topsy. 
Der goldhaarige Chow, trans. Anna Freud and Sigmund Freud 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1989), 9.
13 Bonaparte, Topsy. Der goldhaarige Chow, 87. I relied on the English 
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Healed through the radiation therapy that by her influence 
Bonaparte was able to secure for a “mere” dog, Topsy’s recovery 
redresses the earlier death of Bonaparte’s father, whose treat-
ments by the rays did not save him, and, following the arc of wish 
fulfillment, transmitted to Freud, her scientific father, fantastic 
get well wishes. The brief text chronicles the princess’s working 
through the fantasy thicket of wishes to arrive in the clearing at a 
wishing well. Preemptive ruminations on Topsy’s death alternate 
with declarations of love that gather together all her love objects. 
“Because I was in danger of losing her, because I felt […] that her 
life, Life itself, was threatened in her, I started to love her fiercely, 
with an abandon incomprehensible to me.”14 By anticipating 
Topsy’s death, which isn’t due in the text, Bonaparte engages 
open-endedly in premature mourning. There remained an open-
ing for burial in the corpus of her dog story, which Freud’s play-
ful question to Bonaparte touches upon: “Does Topsy realize she 
is being translated?”15 
Bonaparte doesn’t hold back her own ambivalence, and one 
gets the sense that what Topsy protects her against is being struck 
down in the muddle of her wishes and thoughts by vengeful 
ghosts. She keeps trying out fantasy scenarios of mixed mood 
as though in clarity training for big feelings she can stand by. 
She daydreams her own grieving over Topsy and how she is 
reproached for it: “People will probably say: that’s too much 
grieving over a poor dog. But I loved little Topsy as one can only 
love what is part of oneself, to which one daily and hourly feels 
close.”16 But even more than the loyalty to an internal object the 
transference gift to Freud is Bonaparte’s fantasy of how, in the 
event she went first, she would return in Topsy’s dreams. We shall 
overcome the transitive sentencing of loss and the ambivalence 
of survival: both parties to the loss are lost to each other. “My 
translation – Topsy: The Story of a Golden-haired Chow, trans. Gary 
Genosko (London: Routledge, 1994) – but often modified it to match 
the Freud translation.
14 Bonaparte, Topsy. Der goldhaarige Chow, 18.
15 Cited in Gary Genosko’s Introduction to Topsy: The Story of a Golden-
Haired Chow, 2.
16 Bonaparte, Topsy. Der goldhaarige Chow, 51–52.
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shadow will visit you in your sleep […]. You will let me come 
back and your stretched paws will twitch in your sleep when, 
dreaming, you jump up on me.”17
Cats and Dogs
When once again invited to visit a USC film studies class, this time 
in 2002, Pat Hitchcock related that her father had been enam-
ored of Benji (1974), which turns on a POV that is the topsy-turvy 
version of the dead-end given in Psycho. The camera repeatedly 
adopts the POV of the canine protagonist, both as objective 
perspective and, in flashback, as subjective camera. What’s more, 
the movie as a whole is largely filmed on a level with the dog’s 
eye view of events. Benji is one dog movie that ends happily, and 
without the idealization that packs away the raging problem of 
animal mortality. The death of the animal in film and TV can 
never be fictional.
Hilda Doolittle, her nickname was Cat, entered Freud’s clos-
ing act in 1932 by Sachs’s referral. Her first transference dream 
was a refiguration of Gustave Doré’s illustration of baby Moses 
discovered by the princess among the bulrushes. Freud recom-
mended that she read Rank’s 1912 study The Myth of the Birth 
of the Hero.18 The Princess in the dream is Marie Bonaparte. The 
stage was set. 
On one of our canyon walks in the first decade of the new 
millennium, because my good little girl Elli was lagging, I turned 
around and clapped my hands to speed things up. But she made 
that into a repeatable command and henceforth, when I turned 
to face her and clapped for her to follow she answered by a rush 
forward, the show of high spirits she delivered on cue. If dogs 
communicate through their trainability, cats redirect lines of 
communication through play. When the canine protagonist of 
Benji is kept from taking his routine stroll through the neighbor-
hood one morning, the local cat he usually chases is put out. It 
17 Ibid., 98.
18 Hilda Doolittle, Tribute to Freud (New York: New Directions, 1984), 
120. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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turns out that Benji filled out a role by his trainability, his line of 
response to the cat’s playacting.
The dog waits and watches; the cat looks and looks, which, 
when it’s your turn to be looked at, can be therapeutic or unnerv-
ing. The raw nerves bring back the mother of disappointment, 
whose interest has to be wooed over and again. In her analysis of 
Poe’s “The Black Cat,” Bonaparte argues that the cat is a totem of 
the witch mother.19 But if your early mother was a dog, you can 
meet the cat’s stare and playful nonlinearity halfway and find the 
cat mother charming. 
Hilda reports that the Professor “always seems interested when 
I tell him of my animal findings and fairy-tale associations” (136). 
In puzzling out the meaning of her dream, they play, she writes, 
“puss-in-a-corner, find one angle and another or see things from 
different corners or sides of a room” (119). Hilda wanted her gift 
to be unique and ended up being the only analysand not to give 
Freud a birthday present for several years running. 
The capacity for play comes in good stead when a cat can’t 
think the way back down from the top of a tree or the roof. Cats 
get caught in tight spots from which the only way back down is 
a straight line. But often upon being helped to return to the start 
position, they disown their plight by the ploy of play. Freudchen, 
my cat in the 1990s, would greet me upon my return from cam-
pus standing on the roof over the entrance to our home. Each 
time it appeared that he was stuck up there. I would walk around 
the house, which was built into an incline, to the point in the 
roofline where he could readily jump down (and had probably 
climbed up). He would high-paw me like the joke was on me, 
too. Then he would tell me extensively about his day in language 
that remained enigmatic to me but which followed all the modu-
lations, in emphasis and affect, befitting a narrative between 
plaint and entertainment.
When Hilda entered the office for her first session, Freud was 
taken aback that his brand-new analysand took in the setting 
19 Marie Bonaparte, Edgar Poe, étude psychanalytique (Paris: Denoël et 
Steele, 1933). The second volume of the German translation, Edgar 
Poe. Eine psychonalytische Studie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1984), closes with the section on “The Black Cat.” 
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from its various angles and corners before facing him: “You are 
the only person who has ever come into this room and looked at 
the things in the room before looking at me” (62). When Freud’s 
chow comes around the bend of the couch, Hilda, although not 
a dog person, bends down to greet the so-called lioness. Freud 
warns her that the dog is difficult with strangers and might snap. 
But they embrace. Freud barks: “I am an old man – you do not 
think it worth your while to love me” (ibid.). But she’s wrong, he 
says; the analyst doesn’t die of old age. “In analysis,” he instructs 
her, “the person is dead after the analysis is over – as dead as your 
father” (141). 
In Topsy: The Golden-Haired Chow, Bonaparte’s summary 
of the prehistory of the relationship between man and dog can 
be read as interlinear gloss between two stories, its allegory and 
translation.
When […] man, still savage, hunted wild beasts and pursued 
his prey, sometimes the ancestors of the dogs must have come, 
once night had fallen, to look for the leavings of this prey. 
[…] Man, jealous of his prey, if he still caught sight of them 
at dawn, chased them away. Sometimes he pursued them; 
but, some day or other, he must have killed a mother by the 
side of her puppies and have taken them. Then, as they grew 
up, they learned to hunt with him, to share his cave and his 
meals. Since then, oh Topsy, how many dogs have arisen, 
have run in the woods and the steppes, then have laid them-
selves down forever to mingle their bones with our bones, 
in this same earth on which you are now stretched! And in 
how many places! For everywhere on this soil that bears us, 
where the sole of human feet has left its imprint, the imprint 
of dogs’ paws has followed. […] In the bargain concluded in 
those times between man and dog, the dog sometimes had to 
pay dearly. For the easier prey, for the daily meal, how many 
blows? And the death of the dog which did not matter, when 
the master was tired of it!20 
20 Bonaparte, Topsy. Der goldhaarige Chow, 76, 79. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
the block of fame
88
Bonaparte recounts that Topsy’s ancestors in China pulled sleds 
and hunted wolves and that on occasion her living kin are still 
what’s for dinner: “in Canton the flesh of the yellow and black 
chows is eaten, probably also for ulterior purposes related to 
magic” (36). 
The animal medium, as big as lifetime, never drops close 
contact with finitude, as Bonaparte writes: “Since a dog’s life is 
so much shorter than our own, to have one, to love one, is […] 
gratuitously to invite Death into one’s house” (48). The animal 
that in coming close to us lays bare the lifetime we spare also 
comes back to us out of the transference. Bonaparte ruminates 
continuously on the end of Topsy, while all the deaths that fit 
her transferences are brought home. The animal kept close, like a 
medium at the séance, is an open invitational for all one’s ghosts. 
But Topsy is also the safeguard against the backfire of wishing 
upon the other’s itinerary or destiny. “In the nightly darkness of 
the large garden uncanny forces reside; under the black trees I 
see the ghosts of my departed waiting for me, my dead mother, 
who wants her child back, my deceased father, who calls me to 
his side. When you are gone, Topsy, who will protect me against 
these ghosts?” (39). 
Topsy’s recovery spares them both the haunting prospect of 
Chow Down. Bonaparte is jubilant: “Topsy, when I watch you 
run now after your cure, the thought that I was able, through 
magic powers, as it were, to prolong your little dog life, makes 
me as proud as if I had written the Iliad” (71). Her breakthrough 
affirmation coincides with a break Freud takes from the materi-
als of his Moses genealogy to consider what the heroic sagas of 
Greek Antiquity drew on and covered up. 
During the period at which, among the Jews, the return of the 
religion of Moses was in preparation, the Greek people found 
themselves in possession of an exceedingly rich store of tribal 
legends and hero-myths. […] With our present psychological 
insight we could, long before Schliemann and Evans, have 
raised the question of where it was that the Greeks obtained 
all the legendary material which was worked over by Homer 
and the great Attic dramatists in their masterpieces. The 
answer would have had to be that this people had probably 
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experienced in their prehistory a period of external brilliance 
and cultural efflorescence which had perished in a historical 
catastrophe and of which an obscure tradition survived in 
these legends. The archaeological researches of our days […] 
have uncovered the evidences of the impressive Minoan-
Mycenaean civilization, which had probably already come 
to an end on the mainland of Greece before 1250 B.C. There 
is scarcely a hint at it to be found in the Greek historians of 
a later age: at most a remark that there was a time when the 
Cretans exercised command of the sea, and the name of King 
Minos and of his palace, the Labyrinth.21 
Of all the factors that Freud identifies building the momentum 
for the ultimate ascendancy of the Mosaic god, including uniden-
tified persistence of a kind of memory or the encysted survival of 
isolated traces, the most compelling, perhaps the catchall, is that 
of a darkly distorted tradition that continued to be effective in 
the background: it was the tradition of a great past, a great cause, 
which had been lost. The poets of Ancient Greece drew on such 
a tradition involving the loss of Minoan civilization. Later on, 
historiography took tradition’s place, while the artist filled the 
gaps in transmission with fantasy.
In Kunst und Künstler (Art and the Artist, 1932), Rank bela-
bors his sense of the advance of Greek antiquity, which, as he 
already underscored in The Trauma of Birth, was the first culture 
to separate the human from the animal and advance thus from 
religion to art. The Greeks were the “only culture really to live 
on the earth and in the light of the sun, which is why a strict 
border was drawn between the world above and the underworld, 
in which the dead led a bloodless and soulless existence.”22 
21 Sigmund Freud, “Moses and Monotheism,” in The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXIII 
(1937–1939): Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis 
and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1964), 70.
22 Otto Rank, Kunst und Künstler. Studien zur Genese und Entwicklung 
des Schaffensdranges (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2000), 149. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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In the fabled Minoan labyrinth, Rank looked for the meta-
bolic change going into the ascent of Greek antiquity. Since 
the experts of the day claimed that Cretan prehistory was not 
verifiable, Rank turned to the evidence of medieval labyrinths 
in northern Europe. “Certain labyrinthine constructions char-
acterized in the Icelandic saga as animal traps, are identified in 
England and Scandinavia as Troytowns or walls of Troy” (151). 
Walls of Troy trapped evil spirits encircled by the steps and turns 
of a dance.
The turning of the dance guided by the structures themselves 
turns on the labyrinth in which the Minotaur, half human, half 
animal, could be kept, but only through the proffered intake of 
human sacrifice. So-called palaces of the intestines in Ancient 
Babylon turn labyrinthine construction back upon the insides 
of animals, the prospect that vouchsafed prophecy, but also 
served to mediate the rebirth of the deceased into the afterlife. 
A privileged form of early burial, therefore, was the deceased’s 
insertion inside an emptied-out animal skin: the animal used 
was also reborn within the animal parts of the human organism 
while the reclaimed human soul, like the treasure the hero brings 
back from his quest, enriched all the members of the clan (164). 
The alternative to burial inside an animal skin was to be eaten 
by animals or swallowed whole by a very large animal. Rank 
seizes the possibility that the Minotaur legend was overcome in 
the Trojan horse. 
Instead of the inner intestinal spirals, which in ornaments still 
dominate the civilization of Ancient Crete, there appears not 
only the stylized animal body (the horse), but also the human, 
who frees himself from his animal basis, and ultimately in the 
idealized human forms of the Olympian Gods, triumphs over 
the chthonic-animal principle. (158) 
Rank’s wishful thinking cannot escape the datemark, the race 
toward, away from, and against Freud’s mortality.  
It was not the close reading of the metabolic ins and outs 
of the primal fantasy in Art and the Artist that marked his 
abandonment of Freud’s science. Rather it was the conclusion 
Rank appended to the passages of endopsychic reading like a 
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refrain. Self-creation, the end-all of psychic processes, is real-
ized in its perfectibility across an arc of wish fulfillment link-
ing Greek antiquity and Christianity. If one brackets out this 
refraining order Art and the Artist remains at the bulk rate 
continuous with Rank’s earlier work as well as compatible with 
Géza Róheim’s folklore studies or Herbert Silberer’s analyses of 
the occult. At the same time, there was another refrain, which, if 
missing, signaled abandonment of Freud’s science: the recurring 
strain of the sexual etiology of neurosis. Freud required the knee 
jerk of sexuality as bulwark against the mudslide of the occult, 
as he put it. Is Freud’s outspoken rejection of the occult in this 
instance, given his interest in telepathy and haunting, the defec-
tive cornerstone of his science? No. Like Immanuel Kant and 
Arthur Schopenhauer before him, he was rejecting the so-called 
spiritualist view of occult phenomena, which disowned our ani-
mal relation. 
The day before receiving from him the lethal injection of mor-
phine, Freud confided to his physician Max Schur that his final 
reading selection, Honoré de Balzac’s The Wild Ass’s Skin,23 had 
turned out to be a perfect fit, since the story turned on shrinking 
and starvation. Freud wrote of his father as he lay dying that he 
was “steadily shrinking towards […] a fateful date.”24 The span 
of skin tightens its hold over someone starving in its vanishing 
act. Rank, who had written long and hard on the overcoming 
of primal forms of burial, in particular those signaling rebirth, 
like interment inside an animal skin, died suddenly of an obscure 
infection within one month of Freud’s departure. It was a wrap. 
They Eat Horses, Don’t They? 
Released within eight years of her father’s jump out the window, 
Emilie Deleuze’s movie Mister V (2003) tracks changes in rela-
tionality that commence when Mister V, otherwise an untrain-
23 If you flash on my reading of Balzac’s story centered on the philosophy 
of wishing in volume one of Critique of Fantasy, you’ll see that a circle 
is closing.
24 Max Schur, Freud: Living and Dying (New York: International 
Universities Press, Inc., 1972), 528. 
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able or psycho horse, flexes immense potential by clearing the 
wall of his pen in one impossible jump. At this point the film 
identifies with its own medium nature, its own trainability, and 
gives us a couple of staggered replays of the jump. 
Lemoigne, a Belgian gangster, contracted Luigi to buy Mister 
V. The scheme is to cash in on the insurance value by arranging 
for the animal’s fatal accident. Following the spectacular jump, 
however, Luigi becomes determined instead to train the talented 
horse to be a prize winner. But then Luigi is found dead in Mister 
V’s stall. His brother Lucas and widow Cécile decide not to treat 
the horse’s violence against Luigi as intentional. Mister V carries 
forward Luigi’s loss but also exceeds it. The anxieties that accrue 
to the disposability of this horse crowd out any room at all for 
Luigi’s absence. When they spared Mister V, Cécile and Lucas 
reclaimed unmournability and raised it to totemic power. 
Following a stint of his everyday life in town suspended 
between lab research and tap dancing, Lucas is called back to the 
country by messages on the answering machine left in earshot of 
his responsibility. Lemoigne’s messages remind him of his dead 
brother’s debt to the underworld; Cécile’s messages ask him to 
mind that he promised not to leave her alone. When Lucas is 
back, his niece Clara announces that mummy is expecting him 
and directs him to the site of Cécile’s partially towel-wrapped 
nude sunbathing. When she signals to him to sit down, the cam-
era takes over, as earlier with Mister V’s jump, and replays the 
gesture, which hovers in the medium. 
Lucas’s clumsiness and carelessness while trying to bind 
Mister V make it easy for the horse to corner him in the stall. But 
this time the horse doesn’t kill his human. He bites him instead, 
whereupon Lucas passes out. It is a scene of identification with 
the departed, over which Mister V watches. When Cécile points 
out that the horse could have killed him, Lucas counters: “But 
he didn’t. I saw him.” Lucas urges Cécile to stick to her resolve 
not to kill Mister V: “If we kill him we’ll never know.” Know? 
“If Luigi was right.” Lucas declares that to help out he will take 
a longer leave from work, not a vacation but a sabbatical. They 
embrace, kiss, and the rest is substitution. But it is an interlude of 
success (and succession) that wrecks Lucas, who must start over.
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When Lucas rebukes his brother following the high-rolling 
purchase of high-strung Mister V, Luigi promises that this insur-
ance scam is just one last turn in the underworld that will free 
him of a residual indebtedness. Lucas next asks about Cécile, 
who is in recovery from a bout of depression. “Et Cécile?” Lucas 
asked his brother, thus placing the short hand over the heart 
of his longstanding love affair with his brother’s family. Luigi 
promptly reports to Lucas that daughter Clara is excelling at 
school. That his brother’s family is a readymade only one mur-
derous substitution away from his understanding and grasp is 
what the film and horse must circumvent unto the prospect of 
survival in mourning.
On the morning after, Clara brings Lucas a present from 
Lemoigne: a needle for injecting the horse. The one-night 
understanding of substitution and successful mourning cannot 
get past the relationship to Mister V’s mortality. Lucas moves in 
with Mister V. 
Fantasying follows the beat or measure of fulfillment when 
Lucas establishes eye-to-eye coordination with Mister V. He sta-
bilizes the horse in the stable, while movement extends the bond 
unto a fantastic correspondence. Lucas’s modified dance steps 
are given (or edited) in exchange with Mister V’s matching steps. 
The dissociation organizing Lucas’s relationship to his own or 
the mother’s body (which he has projected into the techno sci-
ence of measuring horses in motion, his profession, and into 
the art of tap dancing, his hobby or fetish) is re-collected in the 
relationship to Mister V.
After a visit to his brother’s grave, Lucas informs Lemoigne 
that the horse will die: “I’ll call when it’s done.” The underworld 
insurance scam can now be extended to fund new beginnings. 
The horse farm can go up in smoke, and yield its insurance value, 
while the senior horse Tiberius can be put to sleep right before 
the fire and, passing for Mister V, earn the premium insurance 
coverage. 
When Lucas starts to inform Cécile what happened to Mister 
V, she stops him. “For me he’s dead. I don’t care.” They embrace. 
We watch, with Lucas, as Cécile, moving away, strokes the back 
of her neck turned toward us, rubbing the spot we’re in with 
Mister V. But it is from this spot (or out of it) that Lucas can now 
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make plans to travel to the location of possible reunions with 
Cécile and Clara. 
Lemoigne says he knew the father of Luigi and Lucas. 
Batistella, the saving foreign purchaser at the end of the film, 
who gives shelter to Mister V, recognizes in Lucas his mother’s 
lookalike. At this point of identification – of a loss in his face 
– all the parties to the film’s happy end begin to arrive via a 
reclamation that at the same time exceeds the doubling logic of 
the insurance scam and the underworld filiation. While the first 
figure, Lemoigne, belongs to the murderous underworld of sub-
stitution with benefits, the second, Batistella, recrosses the path 
of the film story stitching together its containment. But when he 
first appears at the opening horse auction he tries to get Lucas’s 
attention, tries to say “Hi,” but is overlooked and passed by. A 
stray connection left unidentified, without follow up, Batistella 
is a continuity error. In the medium of every film story, the conti-
nuity error is the inadvertent performance of a loss of connection 
that appears only to disappear or hide out. 
Following Mister V’s jump, Luigi dismissed Lucas’s second 
thoughts: “For you everything’s a problem.” But Lucas stands up 
for his job description: “I test, I analyze.” Lucas wants to harness 
to the art and science of measurement and distinction the stride 
length of horses and, at a jump, the time between the forelegs 
coming down and the hind legs pushing off. Lucas’s project reca-
pitulates Eadweard Muybridge’s proto-cinematographic photo 
documentation of the stride of horsepower. A wrap with his 
pursuit of tap dancing prowess, his fantasy science project is a 
simulacrum of one of the film medium’s primal scenes. By thus 
reinscribing the advent of motion in pictures, Deleuze projects 
her medium as the emotion picture carrying forward the animal 
relation unto the undecidability of Freud’s leading question of 
priority. Does the totem meal dismantle into measurable doses 
the primal death of the father or does the primal father’s mourn-
able death make it possible for the unmournable animal to be 
what’s for dinner? The inconceivability of Mr. V’s loss, which 
admits only the horse’s rescue, gets Lucas past the impasse of 
unmourning, now the continuity error upholding the happy 
ending of the film.
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Wrecked by Successful Mourning
When in Moses and Monotheism Freud reintroduces the back-
story of the Darwinian primal horde, the term he uses for the 
primal leader of the pack, “Männchen,” literally “little man,” 
is the zoological term used for the male animal. Both meanings 
come together in the German expression for the command given 
a dog to sit up and beg: Männchen machen. The trajectory of 
the primal fantasy also extends through the phrase Männchen 
Malen, literally “to paint or draw Männchen,” which means: 
“to doodle.” It names the daydreaming activity of the older child 
or teen at school, which inscribes the father whose distant or 
tyrannical cast is thus lightened and lubed for friendly or indeed 
oedi-pal identification. 
The story of the primal Männchen must be told, Freud 
announces, in grand condensation, “in großartiger Verdichtung,” 
as though what in reality extended over millennia and was count-
lessly repeated, took place once.25 The aggressive Männchen 
drove away all his sons, who in time formed the fraternity that 
returned to kill and devour him.26 But as in the practice of 
Männchen Malen, the rebellious consumers of the Männchen 
didn’t purely hate and fear him; they honored him as their avatar 
and ultimate object of identification.
The terrain of transmission of the primal father fantasy, 
which Freud demarcates, is scratch and sniff. The traces to follow 
are not specific to human language. And yet, Freud ascribes the 
advent of omnipotence of thoughts, the very crux of wish fan-
tasy, to pride taken in the development of language.27 Ensconced 
in language lies the primal scene of animation or animism, the 
identification of the movement of invisible air currents with the 
breath of life, the first spirit. Man extended the spirit he breathed 
25 Sigmund Freud, “Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische 
Religion,” in Gesammelte Werke, ed. Anna Freud et al. (London: 
Imago, 1950), 16:529.
26 Ibid., 530.
27 Freud, “Moses and Monotheism,” 113.
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in and out to all of nature. Modern science, Freud adds, was still 
working hard to de-animate the results.28 
Upon its posthumous publication, Sachs wrote a review of 
Moses and Monotheism, which he subsequently folded into The 
Creative Unconscious. Sachs tracked the transmutation of Freud’s 
adolescent heroic fantasy set forth in one of the autobiographical 
passages Freud offered in The Interpretation of Dreams, which 
Sachs quotes. “Hannibal had been the favorite hero of my years 
from eleven to fifteen […]. Like many others at the same age I had 
given my sympathies during the Punic wars not to the Romans, 
but to the Carthaginians.”29 Freud goes on to connect all the dots 
between his situation at school with anti-Semitic classmates and 
the ancient exploits of a Semitic hero. Sachs comments: “We 
learn here of a wish-fantasy in the form appropriate to the ways 
of thinking and feeling in early adolescence: To become a fighter, 
a leader in the war against injustice and oppression” (133). 
Shortly before entering the university, Freud dropped his 
plans for a ministerial position, which would have been the ful-
fillment of “the daydreams and ambitions of adolescence” (137). 
He decided instead on a career in medicine and resigned himself 
to the obscurity of a lifetime of scientific research. Sachs connects 
two essays by Freud from the year 1914, the one he published 
anonymously on Michelangelo’s Moses and “On the History of 
the Psychoanalytic Movement,” his public reckoning with the 
departures of Adler and Jung. The highpoint of Moses’ implied 
movement, which the sculpture catches, is the restraint he shows 
in the face of the infuriating rejection of his teaching by his own 
chosen people. Sachs sees further restraint placed upon the ado-
lescent fantasy when Freud argued in Moses and Monotheism 
that Moses was not even a Semitic object of identification but 
instead an Egyptian who selected the Jewish people to carry for-
ward the religion of Aton, which had miscarried in Egypt. 
Freud linked the crux of his adolescent fantasy to early child-
hood experiences, which Sachs unpacks. “Freud does not leave 
us without information about the deeper, early infantile root 
of his resentment against oppression. His first playmate was a 
28 Ibid., 114.
29 Sachs, The Creative Unconscious, 133.
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boy, somewhat older than he (the son of his half-brother) who 
occasionally misused the greater strength which his age gave him. 
‘It seems that he treated me very badly at times and that I showed 
my courage against my tyrant’” (134). The significance of this 
playmate, John Freud, was charged, animated, Freud discovered 
in the course of his auto-analytic correspondence with Wilhelm 
Fliess, by the departure in early childhood of his younger brother 
Julius.30 The ghostly content of transference had all along been 
brought home to him in the serial making and breaking up of 
his same-sex friendships, which recycled the split-level structure 
of denial of Julius to and through the forget-together with John. 
When at last in London, Freud was able to conclude Moses and 
Monotheism and thus put to rest, as he wrote, an unquiet ghost. 
The identification with lost causes that moves teenagers and 
whole nations is a manic defense against the inner reality of 
the wreckage of success. The poetic historiography of Rome, 
perhaps the most famous instance of the niche market of the 
confederation of lost wars, undergoes an update in Macbeth, 
which Freud’s reading of the Macbeths among “those wrecked by 
success” underscores.31 While Freud admits that he could not give 
a satisfying answer to the question why Lady Macbeth collapsed 
after her success, he announces that with his next exemplary pro-
tagonist, Rebecca West of Henrik Ibsen’s Rosmersholm (1886), 
he will be able to penetrate the enigma of another mood swing. 
A split second after jubilating over the longed-for success of her 
plan to become Rosmer’s second wife, Rebecca projects suicide 
instead, her only alternative to the sudden resolve never to accept 
the marriage proposal. 
By her own background, Rebecca is an ill fit with the conser-
vation of family values in Rosmer’s lineage and estate. She is the 
only child of an unwed mother, a midwife. When she died her 
colleague, the freethinker Dr. West, adopted and raised Rebecca. 
30 In my first book, Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on German Crypts 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), I sought to rewrite 
German Kultur upon a series of crypts, in the first place the one 
underlying Freud’s Julius Caesar complex.
31 See the chapter “Identification with Lost Causes” in my Germany: A 
Science Fiction (Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2014).
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After Dr. West’s passing Rebecca found employment with 
Rosmer and his invalid wife Beata. Falling for a new father figure, 
Rebecca contrived an extensive plan for replacing Beata in the 
wife position. What’s missing in the home is offspring. Rebecca 
makes sure that Beata will find a medical manual spelling out 
that reproduction alone is the rationale for marriage. She insinu-
ates that Rosmer’s change of faith in religion and politics follows 
her own views. Finally, she lets Beata know that she, Rebecca, 
will have to go away to conceal and carry to term the outcome of 
her illicit intercourse with Rosmer. 
Motivated by the new rationale that Rebecca has inculcated in 
her that she must get out of the way of her husband’s happiness, 
now inseparable from the future of the family line, Beata drowns 
herself in the stream that bisects the Rosmersholm estate. This is 
the prehistory. The drama commences one year after the suicide, 
at the end of a relatively happy period of Rebecca and Rosmer’s 
cohabitation in ideal friendship. Gossip about their status com-
promises the friendship at the same time that Rosmer begins to 
doubt that his wife’s suicide can be dismissed as symptom of her 
chronic depression. It is to counter the uncertainty that besets 
them that Rosmer proposes marriage to Rebecca, in other words 
the wedding night, whereupon she turns out to be another strik-
ing example of one wrecked by success. 
Rebecca’s diffuse rationalization that in coming under 
Rosmer’s influence her ruthless will has weakened is not so much 
wrong as an elaboration on another instability, which Rebecca’s 
subtraction of one year from her true age reveals. That she is 
one year younger is her best defense against the claim of Beata’s 
brother that Dr. West was her biological progenitor before he 
became her adoptive father. But he knows better that the good 
doctor was in town for an extended visit the year before he 
moved in with Rebecca’s mother. The literalness of her incestu-
ous relations with Dr. West, the illicit affair that no one bothered 
to assume or interrogate, brings home her other primal Oedipal 
crime, the murderous replacement of her mother. 
The prelude to this charged affair was that Rebecca became 
a free thinker like Dr. West, just as she later became a person of 
conscience like Rosmer. What turns success into wreckage is not 
the plain text of incest but what lies between the two stages of 
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its elaboration: the repeated violence to her mother or, more 
precisely, to her dead mother and her remembrance.
Rosmersholm opens with Rebecca’s denial of the existence 
of ghosts. She and the maid watch Rosmer on his return home 
avoiding the bridge that marks the spot of Beata’s suicide. 
Rebecca: “They certainly cling to their dead at Rosmersholm.” 
The maid observes instead: “I think it’s the dead that cling to 
Rosmersholm.” Rebecca looks at her: “How do you mean – the 
dead?” The ecstatic cling of haunting is incarnated by the white 
horses meant originally to run in the drama’s title. Their ghostly 
skittishness conveys the unfinished business of the dead. To deny 
the ghostly dead means to deny them love.32 Rebecca’s resolve 
breaks on this declination of denial. 
32 This is the gist of Melanie Klein’s reading of ghosts in “Some 
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Wish Upon a Star
According to its subtitle, Adorno in Neapel (Adorno in Naples) 
aims to show “how a landscape of yearning was transformed into 
philosophy.” It was, however, already getting late in the book 
before a formulation really grabbed me and showed me the way. 
The author argues that in his jazz essays Adorno declared that 
the constellation, the wrap for his work and the problems under 
investigation, had been stolen.1 By the time Adorno finished his 
essay “Notes on Kafka” in 1953,2 it was restored.
Already prior to 1942, the onset of work on his Kafka essay, 
Adorno shared with Benjamin the recognition of Kafka’s 
inscription of prehistory upon modernity. In his essay on Kafka, 
Benjamin spells out the constellation comprising the hybrid 
Odradek: 
1 Martin Mittelmeier, Adorno in Neapel. Wie sich eine 
Sehnsuchtlandschaft in Philosophie verwandelt (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 
2013), 176. Karl Kraus faced the rise of National Socialism with a similar 
proprietal awareness that his satirical strategies for letting the abuse 
of language in our journalistic Sensurround bleed and read had been 
coopted by the literalness of the Nazi violence in word, indeed. 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka,” in Gesammelte 
Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, vol. 10, pt. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2003), 254–87.
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In Kafka’s work, the most singular bastard which the pre-
historic world has begotten with guilt is Odradek. “At first 
sight it looks like a flat, star-shaped spool for thread, and it 
really seems to have thread wound around it; to be sure, this 
is probably just old, broken-off bits of thread that are knotted 
and tangled together, of all sorts and colors. But the object is 
not just a spool, for a small wooden crossbar sticks out of the 
middle of the star, and another small rod is joined to it at right 
angles. With the aid of this latter rod on one side and one of 
the extensions of the star on the other, the whole thing can 
stand upright as if on two legs.”3
Writing to Benjamin on December 17, 1934, about the essay 
“Franz Kafka” pre-publication, Adorno jumps on the formula-
tion of guilt to make a point he drives home: 
Doesn’t he have his place beside the father of the house – is he 
not the father’s care (Sorge) and danger, is not the overcoming 
(Aufhebung) of the creaturely relationship to guilt prefigured 
in him – is not the care (Sorge) – truly a Heidegger put back on 
his feet – the cipher, indeed the most certain promise of hope, 
precisely by the overturning (Aufhebung) of the house?4 
With Kafka, then, Martin Heidegger stands on his footnotes and 
Goethean-Faustian Sorge is on the same page with Freud. 
While reading Augustine on love under the covers with 
Heidegger, Hannah Arendt situated the liminality of creature-
liness between the “no longer” (nicht mehr) and the “not yet” 
(noch nicht).5 The formulation is set on St. Augustine’s own 
3 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversay of His 
Death,” in Selected Writings, ed. Michael Jennings, trans. Harry Zohn 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 
2.2:810–11.
4 Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, Briefwechsel: 1928–1940, ed. 
Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994), 2–93.
5 Hannah Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer 
philosophischen Interpretation (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2006), 6. 
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oeuvre, which spans like the onset of allegory a pagan education 
and the after-the-fact impact of the turn to Christianity. 
In her 1946 review, “No Longer and Not Yet,” Arendt activated 
for the first time extramurally her key formulation of creaturely 
temporality in characterizing the impasse following the First 
World War. Where did the transition/tradition binding the loss 
in generations to the continuity of high culture go? “Hume once 
remarked that the whole of human civilization depends upon 
the fact that ‘one generation does not go off the stage at once and 
another succeed, as is the case with silkworms and butterflies.’ 
At some turning-points of history, however, at some heights of 
crisis, a fate similar to that of silkworms and butterflies may befall 
a generation of men.”6 In pitching the advent of a third option, 
which Arendt associates with Kafka, she reintroduces her timing 
of the creature. “Between the generations, between those who 
for some reason or other still belong to the old and those who 
either feel the catastrophe in their very bones or have already 
grown up with it, the chain is broken and an ‘empty space,’ a 
kind of historical no man’s land, comes to the surface which can 
be described only in terms of ‘no longer and not yet.’”7 
According to Adorno, Kafka saw the Nazi death-wish factory 
realize the creaturely estate according to a malignant superegoic 
model of a punishing fulfillment without rescue or hope. “In 
the concentration camps […] the line of demarcation between 
life and death was erased. They produced a liminal state, living 
skeletons and the decaying, victims whose suicide fails, Satan’s 
laugh at the hope of an end to death.”8 Adorno’s emphasis in 
his essay on a Freudian infrastructure in Kafka’s works offered 
a stay against the forwarding of all unidentified liminal states to 
philosophy’s new “uncanny” address. The Odradek story (“Die 
Sorge des Hausvaters”) was published the same year as Freud’s 
analysis of the uncanny. A few years later, the Enge (“narrow-
ness”) that is the etymon and strait place of Angst (“anxiety”) is 
6 Hannah Arendt, “No Longer and Not Yet,” in Reflections on Literature 
and Culture, ed. Susannah Young-Ah Gottlieb (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 121.
7 Ibid., 122.
8 Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka,” 273.
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for Heidegger a misapprehension of the embarrassment of pos-
sibilities we lag behind. We take flight into “fantasy worlds” from 
das Unheimliche, our literally “not being at home,” which is our 
situation or condition.9 
“Notes on Kafka” opens with the author’s dissatisfaction that 
the work enjoys such a great popularity with those seeking it 
out as their “information desk” for the insider knowledge that 
allows them to reduce untenable situations to what’s already 
known, seen through, and throwaway. “But it is the false fame 
(der falsche Ruhm), the fatal variant of forgetting, which Kafka 
wished for himself in bitter earnest, and which compels our insis-
tence before the riddle.”10
If Adorno was able to retrieve the theft of his constellation 
by the time of publication of “Notes on Kafka,” then he found a 
third option that plagiarism cannot breach. It’s easy to overlook 
that Kafka, one of the bestselling authors of high Kultur, was 
posthumously rescued from the realm of the unread. Tested 
by the prospect of annihilation, its own holocaust, the work 
is uniquely free of proprietary influence. The fit Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari found with the flow charts of their pre-Oedipal, 
I mean Anti-Oedipal, manifesto-theory allowed them to be, 
not unlike Adorno within his constellation, in alliance with 
Kafka. In Kafka, it’s not “Steal This Book!” It’s “Just Try Stealing 
inside the Burrow to Claim It”: “Only the principle of multiple 
entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier 
and those attempts to interpret a work that is actually only open 
to experimentation.”11 
Adorno went back to the scene of his wartime work on the 
reversals of psychoanalysis to revisit the culture industry’s theft 
of his critical praxis, the constellation. You go back to achieve 
the best formulations of your retired inquiry. Adorno’s essays on 
television came out of this replay of his sojourn in the under-
9 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1986), 
5–95. 
10 Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka,” 254.
11 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, 
trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 
3.
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world. The third one, “How to Look at Television,” was written 
in English. His main effort during this return engagement was 
The Stars Down to Earth, the analysis of an LA astrology column 
that he began studying in 1952 and also wrote down in English. 
At the time, he was contemplating residing in California indefi-
nitely. His wooden English might have been the best reason for 
his return to the German-language world. He was back in time 
for publication of “Notes on Kafka,” which launched Adorno’s 
postwar West German career as famous author whose essay col-
lections were on every bookshelf. 
The horoscopes that Adorno began studying in 1952 offer 
non-sequiturs, so-called “blanks,” which the reader can fill in 
emotionally so as to believe.12 A practical aspect aids in rationaliz-
ing these blank desires as recreational contact: “The semitolerant 
integration of pleasure into a rigid pattern of life is achieved by 
the ever-recurring promise that pleasure trips, sprees, parties and 
similar events will lead to practical advantages. One will make 
new acquaintances, build up ‘connections’ that prove helpful for 
the career” (65). 
Because the columnist addresses their “fondest hopes,” the 
readers are “temporarily prepared to accept the most improb-
able promises” (78). What is compelling about the forecasts, 
however, is the status quo’s authoritarian grasp, which force-
fills in the irrationalism gap, its corollary, with good sense and 
direction. “The common-sense advice itself contains […] many 
spurious ‘pseudo-rational’ elements, calling for some authoritar-
ian backing to be effective” (24). The nimbus of down-to-earth 
counseling in the forecasts falls into the gap: “the law according 
to which the reasonable attitudes are applied to ‘realistic situ-
ations,’ is arbitrary and entirely opaque” (39). Freedom means 
12 Adorno analyzed the LA astrology column while back in California for 
a 1952–53 stint of research. What he uncovered at the Hacker Institute 
in Beverly Hills led to the monograph published five years later. 
Theodor W. Adorno, “The Stars Down to Earth: The Los Angeles 
Times Astrology Column. A Study in Secondary Superstition,” in 
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2003), 9.2:78. Subsequent page numbers are given in the 
text.
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volunteer for nothing else to do: “there is in astrology an implicit 
metaphysics of adjustment” (28).
Adorno analyzes the wrap of fantasy in reality, the flight to 
reality, within the B-genre that reaches for the stars: 
This wide-spread fad may owe its tremendous popularity to 
its ingenious solution of the conflict between irrationality and 
common sense. The science fiction reader need no longer feel 
ashamed of being a superstitious and gullible person. The 
fantasies of his own making, no matter how irrational they 
are, and how much projective content of either individual or 
collective nature may be implied, appear no longer as irrecon-
cilable to reality. (85) 
Science fiction both updates Christianity and denies the prov-
enance, defending against the depressing prospect with the fan-
tasy-ring of reality: “Thus, the term ‘another world’ which once 
had a metaphysical meaning, is here brought down to the level 
of astronomy and obtains an empirical ring” (85–86). Contrary 
to the law of convergence, which holds that the development of 
life even on distant planets would be more or less continuous in 
terms of enabling conditions and outcome, science fiction fol-
lows out instead a “secularization of demonology” to bring back 
entities of “olden times” but “treated as natural and scientific 
objects coming out of space from another star” (86). 
In these borderlands of fantasy and science fiction, notions of 
soft and hard science add up to the “bill” that astrology presents 
“for the neglect of interpretative thinking for the sake of fact-
gathering” (114–15). In the half-educated gathering, the “facts” of 
stellar movements and well-known psychological reactions con-
tribute to “the readiness to relate the unrelated” (116). Fact-based 
“wild constructs” arise, while “the spuriousness of the links 
goes unacknowledged” (115–16). The gathering that thus arises 
draws consolation from “fatality, dependence, and obedience.” 
The “will,” that is, “the will to change,” is reduced to private 
“worries” for which the column promises “a cure-all by the very 
same compliance which prevents a change of conditions” (117). 
But the reduction must be an internal adjustment supervised by 
the reader’s own insight: “Meekness towards the more powerful 
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seems to do less damage to so-called self-esteem if cloaked as the 
outcome of higher insight either into oneself or into those whom 
one obeys” (90). 
The irrationality of astrology is not that of a dream world but 
in its processed form is comparable rather to what the so-called 
dream factory assembles (34). “The message of the dream, how-
ever, the ‘latent dream idea’ as promoted by motion pictures and 
television reverses that of actual dreams” (46). The promotional 
idea that the dream is seen to transmit is the wish – for controlled 
release, to be controlled. “It is an appeal to agencies of psycholog-
ical control rather than an attempt to unfetter the unconscious” 
(ibid.). Adjustment works because it allows you, too, to roll off 
the assembly line: “The semi-irrationality of ‘everything will be 
fine’ is based on the fact that modern American Society […] suc-
ceeds in reproducing the life of those whom it embraces” and 
grasps (43). The pitch to adjustment, reasonableness, and so on, 
is the hitch by which “threat and help converge” (46). The com-
forting trust conveying that in due time everything will come out 
all right corresponds to a child’s fantasies of what will happen 
when grown up (58). 
The column deploys a timeline in its counseling that dispenses 
“with contradictory requirements of life” by “distributing these 
requirements over different periods mostly of the same day” (56). 
A pseudo-solution results that swaps first–next sequences for the 
either–or impasses of life: “Pleasure thus becomes the award of 
work, work the atonement for pleasure” (58). The flight trajec-
tory of fantasy is thus stuffed inside the twenty-four-hour span 
of time to give it all the illusion of quality time – like the boon 
for signing up with the Devil. “Sexuality itself is being desexu-
alized, as it were, by becoming ‘fun,’ a sort of hygiene” (65). 
The infernal rear view of power is staggered in fits and starts: 
“Encouraging ‘behind-the-scenes’ activities is an inconspicuous 
form of conjuring up such tendencies usually projected upon 
out-groups. […] The advice to finagle is countered – undone 
in the psychoanalytic sense – by interspersed reminders to keep 
within the realm of the permissible” (79). 
The omnipotence in wish fantasying that pumps up outer 
reality makes the adjustment to a greater power that calls the 
shots: “The pleasures ordained are no longer pleasures at all, but 
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really the duties as which they are rationalized, the rationaliza-
tion containing more truth than the supposedly unconscious 
wish” (66). The culture industry turns around the relationship 
between wish fantasy and poetry into how-to rationalizations 
for adaptation to the practice of wishing well: “The idea of the 
successful, conforming, well-adjusted ‘average’ citizen lurks even 
behind the fanciest technicolor fairy tale” (46). 
These are the moments Adorno strung together under the 
slogan or rebus “psychoanalysis in reverse,” which he applied 
both to the culture industry and National Socialism. Pivotal 
to a reading of the mass-media psychology going into National 
Socialism, the provenance of the phrase lies in the benign pla-
giarism or teamwork among the Frankfurt Schoolers in exile. 
That Leo Lowenthal is occasionally given the credit means that 
it was, biographically speaking, an occasional formulation that 
subsequently, however, grew like a rumor in meaningfulness.13 
We can also find it cited in Adorno’s second essay on American 
television, “Fernsehen als Ideologie” (“Television as Ideology,” 
1953). Before he gives the phrase (in quotes), he unpacks its sense 
in the setting of a TV story: “Psychoanalysis, or whatever type of 
psychotherapy is involved, is abbreviated and concretized in such 
a way that not only is the praxis of such a procedure mocked, but 
its sense or purpose is even turned around into the opposite.”14
By its extension to the relationship between wish fulfillment 
and B-culture, Freud’s 1907 analysis of the structure of day-
dreaming shows, in effect, how liminality or uncanniness can be 
reshuffled and reedited by the culture industry. “The Poet and 
Daydreaming” is either a wrap with the culture industry or it 
gives the outline for production. Freud also argued that every 
daydream bears, just the same, the datemark of its triggering in 
the present going on recent past, whereby a portal opens to the 
13 In “How to Look at Television,” written at the time of his astrology 
study, also at the Hacker Foundation, Adorno writes that Lowenthal 
coined the term “psychoanalysis in reverse” (223). The Quarterly of 
Film, Radio and Television 8, no. 3 (Spring 1954): 213–35.
14 Theodor W. Adorno, “Fernsehen als Ideologie,” in Gesammelte 
Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 
10.2:528, 526.
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underworld of the fantasy in history. It is one of those moments 
of breakthrough in analytic theory that can be seen as giving the 
how-to for proper conduct of psychic reality. In your daydream, 
however, as Freud argues, the fantasy arc jettisons the wish from 
an idealized past directly to the future of fulfillment. This can 
be taken to be owner’s manual instructions for imagineers. The 
reversal of psychoanalysis is the gist of Adorno’s plagiarism by 
the culture industry.
Edmund Bergler was one psychoanalyst who claimed exper-
tise in understanding plagiarism. However he had to treat it 
more carefully than, for example, writer’s block. Intellectual 
property theft can only be looked at closely, he admits, and case 
by case. Only historically does it come into focus at all. It is at 
once a byproduct of “publicity” and a “privilege” of the limited 
set of people pursuing scientific, literary, or artistic vocations: 
“other persons have little opportunity to plagiarize even should 
they want to.”15 
That plagiarism is a privilege of publicity makes it the tour de 
farce of the wish to be an author. Ernst Kris may be best known 
by now for his dismissive treatment by Jacques Lacan (in “The 
Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power”) in 
regard to his interpretation of plagiarism.16 Kris undertook the 
second analysis of a patient afraid of plagiarizing. The first ana-
lyst, with whom Lacan seems to side, was Melitta Schmideberg, 
Melanie Klein’s acting-out daughter who specialized in the cor-
rection of adolescent acting out, and yet in a manner so antipo-
dal to Winnicott’s treatment of the asocial tendency that Lacan 
strikes two rivals with one championship. 
According to Schmideberg, her patient’s tendency to steal in 
his youth was so successfully corrected that by adulthood, because 
he could not risk the crime of plagiarizing, his research was utterly 
blocked and his livelihood threatened. But then Kris discovers in 
his follow-up treatment that in the research team to which the 
patient belongs, a more established member was exercising his 
15 Edmund Bergler, The Writer and Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Doubleday, 1950), 184.
16 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Bruce Fink (New York and 
London: W.W. Norton, 2004), 27–28.
the block of fame
110
prerogative and recycling the younger man’s research. When the 
patient saw his senior colleague’s recent publication, rather than 
remember and recognize his own input, he felt an illicit desire to 
steal the other’s work, which set off the phobic chain reaction. 
This leads to Kris’s analysis of the patient’s failed adaptation to 
the team setting of academic communities: “Finally, the distor-
tion of imputing to others his own ideas could be analyzed and 
the mechanism of ‘give and take’ made conscious.”17 In the food 
chain of teamwork you only steal what’s already stolen
The other amazing tidbit of give and take that the patient 
offered Kris in session, which Lacan cites with glee, is that for 
some time now upon leaving the analyst’s office he likes roaming 
among restaurants like a ghoul searching the posted menus for 
his favorite meal: fresh brains. This is one rare occasion when 
Lacan hears a “daydream.” A patient anxious about being a pla-
giarist who in session with his author–analyst says that he likes 
to eat brains strikes out against the recording agency of the case 
study by a literal fulfillment of the analyst’s wish for recognition. 
Lacan concludes that Kris’s analysand was afraid of stealing 
“nothing.” But Lacan steals away from a spot of oblivion in their 
presentations. Kris prominently referred to Helene Deutsch’s 
case example of a patient who suffered oblivion in the present to 
cover and enable his plagiarism. Although Kris admits he forgot 
all about the article he is sure that it influenced the strategy he 
was following in his analysis of the patient with a similar disor-
der. Deutsch’s patient forgets the scientific literature that he was 
just reading and then all his own pages of research in progress. 
Because it is the present moment that he forgets, Deutsch makes 
the fantastic intervention of asking her patient to bring his cur-
rent research to session.18 She is taking a short cut through his 
intellectual pursuits, usually a diversion in analysis from the 
problem at hand. A close friendship with a colleague is part of 
17 Ernst Kris, “Ego Psychology and Interpretation in Psychoanalytic 
Therapy,” in The Selected Papers of Ernst Kris (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 247.
18 Helene Deutsch, “A Discussion of Certain Forms of Resistance,” in 
Neuroses and Character Types: Clinical Psychoanalytic Studies (New 
York: International Universities Press, 1965), 251–52.
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his workspace. It is only by bringing his scene of writing into the 
sessions that she discovers that not forgetting but plagiarism (of 
the friend’s work) is the presenting problem. Indeed, oblivion 
seems always to attend plagiarism, even its study, which is tanta-
mount either to admission of guilt or to the untenability of its 
transitive charge. 
Bergler’s revision of the Oedipus complex as “no more than a 
desperate inner defense developed in the desperate inner battle 
of passivity”19 no doubt qualifies as one of the many subtypes 
of plagiarism he identifies by letting the charge roam. But 
plagiarism, by the account of Bergler’s theory, offers the best 
defense against writer’s block. By manifestly defending against 
plagiarism, which is just as plainly a first defense against the deep-
est wish, to be refused, ignored, and unread, plagiarism cuts to 
the quick of every case of writer’s block. One of Bergler’s cured 
author–patients recognized the slip he had given the block when 
he recognized “burglar” in his treating analyst’s name.20
Medleys
The constellation, which was the import of his relationship 
to Benjamin’s Origin of the German Mourning Play, grew 
on Adorno. In their correspondence, whenever Adorno calls 
Benjamin to account on the turf of the allegory book, he scores 
winning reformulations of “their” insights, although his friend 
seems to have forgotten his share. A strong example is Adorno’s 
memo to Benjamin that the recent past remains the time zone 
that lurches back into the present catastrophically as prehistory 
(August 2–4, 1935).21 Adorno takes the dream out of Benjamin’s 
equation with the dialectical image in order, he says, to bring the 
friends back to the constellation hovering between the Origin 
book and his study of Søren Kierkegaard. The constellation gives 
allegorical form to their respective readings in the debris of fan-
19 Bergler, The Writer and Psychoanalysis, 66.
20 Ibid., 262.
21 Adorno and Benjamin, Briefwechsel: 1928–1940, 11. Some time ago I 
emblazoned this passage, an Adorno “original” dispatched between 
friends, on the banner of my own work.
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tasying, waking dream states, and media – the hell of civilization. 
The nonrapport between the cosmic design of constellation and 
its representatives on earth was another form of legibility in gaps 
that cannot be filled (or fulfilled). 
Adorno’s 1928 essay “Schubert” enters the lost-and-found 
department of a bowdlerized reception to hoist upon its retard 
his first constellation in which the truth of the lost work shines 
brightly. The essay opens on a volcanic landscape that com-
mands Adorno’s reverie. Suffering a shiver of horror (Schauer) 
as he crosses the threshold between Ludwig van Beethoven’s and 
Franz Schubert’s death years, Adorno glimpses the landscape rise 
up out of the ashes.22 If Schubert’s music doesn’t flex the will 
that is the focal point of Beethoven, it still ends up in the same 
chthonic depths out of which the will emerged – and sits under 
the same stars that shine beyond all eager willful grasping. 
But then Adorno enters upon new landscaping befitting 
smaller views, like those on postcards. He starts over inside a 
fairground, lowering his sights. Artworks aren’t creaturely or 
organic. They are like targets on a fairground booth’s shooting 
range, which the visitors aim to hit. If the right number flashes, 
then the target falls over and reality shines through (19–20). “The 
unveiling of the image remains the work of man. […] The image 
of truth, however, stands at all times in history. The history of 
the image is its decay” (20). Truth steps out of the ruination 
of the image. This “movement” is reprised several times in the 
course of the essay, each time adding an element, which counts 
that round as fundamental.
The targeting reduction shrinks what blocked our view of 
the spellbinding landscape (21). Like a hinge, the Biedermeier-
genre postcard allowed Adorno to open up the essay’s own 
landscape horizon. What next falls into place is the relocation 
of Schubert’s music to the “inadequate world of the medleys 
(Potpourris),” which, however, granted the music a second life 
(21–22). No accident that the medley came to be introduced in 
the nineteenth century as a surrogate for musical form. It is on 
22 Theodor W. Adorno, “Schubert,” in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003), 17:8. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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one continuum with the miniature landscape, another bour-
geois commodity in its many variations, including the picture 
postcard (Ansichtskarte) (23). 
Adorno appears to be reading Schubert’s music at its weakest 
point. But it is through its “depravation” in the setting of the 
song medleys that the music still plays and can yet be heard, more 
“eloquently” in fact than the music of his contemporaries (24). 
It is this depravation that brings the music closer to its origin and 
truth. “In the medley the traits of the work, scattered through the 
decline of its subjective unity, move together into a new unity, 
which cannot legitimate itself as such, but which directly con-
fronts and illuminates the uniqueness of the traits” (22). While 
rigor mortis befell the opera medleys of the nineteenth century, 
with Schubert the themes press onward without the medusoid 
recoil (ibid.). 
The interchangeability of every thematic unit indicates a 
simultaneity of all events, which lies outside history. “Out of this 
simultaneity one can yet discern the contours of the Schubert 
landscape, which it otherwise infernally mirrors” (ibid.). That 
the infernal foe is yet kept in check by the landscape perspective 
pushes the origin of the depravation back inside the music itself. 
Every truly legitimate depravation of aesthetic contents is 
inaugurated by artworks in which the unveiling of the image 
has gone so far that the power of truth in the image shines 
through, not stopping in the image but penetrating reality. 
That transparency, for which the artwork pays with its life, is 
suited to the crystalline Schubert landscape. Here fate and rec-
onciliation rest together undivided; their ambiguous eternity 
is shattered by the medley so that it can be recognized. It is the 
landscape of the death before (zuvor). (23) 
The death before is an object relation. We are approaching 
mournfulness, the ultimate addition to the movement reprised 
unto the essay’s conclusion. 
The depositing of death runs deep inside Schubert’s land-
scape: “but not in order to resolve itself in the affect of the indi-
vidual, but rather to rise up rescued following the descent out 
of the musical form of mourning” (25). A qualitative change has 
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thus occurred. “But change is only possible in that which is most 
small” (ibid.). On the larger scale death reigns, reining in the rela-
tions with the dead, blocking mourning. Upon introducing the 
wanderer as allegorical reader on the track of the dead, another 
turn of the perspective reveals the constellation in the landscape. 
“The eccentric construct of that landscape in which every point 
is equidistant from the center is revealed to the wanderer passing 
through but never advancing” (ibid.). The last and first steps are 
equally near death. 
If this is timelessness, then it’s the mood (Stimmung) that 
swings. Because citation cannot be simultaneous, the mood has 
a certain momentum (27). As we swing around in the oscillating 
musical structure or “landscape” of the degrading reception of 
Schubert’s music in Schubert’s music, we are at the portal again 
to decline, but now mourning is added, and in the first place, 
which changes everything. “The affect of death – for the affect 
of death is imitated in Schubert’s landscape, the grief (Trauer) 
over men not the pain in them – is alone the gate to the under-
world, through which Schubert descends” (29). Grief attracts 
the infernal foe: “thus the mirror of the Doppelgänger sentences 
man on grounds of his sorrowfulness” (30). Just the same, grief 
opens the other pathway through Schubert’s music, the parallel 
universal alongside depravation’s track, which it leaves behind. 
Now we begin to recognize the liberated music of a mankind 
transformed. How sad that we yet fall short of these utopian 
prospects. It doesn’t matter if mere sentimentality jerks them 
out: our tears let us see better “the ciphers of ultimate reconcili-
ation” (33).23
23 I’ve underscored in the first volume the welling up of tears arising with 
the eucatastrophe’s joyous anticipation and deferral of an ultimate 
ending. The direct hit of music appreciation reflects and deflects a lost 
and found specific emotional situation. Now Adorno reads in musical 
tear jerking the inscription of a far-out reconciliation. A guaranteed 
party-pooper, Edmund Bergler identified happy tears as the insignum 
of an author’s defensive illusion of autarchy, his self-consolation. These 
tears are self-produced and self-given. “Paradoxical Tears – Tears of 
Happiness,” in Selected Papers of Edmund Bergler, M.D. 1933–1961 
(New York and London: Grune & Stratton, 1969), 906.
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In the study of Kierkegaard, to which Adorno applied 
himself right after the musical rehearsal of the constellation in 
“Schubert,” the opening up of a landscape of yearning is hard 
pressed to ally itself with and within Kierkegaardss philosophy. 
In his 1933 review of the book, Benjamin summarized the reversal 
of perspective Adorno undertook to dislodge Kierkegaard’s phi-
losophy from its receiving area in Existentialism: 
Here Kierkegaard is taken not forward but back – back 
into the inner core of philosophical idealism, within whose 
enchanted circle the ultimately theological nature of his 
thought remained doomed to impotence. […] Nowhere does 
Wiesengrund’s insight go deeper than where he ignores the 
stereotypes of Kierkegaardian philosophy and where he looks 
instead for the key to Kierkegaard’s thought in its apparently 
insignificant relics, in its images, similes, and allegories.24
By the conclusion, Adorno is able to secure the constellation of 
fantasy through the images printed on sheets for children to cut 
out. “Yearning does not end in the pictures, but rather lives on in 
them, just as it stems from them” (199). The Ansichtskarten, the 
miniature views that inspired Adorno to find the affirmation of 
Schubert’s music in its very depravation, its fragmentation in the 
medleys, are on the same page with Kierkegaard’s image sheets. 
That we are also on the same page with Winnicott’s analysis of 
the dissociated daydreamer, which we followed in the first vol-
ume of Critique of Fantasy, is owed to the import Adorno grants 
the miniature in or as childhood in establishing and sustaining 
visual literacy, a capacity he later called sublimation and judged 
evacuated – washed and watched out – in the TV viewer. Was it a 
daydream or night dream on which she awoke that saw her cut-
ting out a pattern for a dress? Patient and analyst were at a border 
dislodging the opposition that Winnicott was plying between 
the depravation of fantasying and the symbolism, even poetry of 
24 Walter Benjamin, “Kierkegaard: The End of Philosophical Idealism,” 
in Selected Writings, ed. William Jennings, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 
2.2:703–4.
the block of fame
116
the night dream, and that consequently required new thinking 
and language. The third option for the analysis, then, became a 
fantasying of fantasy, admitting in the patient’s fantasying new 
approximations to dreaming, waking, and living
Adorno underscores Kierkegaard’s fascination with the pic-
ture sheets and shows how the exception that the philosopher 
thus makes heads off at the impasse the melancholic core of 
interiority decoration he dwelled on and in. “If Seligkeit itself, 
around which wish and cipher of all images gather, knows no 
images, then Kierkegaard’s discourse is delivered of a ‘burden 
of hope’” (194). Seligkeit is the word for a happiness still borne 
that extends to (or ends in) the “bliss” one prays is the lot of 
the blessed departed (as Freud elaborated its ambivalence in 
his reading of Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness).25 “Undialectically the images are to him finite goods that 
block the infinitude of Seligkeit” (194). But through his elevation 
of pictures on sheets for children to cut out, the philosopher’s 
“modesty (Unscheinbarkeit) signifies not only the annihilation 
of appearance (Schein) in death but rather its ultimate extinction 
in truth, which, for once corporally present, would let the images 
disappear, in which it however has its historical life” (193). 
What Adorno lets stand in Kierkegaard’s words is the identifi-
cation of posthumous works as ruins, the appropriate haunt for 
the retired, secluded, or dead. What the philosopher Kierkegaard 
would like to get across, Adorno interprets, gains through art 
the effect of posthumous works. Art manifests a pleasure that is 
never present, but in which a moment that is past always inheres, 
a pleasure that enters consciousness but as already passed (198). 
The cutting out of the pictures outlines the fantasy in the 
fragment. “If the history of guilty nature is that of the decay of its 
unity, then it moves the decaying toward reconciliation, and its 
fragments carry the fissures of decay as ciphers of promise” (198). 
25 Sigmund Freud, “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XII (1911–1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique 
and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1958), 30.
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Fragmentation (cutting out, sorting through, collecting) can 
circumvent the impasse, for example between improvement and 
controlling interest, by reducing the scale of change. Adorno’s 
concluding line: “For the step from mourning to comfort is not 
the biggest but the smallest one” (200). 
The slightest elaboration through fantasy brings rescue. 
“The model for this realization Kierkegaard […] found in the 
behavior of the child cutting images out of a picture sheet” (196). 
While fantasying a dream of cutting out a dress Winnicott and 
his patient discover that the dissociated daydreamer’s “child-
hood environment seemed unable to allow her to be formless,” 
creative, and so she could not accede to the transitional object.26 
Winnicott and his patient must make the cut of starting over and 
by potentiating the fantasying push back her suicidal impasse of 
daydream dissociation. Adorno wants to get past Kierkegaard’s 
thoughts of sacrifice by underscoring the moment of respite that 
lies between the lines of cutting out picture sheets, throwing 
them away, and letting them rebound as prehistory. 
“The moments of fantasy are the holidays of history. As such 
they belong to the free, liberated time of the child, and their 
material is historical like the picture sheets themselves” (197). 
The situation of the people and the commonplace, the “concrete 
images of their wish,” hit home and secure access to images by a 
wish fulfillment that is free of sacrifice (200). “If fantasy cannot 
grasp the ultimate images of despair […] then this incapacity is 
not its shortcoming but its strength. […] The unimaginability of 
despair through fantasy is its guarantee of hope” (196).
Team Player
Freud allowed that the screening of the primal scene (all over 
town) as false memory made it hard to reconstruct. But he also 
stressed in his case study of the Wolfman the all-importance 
of the scene’s priority.27 By setting reality (realization or fulfill-
26 D.W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 
2001), 34.
27 Sigmund Freud, “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis,” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
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ment) before the wish, the scene places fantasying on a schedule 
of racing to catch up with but never overtaking the deadline of 
realization. 
In Dick’s Ubik, all devolution of commodities, the allegoriza-
tion of half-life, stops at 1939. Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok 
lodged their notion of the crypt in a language of cryptonymy that 
added syntax to the images used by the survivors of the death 
camps: “the homeless dead,” “missing grave,” “the imitation 
corpse.”28 The Holocaust doesn’t discount other atrocities in 
history but places them on a schedule of legibility with its prior-
ity in the reality and realization of the death wish, with, in other 
words, the priority of the reality of fulfillment over the wish. The 
heft of realization in the construct of traumatic history’s primal 
scene is rehearsed in the mise-en-scène of déjà vu between dou-
bling and fantasying. 
Adorno identified the new setting of the Doppelgänger, the 
daydream milieu of déjà vu, as the other future that Kafka’s writ-
ing foretells: “Perhaps the secret aim of his writing in general 
was to make déjà vu available, technical, and collective” (263). 
The resemblance to the night dream and its pre-logical logic 
is so ubiquitous in Kafka’s works that Adorno sees the dream 
factor unthematized and excluded. Kafka addresses our second 
nature as daydreamers, but under the aegis of déjà vu, the false 
memory that keeps android doubles going. Like memory, déjà vu 
interrupts fantasying: Haven’t I been here before? Don’t I know 
you? But the interruptus that coincides with the triggering of the 
fantasy, which passes for or into “memory” in order to keep the 
untenable wish concealed, is at no point recognized by or shared 
with anyone else. The Kafkan text addresses the daydreamer in 
the reader: “Each sentence says ‘interpret me,’ and none will per-
mit it. Each compels the reaction, ‘that’s the way it is,’ and with 
Freud, Vol. XVII (1917–1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, 
ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1955). It is best to use the index in tracking Freud’s fraught 
attempt to wrest priority for a scene so readily discounted, by him too.
28 Henry Krystal, ed., Massive Psychic Trauma (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1968).
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it the question, ‘where have I seen that before?’ The déjà vu is 
declared permanent” (263).
In his essay on Kafka Adorno lined up in a row both scenes of 
psychoanalysis, the primal and the double. That also means, as 
touted in Adorno in Neapel, that the Holocaust, which Adorno 
was reading like science fiction extrapolated from the present-
going-on-recent past in Kafka’s works, in effect restored the con-
stellation that the series of reversals of psychoanalysis had stolen. 
That Kafka imagined collecting his early stories in a volume titled 
“Versöhnnug,” literally, almost, “becoming a son,” fits a charge 
not against the fathers, but against the sons, the bargain haunters 
in the stricken world of late capitalism. 
Freud argues in “The Uncanny” that déjà vu looks like the 
return of an early animinstic belief that mankind (or the adult) 
was so convinced had been already and definitely overcome.29 
But on this occult track we might lose sight of the bottom line 
of Freud’s déjà vu analysis, which is the death wish. To lose sight 
of what we nevertheless fill in: this gives the gist of Adorno’s 
critique of the occult in the contemporary setting.30 In his earlier 
analysis of déjà vu, Freud found compelling the case example of 
a patient overcome with the sense of having already been there 
while visiting two school girlfriends in their home.31 The conti-
nuity shot was that their brother had recently succumbed to the 
29 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII (1917–1919): 
An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, 247–48. For a thorough 
account of the history of anticipations and forgettings going into 
Freud’s formulations of the psychological significance of this psychic 
state, see Peter Krapp, Déjà Vu: Aberrations of Cultural Memory 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
30 Theodor W. Adorno, “Thesen gegen den Okkultismus,” in Minima 
Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben, Gesammelte 
Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2003), 273–80.
31 Sigmund Freud, “Fausse reconnaissance (‘Déjà Raconté’) in 
Psychoanalytic Treatment,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIII (1913–1914):Totem 
and Taboo and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna 
Freud (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 203–4.
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illness from which her brother had recently recovered. Yes, we’re 
in the environs of the death wish, but we are brought before its 
fulfillment first, leaving the wish to catch up in the span of a near 
miss. 
Robert Altman’s The Player (1992) got past the verdict upon 
the California culture industry that Adorno was also able to get 
over. Adorno’s culture industry crisis, however, inspired Michael 
Tolkin, like a “wild” Frankfurt-Schooler, to write the judgmental 
novel. In their altercations during filming, which were legend, 
Altman assured Tolkin that the screenplay revisions would be to 
the author’s credit. The novel like its sequel tells the story of an 
“American Psycho,” whose criminality proves to be business as 
usual. 
In the film, the protagonist, Griffin Mill, is a Hollywood pro-
ducer faced with the loss of his inheritance. A rival, Larry Levy, 
has arrived by invitation of the paternal head of the production 
department. In regular receipt of death-threat postcards from an 
unidentified screenwriter, Griffin is an anxious reader of omens. 
When Larry the rival successfully crashes a cocktail party at the 
home of Griffin’s lawyer, getting a contact “Hi” out of everyone 
there, Griffin asks the host: “So the rumors are true?” “Rumors 
are always true.” “I’m always the last to hear about them.” 
“You’re the last one to believe.”
In American slang “a player” is a seducer; he can “play” 
people to his own advantage. But in Southern California it is also 
an ellipsis for “team player.” The teamwork of the Hollywood 
producers to which Griffin belongs digests authorship. Everyone 
writing for Hollywood talks about the ideas that were stolen 
piecemeal in the course of being passed around among the mem-
bers of a team. The protagonist’s surname is also an ellipsis for 
this situation he would disavow: the rumor mill. Every member 
of the team wins for the team as a whole but also wins for keeps 
(for him or herself only). The hierarchy of inheritance shadows 
the teamwork of the Hollywood studio, a contradiction between 
player and team that neurotically incapacitates Griffin.
That the new rival for the position of heir is one reverb in 
the greater figuration of a malignant superego becomes manifest 
when David Kahane, the screenplay author Griffin has sought 
out on the chance that he likes sending upsetting postcards, 
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starts speaking in the name of Larry Levy, elaborating the rival’s 
threat as his own. But before they meet up, Griffin stopped by 
the Kahane home and placed a call watching through the win-
dow. If it was telephonic, then it was only platonic. But that can 
also mean that what Griffin sees is primal. A woman answers; it’s 
David’s partner, June Gundmunsdottir. When Griffin gives his 
name, she recognizes it and innocently repeats David’s nickname 
for him, “the dead man.” She tells him David is out, gone to the 
movies. She never goes, she says: life is too short. 
Griffin follows his screenwriter suspect to a theater that’s show-
ing The Bicycle Thief. While references to European art cinema 
have been making the rounds to demarcate in terms of cultural 
difference the impasse between the Hollywood-only producers 
and the middlebrow authors pitching entry into development 
heaven or hell, this happens to be a film that redresses stealing by 
showing it to be an inadequate synonym for losing. 
When he figures how Griffin knew where to find him, David 
calls June “the ice queen.” We are reminded that in the game of 
chess the queen mother is the son’s best ally in checkmating the 
king. When David begins spouting the words of the rival and 
then, push coming to shove, knocks him over, Griffin fantasti-
cally rallies and attacks back. Griffin undergoes the attack like a 
convulsive episode. Subsequent scenes with the police, which are 
surreal, reinforce the sense that the murderous “attack” screens 
a wish fantasy. In his essay on Dostoevsky Freud argues that the 
author’s epileptic seizures were the p-unitive reversal of wishing 
the father (inside and out) dead. 32 His gambling compulsion was 
a similar enactment. Gambling to lose enacts the double hand 
job of the father’s punishment and the child’s masturbation. 
To conclude his essay Freud turns to a story by Stefan Zweig, 
“Twenty-Four Hours in a Woman’s Life,” in which a young man, 
a gambling addict, meets an older woman who offers a night of 
lovemaking to counter and contain the compulsive schedule of 
32 Sigmund Freud, “Dostoevsky and Parricide,” in The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXI 
(1927–1931): The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and Its Discontents 
and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), 182–84.
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playing. The fantasy that the mother should initiate her son into 
sex to stop the harm he does himself by onanistic playing was 
thus fulfilled. While Zweig’s protagonist breaks his promise the 
very next night and is again lost to gambling, the fulfillment of 
the wish fantasy elucidated by Freud does illuminate Griffin’s 
happy end. Griffin drinks mineral water only, which means he 
is on a schedule with addiction. An afflicted player enjoys a won-
derful life but just can’t get through the day. Not to be a loser for 
twenty-four hours means a good deal. 
Griffin’s relationship with Bonnie Sherow, another member 
of the production team, fits a couple that is secondary to the 
group passing through it. But with the woman who is both the 
mother on the chessboard and by her unpronounceable name 
also “daughter,” which means she doesn’t double a son’s hatred 
for the father, Griffin can uncanny-proof the wish to kill the 
father. If there’s no remorse, the mother-daughter says, well 
then, there is no crime. He ascends within the team to the player 
position of the “man of steal.”
The conclusion that Fritz Lang or Thea von Harbou chose 
for the 1922 film Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler (Dr. Mabuse, the 
Player) shows the gambler or player defeated, lying low in an 
underworld he shares with his victims. By his multiple identi-
ties a superhuman team of one, Dr. Mabuse runs his criminal 
schemes like a terrorist organization in thrall to an idea, which 
can therefore forgo what crime after all does pay. While the novel 
by Norbert Jacques that Lang and Thea von Harbou adapted 
closes with the detective rescuing his love interest from Dr. 
Mabuse, who then falls from the sky to die, the ending on screen 
suggests that there is a supernatural ready position available for 
his return.33 Identification with Nietzsche’s superman turns the 
time to come into the future of wish-fulfilment, but that future 
is right now. To block the identification, Freud proposed in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego that the superman 
in fact belongs in the past. The superman was the primal father, 
33 In 1932 the doctor returns to deliver a “Testament,” the significance 
of which Siegfried Kracauer adapted for his psychohistory of German 
cinema.
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whom we murdered, devoured, and mourned. That we are still 
in recovery is good news.34 
The “ice queen” told Mill that the ex, the dad rival, had not 
believed in happy endings. At the end of The Player, we wit-
ness the Enlightenment right to pursuit of happiness (like in a 
Mozart opera) attain apotheosis via the most negligible and least 
respected plot point in cinema. There is a happy end, however, 
that is an end in itself, marking the convergence of the pursuit of 
happiness with Kant’s imperfect duty to oneself, one’s talent and 
potential. The Christian and utilitarian happy ends intercept the 
end in itself, forging a means to the happiness of the majority 
inheriting the earth. However, even for Tolkien, there can be a 
work of fantasy only if the ultimate happy end is kept out of the 
fiction. The affective impact of the work of fantasy resonates 
within a gap between the postponement of the rendemptive 
end-all and the story’s eucatastrophe, which wishes and hopes 
because the resolution of the work remains out of reach. 
The Player only looks like a satire on Hollywood. Instead it 
is more like a guide to the film industry, even a how-to manual 
for those who would make a career of it. As big as Hollywood, 
but pulled through the fantasy of a happy end unto the utopian 
prospect of reconciliation with our omnipotent wishing, it was 
Altman’s Hollywood blockbuster.
California Susan35 
To know Susan Sontag was to know her disappointment each 
time she put another new non-fiction publication out there. Her 
34 Sigmund Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” in 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XVIII (1920–1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group 
Psychology and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna 
Freud. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1964), 123.
35 “California Susan” was also the title of my lecture/essay commissioned 
for two events in Germany held during the ten-year anniversary of 
Sontag’s death in 2014. The paragraphs on Sontag here and in “My 
Camp” are taken over largely intact from the essay, which appeared 
in the original and in German translation in Anna-Lisa Dieter and 
Silvia Tiedtke, eds., Radikales Denken. Zur Aktualität Susan Songtags 
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signature essays, in which she had given thought to every line she 
wrote, fell short of the words of Walter Benjamin. Like Josephine 
the Singer, however, she expected the declarations of her friends 
and fans to the contrary while she scoffed and sobbed. But she 
had been very lucky to secure a fallback position that she could 
occupy. For every niche in which she couldn’t join Benjamin or 
Kafka there was always the cozy corner of diehard identifica-
tion with Thomas Mann in the thicket of his inner object rela-
tions. This free gift that came with her adolescence in Southern 
California helped see her through the career she made out of the 
wish for it.
There is one sustained autobiographical account of Susan 
Sontag’s adolescence in California, a 1987 New Yorker article 
titled “Pilgrimage,” about an audience with Thomas Mann in 
Los Angeles, forced upon her, as a kind of dare, by a slightly 
older friend, who in this account goes by the name Merrill.36 The 
Sontag who graduated from North Hollywood High School at 
age fifteen might be characterized, like the subtitle to Gidget, as 
the little girl with big ideas. Little, however, in the sense of young: 
Sontag was the tallest girl in her class. Just as Kathy Kohner a.k.a. 
Franzie Hofer a.k.a. Gidget was mediated as somewhat laugh-
able, though charmingly so, through the midlife criticism of her 
father Frederick Kohner, who, as the author of the 1957 coming-
of-age book, mimicked and ventriloquated her, so teen Susan, 
as recalled by Sontag from the other shore of fulfillment of the 
(Zurich: Diaphanes, 2017). The Gidget allegory has grown from a dash 
into a rich filling.
36 Susan Sontag, “Pilgrimage,” The New Yorker, December 21, 1987, 
8–54. Subsequent page references are given in the text. I am returning 
to a footnote I gave this essay in The Case of California (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) in the closing section on 
Thomas Mann and the decision he reached in Southern California to 
come out with the posthumous publication of his diaries. In the same 
book, Gidget was implicit in phrases like “gadget goes.” The Gidget 
novels came out in German translation with the heroine bearing the 
name April. When I pointed out that this was the reason there was no 
German word for gadget, two German friends jumped up and down 
exclaiming “April, April!,” the German version of “April Fools!” I rest 
my case.
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wish to be an important intellectual author, is a touch ridiculous 
for the purity of her aspiration to become the big-ideas version 
of herself. 
According to “Pilgrimage,” Susan was a close consumer of the 
émigré culture in Southern California always in the company of 
one of her two special friends. Peter, whose parents were refugees 
from Nazi Europe, was earmarked for her romantic involvement 
in the near future because taller than Sontag, her early require-
ment for mating. The other best friend was Merrill, a surfer type 
who consumed philosophy, in other words: a typical surfer. 
Cool and chunky and blond, he had all the trappings of 
“cute,” a “dish,” a “dreamboat,” but I, with my unerring eye 
for loners (under all disguises), had promptly seen that he was 
smart, too. Really smart. […] Merrill was the only one of my 
friends I doted on. I loved to look at him. I wanted to merge 
with him or for him to merge with me, but I had to respect 
the insuperable barrier: he was several inches shorter than I 
was. (40) 
That he is recalled as an object of merger, at once downsized and 
off-limits, strongly suggests that he is already inside her. 
Peter appears in diary entries in 1949 and 1950 but, with her 
first lesbian affairs in the ascendant, he’s already on his way out. 
Merrill is not accorded a place, at least not in name. Is he perhaps 
E, one of two persons who accompanied her on the Mann visit, 
according to a long diary entry from 1949? “E, F, and I interro-
gated God this evening at six.”37 In an earlier entry, the character-
ization of E’s intelligence and of Susan’s closeness to him make 
him at least a likely ingredient in the makeup of Merrill: “Yet the 
only tangible good I have gotten out of the summer is my close-
ness to E, whose intelligence I genuinely respect” (47). 
While parked in a car on the rim of Mulholland Drive, accord-
ing to the 1987 memoir, Sontag and Merrill didn’t join in the local 
mating rituals, but instead, on the outer rim of identification, 
37 Susan Sontag, Reborn: Early Diaries, 1947–1963, ed. David Rieff 
(London: Penguin, 2008), 56. Subsequent page references are given in 
the text.
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even internalization, passionately discussed modern music, which 
was the main medium of their joint engagement with European 
high culture in Los Angeles. Sontag admits that the duo felt 
compelled to admire the “ugly” work of Arnold Schoenberg or 
John Cage but sincerely loved only Igor Stravinsky’s music (41). 
At the highpoint of their commitment to each other, they shared 
the waking fantasy of their joint sacrifice of years of their lives to 
add to Stravinsky’s lifetime. After Sontag discovered The Magic 
Mountain and passed it on to Merrill, the duo revered two gods 
of contemporary high culture, Stravinsky and Thomas Mann. 
These recollections are at once charming and unrepentant. The 
tinge of the infernal that attends their bargaining with lifetime 
bears association with the middlebrow milieu Mann thematized 
in Doctor Faustus, ironically at his own peril. 
Closer to the real time of her adolescence than her 1987 
reminiscence, Sontag diagnosed as the hallmark of SF movies of 
disaster, a Californian teen staple, the absence of an adequate 
emotional response.38 She doesn’t supply mourning. Instead she 
registers the loss we are at in these films, the loss, ultimately, of 
our own affective relation to the traumatic histories of the twen-
tieth century. In “Pilgrimage,” Sontag underscores an emotional 
response in her own adolescent milieu, which is hard to call ade-
quate: it seems intransitive and intransigent, abject and illegible. 
Though triggered by the recollection of meeting Mann, it covers 
her own sojourn in the B-genre of Californian adolescence. It is 
how the New Yorker article begins: “Everything that surrounds 
my meeting with him has the color of shame” (38). 
The Indo-European root meaning of shame is cover. Has a 
wrapping been thrown over the absence of an identifiable emo-
tional response? At the conclusion, Sontag again tugs at this 
shroud: “I never told anyone of the meeting. Over the years I have 
kept it a secret, as if it were something shameful” (54). The lines 
that follow seem to modify “something shameful,” but stand out 
as a foreign-body non-sequitur: “As if it happened between two 
other people, two phantoms, two provisional beings on their 
way elsewhere.” Yes, she is pairing off Mann, soon to return to 
38 Susan Sontag, “The Imagination of Disaster,” in Against 
Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Picador, 1966), 225.
once upon a time in california
127
Europe, with herself, who too would soon depart, in her case to 
realize her wish to be a big ideas author. However, a third figure 
is suddenly no longer accounted for, “melted” as Sontag writes in 
her diaries of her relationship to E, whose “unstruggling empti-
ness” reverberating inside her renders him the poster boy of the 
absent response (55). 
According to Heinz Kohut, shame reflects not a disparity 
between the ego and an excessively demanding ego ideal but 
the “flooding of the ego with unneutralized exhibitionism.”39 
The exhibitionism of the grandiose self goes unadmired, unap-
proved, unmirrored. One of Freud’s few accounts of shame, in 
the case study of the Ratman, interpersonalizes the failure of 
admiration as betrayal. The older boy who wants to be Ratman’s 
best friend in childhood, dumps him once he gains admission 
to the household as tutor; he was interested only in Ratman’s 
sisters.40 According to Sontag, it is to Susan’s relief that Merrill 
does all the talking during the Mann visit, but it is at this point 
that the new situation of the wish to mirror or merge counted 
two, not three. 
When she recalls Thomas Mann asking them about their stud-
ies, trying to find the same page on which he and the two teens 
might meet, Sontag starts splitting: “Could he imagine what a 
world away from the Gymnasium in his native Lübeck, where 
fourteen-year-old Tonio Kröger wooed Hans Hansen by trying 
to get him to read Schiller’s ‘Don Carlos,’ was North Hollywood 
High School, alma mater of Farley Granger and Alan Ladd? He 
couldn’t, and I hoped he would never find out. He had enough 
to be sad about – Hitler, the destruction of Germany, exile. It 
was better that he not know how really far he was from Europe” 
(50). 
The homoerotic souvenir she gives as the measure of their 
cultural difference shows that Susan unconsciously clued or 
cooled, as Gidget might put it, the wooing going down without 
39 Heinz Kohut, The Analysis of the Self: Systematic Approach to the 
Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders (New 
York: International University Press, 1971), 181.
40 See my discussion of shame in The Psycho Records, 49–51, in the 
reading of Peeping Tom, which belabors the same Ratman reference.
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her. According to his diaries, Mann only kept under cover and 
in another place his ongoing homoerotic appreciation of life is 
a beach, of his being a teenager at heart, just as in “Pilgrimage” 
Sontag kept her adolescence alongside her as her fellow teen 
thinker, in the separate bod of a surfer object. 
Prior to Merrill’s dare that they go ahead and visit Mann, 
Susan had already rehearsed merger with the fictional character 
Hans Castorp via the author’s tenderness toward him: “I loved 
the tenderness, however diluted by condescension, with which 
Mann portrays him as a bit simple, overearnest, docile, mediocre” 
(42). She sees through his condescension, and thus through his 
irony, also because she applies it in this retrospective account to 
herself. Following “mediocre” in the list of Castorp’s attributes, 
Sontag inserts a parenthetical interjection or introjection: “what 
I considered myself to be, judged by real standards” (ibid.). As 
she builds up the identification that will see her through the 
Mann visit, she leaves this niche of emotional response empty.
Shame tends to be linked in the clinical literature to the 
sense of being a fraud, an impostor, typically in adolescence and 
psycho-pathologically in adult borderline disorders. As Gershen 
Kaufman summarizes: “The impostor syndrome is one of the 
important cognitive signs of shame affect.”41 While there is the 
passing sense of one’s own fraudulence in adolescence, the impos-
tor as syndrome builds on an organization by identification that 
isn’t single-occupancy. The admiring audience is a requirement, 
according to Helene Deutsch’s profiling of the impostor, even 
if secured by sending out pseudopodia into the hard shell of its 
simulation. The impostor’s success lies in the eyes of the pro-
jected observer: “As one’s ego ideal can never be completely grati-
fied from within, we direct our demands to the external world, 
pretending […] that we actually are what we would like to be.”42 
The impostor is the group shoved into an individual format, like 
teenagers packed inside a telephone booth. According to Lionel 
41 Gershen Kaufman, The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of 
Shame Based Syndromes (New York: Springer, 1989), 180.
42 Helene Deutsch, “The Impostor: Contribution to Ego Psychology of 
a Type of Psychopath,” The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 80, no. 4 (2011): 
1023. 
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Finkelstein, whose study of the impostor applied the composite 
picture Phyllis Greenacre shot and assembled in the 1950s, those 
who have studied impostors (and, he adds, homosexuals) “often 
comment on how many can be observed once one has become 
aware of their existence.”43 
Greenacre argues that the impostor is a special case of the day-
dream fantasy known as the family romance.44 The wish fantasy 
that someday one will be delivered of one’s parents by the evi-
dence of true blue progenitors goes into what Otto Rank identi-
fied as the birth of the hero – for better or worse. Oedipus ben-
efits from the family romance only as long as he enacts it without 
knowing it. Oedipus started out a baby left out to die because the 
father sought to undo what he was foretold, namely that an heir 
would be his undoing. Oedipus, rescued and entrusted to foster 
parents, hears the same prophecy in adolescence, whereupon he 
loves and leaves the only parents he knows. But young Oedipus, 
grown strong enough to act on his wishes, walks straight into the 
prophecy’s fulfillment. He kills a belligerent stranger, his father. 
Did the altercation between young Oedipus and the older man 
qualify the murder as homosexual panic? As a young man, Laius, 
the father of Oedipus, kidnapped the teen son of his host and 
raped him. Sometimes a pun that seems to come from nowhere 
or is too close to home doubles as a direct hit: Kenneth Burke’s 
“riddle of the sphincter” upends the saga like a spoiler.45 There’s 
more on all fours than babies.
In “Pilgrimage,” Mann, too, is contaminated by the shame. 
“What I was obscurely starting to mind was that (as I couldn’t 
have put it then) he talked like a book review” (48). That Mann’s 
reliance on phrases recycled from his public interview persona 
43 Lionel Finkelstein, “The Impostor: Aspects of His Development,” 
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1974): 85. We have strayed into 
the environs of my reading of the impostor in The Case of California, 
270–77.
44 Phyllis Greenacre, “The Impostor,” The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 27, 
no. 3 (1958): 363–64. 
45 Burke repeatedly made recourse to this punning image. See, for 
example, his Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, 
and Method (Oakland: University of California Press, 1966), 338.
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made his pronouncements sound like review writing com-
municates across the decades with Sontag’s own engagement 
in cultural journalism. From the more tolerant vantage of her 
grown-up career, she identifies the embarrassment of her adoles-
cent riches as a gap folded deeply in memory, the scream memory 
of shame: 
Years later, when I had become a writer, when I knew many 
other writers, I would learn to be more tolerant of the gap 
between the person and the work. Yet even now the encounter 
still feels illicit, improper. In my experience deep memory is, 
more often than not, the memory of embarrassment. (ibid.)
There are few indications in Sonntag’s diaries of the shame 
attending her Mann visit. Alongside Mann’s observation during 
the meeting that the relationship of The Magic Mountain to his 
personal experiences before WWI was metapsychological, there is 
a marginal jotting of disappointment, which, even without the 
editor’s corroboration, no doubt hails from a later date, perhaps 
the time of composition of “Pilgrimage”: “The author’s com-
ments betray his book with their banality” (58). 
In her diary record of the visit, Mann talks about Doctor 
Faustus and refers to the English translation as concluded in the 
recent past. By backdating the 1949 session in “Pilgrimage” to 
1947, Sontag remembers herself in the sweet high-school phase 
of the wish to be someone important, which by college age can 
already begin to circle around the drain of unfulfillment. But 
most important, the book Doctor Faustus (in English transla-
tion) is removed from the foreground of the encounter. Susan’s 
relationship to or through Doctor Faustus, discernible already in 
the soul-murder pact with Merrill, runs deep in her diaries. 
Somewhere, in an earlier notebook, I confessed a disappoint-
ment with the Mann Faustus… This was a uniquely undis-
guised evidence of the quality of my critical sensibility! The 
work is a great and satisfying one. (19)
In the course of an autobiographical rundown from 1957 titled 
“Notes of a Childhood,” Sontag’s diaries register a one-line recol-
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lection, which counts after all as the single and strong reference 
to the shame of her 1987 reminiscence: “Being caught at the 
Pickwick Bookstore for stealing Doctor Faustus” (113). 
There is no sign that Susan stole compulsively; rather we 
have Sontag's word for it in “Pilgrimage” that, given her puny 
allowance, she bought when she could but occasionally stole when 
she dared. However, something like compulsion is registered 
when she allows that she didn't even think of going to the library. 
Buying and stealing become at some point interchangeable: “I 
had to acquire them, see them in rows along a wall of my tiny 
bedroom. My household deities. My spaceships” (39). 
That Susan's book collection was her alternate network 
of good object relations is indicated by her express powers as 
“demon reader” over and against her parents: “to read was to 
drive a knife into their lives” (38). By her merger with Hans 
Castorp, or rather with Mann's tenderness toward him, Susan 
fleshed out the inner recess into which she followed the rapport 
between Mann and Merrill. But there was one disturbing 
thought as she contemplated the extent of her identification 
with Castorp, namely, that she could be a Goody Two-Shoes, the 
appalling accusation her mother once hurled at her (42).
How does one learn to steal or cheat in adolescence or go out 
on a date and make out for that matter? Libidinally benign peer 
pressure. But what commences as initiation rite into a new milieu 
that recruits you and issues the group license can also end up, 
through the pressure cooker of internalization, the main sexual 
outlet. Stealing is already the extra step inside. It is a clandestine 
operation of appropriation of items, which must be treated as 
already and always there. I don’t know how they got into my 
purse. Hence the psychoanalytic view that one steals or steals 
back only what belongs to one: the true mother, not the faux 
one currently getting in the way of her daughter. In Playing and 
Reality, D.W. Winnicott interprets stealing in a grid of internal-
izations, elements he names by gender. In a final note appended 
at the end of his case presentation of the male patient who was 
containing a girl (which we discussed in the first volume along-
side the case of Oscar Wilde), Winnicott asks what in stealing, 
which the male element tends to carry forward, corresponds to 
the female element in boys and girls: “The answer can be that in 
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respect of this element the individual usurps the mother’s posi-
tion and her seat or garments, in this way deriving desirability 
and seductiveness stolen from the mother.”46 
Sloburbia
The father/daughter relationship celebrated on the stage of the 
bourgeois Trauerspiel, not only during the Enlightenment but 
in all that era’s introjects and rocket ships, is the other mainstay 
of the Oedipus complex. Without it there is no father function. 
In its postwar modern iteration this relationship of authorship 
and invention works through the heir pocket of homosexuality, 
which more and more was hiding out in the open. In “Valley 
Girl,” Frank Zappa’s biggest single hit, his fourteen-year-old 
daughter Moon Unit, his collaborator on the song, talks us 
through a school scene in which the beringed male teacher ogles 
all the boys in class. It’s a new high point in the lingo, because the 
midlifer’s breach of the teen setting of recruitment gags her with 
a spoon. But the term that rides the waves breaking between 
coasts and generations is “bitchen” – the defiant condensation 
of life’s a bitch and life’s a beach. The Hollywood counterpart to 
Manhattan’s dismissal of the bridge and tunnel crowd (coming 
into the city for the weekend) is the beach and valley crowd. And 
yet the innovation – the lingo – of California’s Teen Age folds 
out from under this arc and projection like its datemark.
In Gidget: The Little Girl with Big Ideas, every gesture of 
transgression fits inside the protagonist’s ambivalent relationship 
to psychoanalysis, including the transgression to which the book 
owed its publication, at least according to the story told together 
with the publicity photos when the book was released. Fredrick 
Kohner had written down the teen discourse of his sixteen-year-
old daughter largely by listening in on her phone conversations. 
Wanting reassurance about his daughter’s involvement with 
those beach bums, the fictional father asks son-in-law Larry, a 
psychoanalyst, to probe Gidget for the truth. She gets to listen 
in on the extension phone when Larry reports back the outcome 
of their meeting. What she couldn’t possibly have recognized 
46 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 85.
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or imagined is what Frederick Kohner alone could have mixed 
up out of his memories of psychoanalysis in Germany. The 
Californian analyst “sold” his father-in-law “a double size of 
Freud and Adler, well mixed.”47 
For the fictional world of the Gidget novels, Kohner remade 
himself as Professor Hofer, who teaches German literature at 
the University of Southern California.48 Kohner wasn’t without 
academic credentials, having studied literature in Vienna and 
Paris, concluding his graduate education with a thesis titled Film 
ist Dichtung (Film Is Poetry). The Hofer family into which the 
psychoanalyst married is educated, cultured, and travels in an 
orbit that skips the East Coast. Waiting for her flight to Hawaii, 
Gidget makes a new acquaintance, a girl from the big apple, who 
just can’t believe she doesn’t know what “the Village” is. But the 
Californian rallies (in earshot of Gertrude Stein on Ezra Pound). 
Swapping their addresses at the destination, the New Yorker says 
she’ll be staying at The Hawaiian Village: “Brother. She was a 
real expert on villages.”49 
After he left Berlin in 1936, Friedrich Kohner became Frederick 
Kohner and continued working as screenwriter in Hollywood, 
joining his older brother who had since his 1920 career move 
established himself as a prominent Hollywood agent. Gidget 
47 Frederick Kohner, Gidget (New York: Berkley, 2001), 77. Subsequent 
page references are given in the text. That one of her boyfriends at 
college was a Jungian – in the sequel Cher Papa – completes the 
German triangle of eclectic psychotherapy central to the Göring 
Institute in Nazi Berlin. While there are residual traces of the Kohner 
family system in the Gidget novels, there seemed no one there backing 
Larry the analyst (until now). There was, however, a psychoanalyst 
in the extended family. Gottfried R. Bloch, the brother of Hannah 
Kohner, Walter Kohner’s wife, was the author of Unfree Associations: 
A Psychoanalyst Recollects the Holocaust (Los Angeles: Red Hen Press, 
1999). Pancho Kohner pointed this out in an email dated August 22, 
2019. I was also in email contact with “Gidget.”
48 Sometimes he teaches modern literature, at one point he refers to 
his Old High German field, at another station stop he appears to be 
teaching at UCLA.
49 Frederick Kohner, Gidget Goes Hawaiian (New York: Bantam, 1961), 
16.
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was Frederick Kohner’s big success. He sold it as book and as a 
film within one week. His writing scheduling adapted itself to 
the alternating momentum of Gidget versions between media. 
The same year that the movie adaptation was released, Kohner 
published the first sequel, Cher Papa. He also wrote noveliza-
tions of the two subsequent films, which didn’t adapt his novels. 
The second novelization, Gidget Goes to Rome, appeared the 
same year as another of his own efforts, The Affairs of Gidget. 
The next in line, Gidget in Love, appeared in sync with the first 
year of the TV show.50 
That Frederick Kohner remade his daughter as the next gen-
eration of émigré culture in Southern California was displaced to 
the background by her status as dream teen. To express that she 
could just drop dead in Gidget Goes Parisienne, the Californian 
teenager asks to be buried alongside her great-great-great uncle 
Heinrich Heine. That’s about as close as we get to her Jewish 
background.51 In Gidget Goes Hawaiian we learn that the ten-
years-older sister Ann was born in Berlin.52 In the finale, Gidget 
Goes New York, our heroine steps out of the paperbacks into 
life’s hardcovers, her father notes with approval, after she meets 
UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg: “he looks a bit like my old 
man. Very sympático.”53 Shortly after she arrives in New York, 
this is her first time outside the California/Europe orbit, Gidget 
stands across from Jewish-American ethnicity in the person of 
the waiter, who “talked in a flavorful Jewish brogue” and “per-
mitted himself one of those double-something looks that would 
have done credit to Groucho Marx” (42). 
50 He wrote other non-Gidget novels, too, but whatever was fulfilled 
through the fictionalization of his relationship to his daughter it wasn’t 
his wish to be an author.
51 Frederick Kohner, Gidget Goes Parisienne (New York: Dell, 1966), 14.
52 Kohner, Gidget Goes Hawaiian, 1. A match with Kathy Kohner’s older 
sister Ruth.
53 Frederick Kohner, Gidget Goes New York (New York: Dell, 1968), 29. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text. The father’s blessing 
of his daughter’s decision in the tidy packaging of authorship is on page 
35. Gidget uses the same analogy on her own toward the end of Gidget 
Goes Parisienne, 149. 
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Any details of the Kohner family history get lost in the eight 
Gidget novels, where surfing, skiing, or being a So-Cal teenager, 
however, come to share a lexicon with an eclectic interest in high 
culture. The elective affinity between the academic father and his 
precocious daughter on the basis of cultural reference first takes 
off in the novelizations. In the first novel, Gidget is at a loss when 
Cass (a.k.a. Cassius or the Great Kahoona) calls her Undine (27). 
Oddly she’s also never heard of a faggot or a flit, terms the surfers 
use as warning labels to protect the impenetrable homoerotics 
of their lifestyle. The Great Kahoona is the slightly older leader 
of the surfer pack, a primal father, to be sure, but without the 
backend deal. 
Susan Sontag was grateful to her stepfather for her distin-
guished signature name sans the diversion of obvious ethnicity. 
Kohner turned his daughter Kathy into Franzie Hofer, aka 
Gidget, who isn’t obviously Jewish while showing all the trap-
pings of belonging to a secular assimilated So-Cal Jewish fam-
ily. Franzie’s parents like Kathy’s were originally Austrian, and 
when her father adopts the lingo in their repartee she finds the 
German-accented result deplorable, which could be another 
overlap between fact and fiction. In time, Gidget’s patois starts 
bouncing around the Gestell of the academic father’s learning 
and culture, probably an invention and an upgrade. 
In the first novelization of the first sequel to Gidget, Gidget 
Goes Hawaiian, the So-Cal teen dabbles in the lexicon of high 
culture, as when she realizes she can’t find solace in her reveries:
I knew then there was no use pretending or trying to cajole 
my mind into silence or contemplating the stars which might 
have been okay for Immanuel Kant or Albert Einstein – but 
not for me.54 
Or again, finding analogy for the sounds her car makes: “The 
old Nash started rattling and coughing and gasping like Mimi in 
the last act of La Bohème.”55 When our heroine watches senior 
citizens wobble toward the surf and then come alive in the ocean 
54 Kohner, Gidget Goes Hawaiian, 103.
55 Ibid., 93.
the block of fame
136
she’s reminded of the painting of the fountain of youth that 
hangs in Berlin.56
In the second novelization of the second sequel on screen, 
Gidget Goes to Rome, the heroine counters her insomnia by 
counting cultural references and looking forward to living them: 
“In a few hours, you’re going to walk the same cobblestones 
that old Julie walked and Marcus Aurelius and Michelangelo 
and Napoleon and Keats and Shelley and old Johann Wolfgang 
and Casanova and Vitorrio de Sica (about whom I’m specially 
kookie).”57 Or again, thinking with the lilt of literary reference: 
“Both Marcello and the jeweler exchanged looks that bespoke a 
complete short story by de Maupassant.”58 
While references to WWII are few and far between, and often 
steeped in adolescent ahistoricism,59 the Cold War setting that 
both Kathy Kohner and Franzie Hofer visited in Berlin holds 
together history in the making. As Kathy Kohner Zuckerman 
tells it in an interview in the magazine Jewish Woman,60 she 
turned to the quest of surfing upon her return from the fam-
ily’s two-year sojourn in West Berlin, where her father had found 
employment with a local film company (in the novels Professor 
Hofer had been on sabbatical leave). Europe or her experiences 
there had changed or displaced her and she couldn’t find the 
point of reentry with her peers. That’s why when Gidget again 
meets close-up one of the figures on the beach in Hawaii who 
had reminded her of the painting in Berlin, she recognizes in 
the hale eighty-three-year-old a Berlin analogy stripped of high-
cultural reference.
56 Ibid., 34–35. 
57 Frederick Kohner, Gidget Goes to Rome (New York: Bantam, 1963), 23. 
The adventure begins with the father tutoring Gidget to be culturally 
prepared for her Rome experience. However she not only takes to the 
prep work, she outflies it.
58 Ibid., 72.
59 I give an account of the German history inscribed within the Gidget 
novels in Germany: A Science Fiction (Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus 
Press, 2014), 122–25. 
60 “Gidget,” Jewish Woman, 2002, https://web.archive.org/
web/20020711083557/http://www.jwmag.org/articles/03summer/p38.
asp
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Her body above the waistline looked rather depleted while 
everything below still had the vigor and freshness of youth. 
It was like Berlin, Germany. The Eastern Zone hoary and 
decrepit, the Western still full of juice and vinegar.61
Since early childhood when her mother tried to stretch her short 
daughter at least beyond the midget limit through a regimen of 
rigorous swimming, as Kathy Kohner Zuckerman continues 
in the conversation with Jewish Woman, she was athletic and 
aquatic. “By learning to surf, I could do something physical 
and prove something. It took practice and perseverance but, of 
course, it was fun – and there were all these good-looking guys.”62 
In Gidget: The Little Girl with Big Ideas, our heroine identi-
fies the significance of the setting of her surfing quest right before 
she shoots the curl: “This was the final testing ground that I had 
picked for myself” (148). In “Pilgrimage,” Sontag introduces 
us to her adolescent obstacle course of testing grounds in LA. 
Accompanied, she writes, by Peter and Merrill, she proceeded 
to the subsequent stations in her bildungsroman. “I […] studied 
philosophy, and then, and then […] I went on to my life, which 
did turn out to be, mostly, just what the child of fourteen had 
imagined with such certitude.”63
The realization of the fantasy carries forward unambivalence, 
the flip side of the shame hanging over “Pilgrimage.” In The 
Affairs of Gidget, the heroine takes time out from her relation-
ship to psychoanalysis by marriage, which is not so different from 
Sontag’s own personalized sojourn in psychoanalytic theory, to 
get past ambivalence: 
In trashy books and stories, you always read about the ‘con-
fusion’ of emotions. Well, fans, let me tell you that there is 
no such thing as mixed emotions. It is quite impossible for a 
person to have more than one emotion at a time. And mine 
was of shame.64 
61 Kohner, Gidget Goes Hawaiian, 46–47.
62 “Gidget,” Jewish Woman.
63 Sontag, “Pilgrimage,” 53–54. 
64 Frederick Kohner, The Affairs of Gidget (New York: Bantam, 1963), 47.
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To enter the testing ground of fantasy is to separate out in 
the mix and mess of wishes crossing the mind at the speed of 
thought one emotion at a time, and to make it each time a big 
one. Daydream fantasying can mean to be in training for big 
ideas and big feelings.
Going Steady; or, the Other Walking on Water
Adolescent psychology is girl psychology, but for boys, too. 
As documented in the Gidget novels, the teen milieu is neither 
intolerant nor tolerant of homosexuality. An applicant for a 
modeling job in Paris, the heroine of Gidget Goes Parisienne is 
asked by the designer, Pierre, to strip down to her underclothes. 
She hesitates, until she recognizes the significance of what Pierre 
is wearing: “my eyes fastened on something dangling on a silver 
string around his neck: a medal glued to a piece of leather. The 
sure sign of the fagel.”65 While she goodnaturedly thinks of her 
hairdresser, after he builds her elevating bouffant in record time, 
as an “Italian flit,” and in paraphrasing the school director’s pitch 
for the suitability of progressive education to all kinds of stu-
dents automatically slips in “the high I-Queer,”66 when Gidget 
admits that a female friend she’s having trouble with attracts her, 
she refuses the identification: “I know I’m not queer or I am and 
don’t want to admit it.”67 
Faggots and flits are available to those already in the band, 
which means they are off-limits to a dynamic of recruitment in 
which one can be straight or gay for a day. The teen deems sexual 
identity, especially the marginal kind, an unacceptable limit 
65 Kohner, Gidget Goes Parisienne, 44.
66 Frederick Kohner, Gidget in Love (New York: Dell, 1965), 19, 30.
67 Kohner, Gidget Goes Hawaiian, 51. At the high point of their alterca-
tion, Gidget suggests that the New Yorker’s problem is that her parents 
didn’t practice birth control (62). Writing about Wonder Woman and 
her lesbian gang, Fredric Wertham adds to his infamous reading of 
Batman and Robin spice that’s not nice: “Their attitude about death 
and murder is a mixture of the calousness of crime comics with the 
coyness of sweet little girls.” Seduction of the Innocent (Laurel: Main 
Road Books, 2004), 193.
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and limitation on the pleasure to be had through the trials of 
free membership. If a gay teenager is a contradiction in terms, 
then the contradiction runs deep inside psychoanalysis. Based 
on compatibility with group ties, homosexuality is noted most 
likely to succeed in groups.68 The strong ego of the pervert makes 
him an outsider, who can fit in, however, by manipulating the 
teen milieu of likeability.69 However individualist or different 
the leading idea in adolescence may be, when it comes to the all-
important group bond of likeability, what is important is that 
one should remain uncomplicated and open to enlistment. 
The teenager works hard to align going steady with her 
membership in a milieu of recruitment. Since the first novel, 
Moondoggie or Jeff Griffin is Gidget’s true love. When distracted 
by snorkelling in the first novel, Franzie strayed too far out where 
the waves broke and was out to sea. Moondoggie hauled her 
onto his surfboard and brought her to safety and into the surfing 
group. He gives her the name Gidget, a mix of girl and midget, a 
free gift that comes with in-group membership. Owing to what 
she repeatedly calls her ambivalence, however, and because Jeff’s 
away in the military or she’s away at college, Gidget finds herself 
falling for the others she has not yet forsaken. But it all remains a 
near miss never going all the way to betrayal. 
It turns out that bouts of falling or being in love aren’t the 
same as loving Jeff. This beam or board that she holds onto was 
the curb appeal of the series. Frederick Kohner was running the 
risk of overinvolvement in the father/daughter relationship. 
That’s why at the end of the first novel his daughter’s surfing tri-
umph throws a shadow of doubt on the reality both of her true 
love and her first near miss affair: the former was just a dream and 
the latter reflected curiosity alone. Because of the gap between his 
family setting and her teen milieu of dating, the father/daughter 
68 Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” 141.
69 Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXI (1927–1931): The 
Future of an Illusion, Civilization and Its Discontents and Other 
Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1961), 152.
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relationship sidled up to center stage through mergers in lingo 
and sensibility, and even let slip a reversal in the narration. 
The sequel, Cher Papa, introduces Professor Hofer as pro-
tagonist and first person narrator thinking about and conversing 
with Gidget. In the novel that crossed the line, he performs the 
wish for his elective affinity with his fantasy daughter: “Did I 
establish a mutual admiration society of which we two were the 
only members? I did.”70 She’s fallen again for the near miss from 
the first book, now a ski bum at the resort where she’s working 
for a term off from college. More than understanding his daugh-
ter the narrator father contemplates the “long amorphous photo 
gallery of other ‘dreamboats’” (10) that had knocked true love 
Jeff aka Moondoggie out of the running. Who’s falling for the 
near miss when we read first person that “he was Diogenes, Lord 
Byron, and Heathcliff all rolled into one” (18)? 
To keep it parallel and not perform the body switch of incest, 
Professor Hofer enjoys the company of the near miss’s ex, who 
arrives at the resort odd woman out. “A hundred sensuous 
delights started pervading me, seducing my mind, transporting 
me back to the days of my youth” (27). Through the midlife 
elation their roles reverse and Gidget is parentified. The ex 
is an ex-gun moll, now the merry widow of a dead gangster’s 
ill-gotten fortune. To ensure a level playing field, Gidget does 
something really unimaginable, she reports the woman’s cash 
carrying extravagance to the FBI (83–84). The nasty teen, how-
ever, redeems herself through a rescue operation that stops the 
reunion of near miss and ex, but also leaves her alone with Papa.
Edmund Bergler notes that an author’s second work follow-
ing a success the first time around is the testing ground for the 
array of defences against the wish to be refused.71 Dropping Jeff 
from the equation or telling his father/daughter story outside his 
bit part in her first-person narration just didn’t work. He was 
carrying a girl – not his daughter – who demanded a full-corpus 
shot at fame fictionalization. The two films scripted by other 
70 Frederick Kohner, Cher Papa (New York: Bantam, 1960), 5. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
71 Edmund Bergler, “The Second Book and the Second Play,” The 
Psychoanalytic Review 42, no. 3 (1955): 293–97.
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authors, each of which he studied closely and novelized, kicked 
“his” Gidget back inside the story lines. Aligned again Gidget 
works her way toward the end in the dead end, the inner reality 
she manically defends against, which is her father’s delegation, 
until she makes it to the end in the happy end. Let’s say it leaves 
the father fantasying fantasy about contact with the reality of 
adolescent or group psychology on Germany’s other coast via his 
fictionalized dream-teen daughter. 
Each of the follow-up novels wraps another near miss. There 
are three of them in The Affairs of Gidget, in part because her 
father urged her at its start not to limit her sentimental educa-
tion. It’s not good to be pinned down by her absent boyfriend 
while attending college. Far worse would be elopement, he says: 
he has seen among his USC students too many early marriages 
end in early divorce. Throughout the series, however, Gidget’s 
more serious near misses are with older men. While warming up 
to oldtimer Marcello in Gidget Goes to Rome, Professor Hofer’s 
daughter notes: “I even began to judge my own father with dif-
ferent eyes.”72 
In The Affairs of Gidget, Franzie Hofer’s English Lit professor 
makes moves that she is more than prepared for by transference. 
He uses their shared special interest in contemporary literature 
and philosophy to bring her in for testing at the recruitment cen-
ter. “They say one falls in love. Well, fans, let’s say I had stumbled 
into love.”73 The first stumbling block is the stack of books she 
must remove to sit down in his office: Sex Histories of American 
College Girls (19). His chief strategy is to teach Existentialism, 
which allows him to bring up his open marriage. “I was to find 
out soon why he insisted that I read Justine” (25). The harass-
ment charge has not yet been formulated, but if his morals are 
found wanting he could lose his job. When he asks that she have 
enough savoir faire to keep his pursuit of her under cover, she is 
appalled. “The whole Existentialist façade collapsed before my 
eyes” (33).
72 Kohner, Gidget Goes to Rome, 73.
73 Kohner, The Affairs of Gidget, 18. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text.
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Unlike California Susan, Gidget has no career-size wish to 
fulfill. She comes closest at the end of the first novel when stand-
ing alone on her board she’s too “jazzed up” to care “whether I 
would break my neck or ever see Jeff again” (148). What sends her 
into the surf, the final testing ground, was, however, the “pin-
nacle” she reached upon recognizing that Jeff indubitably loved 
her back (147). To qualify as a coming of age novel, Gidget has to 
sign off with the heroine’s attainment of an epiphany of her own. 
But who can separate the surfer from the surfing?
In the series of novels, Gidget wants true love and must work 
through the ambivalence that keeps her hovering between in-
group recruitment and the couple. While she is a good mimic of 
her father’s knowledge, Gidget often seems really only to know 
the names and the titles and some of the plot and a few lines 
from many sources. At least that’s the story in Gidget in Love. To 
show up Jeff’s doubts about her seriousness of purpose as a col-
lege student, Gidget, still a junior, gets a job teaching literature 
at a So-Cal progressive high school. She convinces the director, a 
petite heavily accented woman, who like her father comes from 
the old country. Gidget goes down her list of names and titles 
and repeats something she remembers reading: teaching is love.74 
Ja! Ja! They are like two California antibodies in a pod.75 
The ambivalence that Gidget likes to cite hides out in wish 
fantasy. When she’s making up with Jeff at the end of Gidget Goes 
Hawaiian, she gives the happy-end reckoning: “Everything up to 
now that had ever happened to me had a dash of make-believe, 
a sprinkling of wishful thinking.”76 With Jeff she over and again 
finds a reality “that didn’t need any fixing up from me.”77 
In The Affairs of Gidget her courtship of the local dentist, 
about the age of her first near miss, the Great Kahoona, sets off 
74 Kohner, Gidget in Love, 22.
75 The setting in which Gidget uses her paternal inheritance spread thin 
to challenge Jeff “had a peculiar haunting charm, à la Brothers Grimm. 
The only outward sign that this edifice harbored a school and not Boris 
Karloff was a plaque with the legend: ‘Learn to live, and live to learn’” 
(19). 
76 Kohner, Gidget Goes Hawaiian, 115.
77 Ibid.
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a spiritualization that seems to make room for friendship with-
out group-membership benefits. This is a variation on the near 
miss that recurs in the series, always auguring a peaceful inner 
separation from Moondoggie and ending as an embarrassment 
of riches (with nowhere to go, send, or spend).
The affair with the dentist offers a full cardiogram of the 
spritualization of the near miss, the ultimate paternal fantasy. 
While waking up from the anesthesia following extraction of her 
wisdom tooth she thinks she sees Jeff in the fog and kisses the 
dentist: “it was like Cloudsville. Like Last Year at Marienbad.”78 
Cloudsville means spiritual, because it’s what she feels even 
though she knows their lips touch. The dentist reflects, however, 
that the kiss can be explained away but how did she know to call 
him by his name, Jeff? Kismet.
During the postop visit while he checks her wound “the hi-fi 
was playing the ‘Liebestod’ from Tristan and Isolde” (91). She 
already administered the love potion by her drug-addled mis-
take. Geoffrey invites her into his private quarters to listen to 
Schubert’s Unfinished on tape. Unfinished? No kidding.
“You know I had certain reservations about asking you in 
here.”
“Did you?”
“Yes. You see, I have a pretty clean record around college.”
“I don’t understand.”
“Well – my patients are mostly recruited from the student 
body. Or should I rather leave out the ‘body’ part?”
He smiled. I got the drift in a flash. (93)
He didn’t leave out the recruitment part. What she takes from 
the “wordless communion” (96) that follows while they listen 
to the tape is that their relationship is “spiritual,” a welcome 
change: “Usually I’m torn between the old flesh and the spirit” 
(99). She becomes his confidante: “Cloudsville, fans” (100). “I’m 
constantly renewing my emotional virginity” (99). She’s thank-
ful for the spiritualization and accepts Geoffrey’s invitation to 
78 Kohner, The Affairs of Gidget, 84. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text. 
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share Thanksgiving dinner with him and his daughter Muffie, 
visiting from his divorce. 
The death potion is, after all, served. Muffie innocently 
addresses the fantasy of making wishes with a bird’s bone: 
“I wonder if birds can make a wish – with their wishing bone.” 
“It’s possible,” said Geoffrey. 
“No, it isn’t,” Muffie said, seriously. “Because when they 
find it, the birds are already dead.” (103)
Cute can kill. At least Gidget concludes that if she did take the 
substitute seat, next to the adorable daughter she’d be as good as 
nothing, just like the dead bird (ibid.).
She sends all the erotic yearnings that her spiritual friendship 
metabolized or denied “straight into the deep freeze” (104). The 
wishbone is no longer connected to the boner. She can now turn 
down Geoffrey’s subsequent proposal to start dating officially 
and seriously and she does so in the name of her surfing prize, 
Jeff a.k.a. Moondoggie. Remembering lines by Walt Whitman 
she whispers goodbye to her fancy (109).
In Gidget Goes New York, just when our heroine is convinced 
that she really is through with the ghost of Jeff a word denied casts 
her back. It belongs to Jeff’s sentence and sentencing that made 
her a peacenik working at the UN. Won’t he be in Greenland 
forever far away from the Vietnam War?
“No such thing as forever,” Jeff said. “They’re sending them 
out every day.”
Again he gazed in my direction and my heart made some 
sort of erratic movement. I guess it was the word “forever.” It 
is fraught with mystical meaning.79 
There is a Chinese saying that comes up repeatedly throughout 
the Gidget series, because it made her Jeff’s lifelong responsibility 
when he saved her life. It comes up again in Gidget Goes New 
York: “Screwy, but that’s the mysterious Orient for you” (16). In 
79 Kohner, Gidget Goes New York, 103. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text.
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this final installment, we enter the discourse of the mystery via 
Gidget’s best friend at the United Nations, Minnie Chan, whose 
father is in the business of manufacturing fortune cookies in 
Reading, no kidding, Pennsylvania. Minnie has contributed a 
few proverbial prophecies and indeed speaks in fortune-cookie 
phraseology. Where do all those fortune sayings come from, 
Gidget wants to know. They can’t all be quotations from the 
sages of the ages. “‘People send them in,’ Minnie said. ‘They love 
to have them printed. Makes them all writers’” (65).
At each bad turn in the renewal of contact with Jeff, Minnie 
has a phrase of fortune that keeps Gidget on course. Minnie takes 
over from Professor Hofer who sent his daughter off to the UN 
with a blessing fit for a cookie: “Life offers usually only one great 
experience, and the secret of life is to repeat that experience as 
often as possible” (36). When she came to his office for a debrief-
ing following her first involvement with peaceniks on campus, 
he helped her recognize that her “subconscious” wanted some-
thing else and that she was drawn to the cause of peace because 
she wanted to protect Jeff (25). 
In the first novel she dreams at night that she and Moondoggie 
are in love (56). There is no conscious residue from the day that 
motivates the dream, no daydreamy thought or wish that’s being 
fulfilled. Gidget realizes the “spirit” of her dream of living and 
loving over and against mere fantasy fulfillment, in other words, 
the “old flesh” of the father’s/author’s fantasy life.
Frederick Kohner cultivated his wish for fame and success by 
fictionalizing his relationship to his daughter’s idiom and libido. 
He couldn’t use his own ticket to the Teen Age washing up onto 
the beach from Germany, not after the success of the ventrilo-
quist act. The fictional Californian daughter knows that when 
her mother “goes to the opera in the intermission she reads such 
stimulating stuff as the Sorrows of Werther – and I kid you not.”80 
That she mentions next to this souvenir of her mother that it’s 
more her father’s speed to look through a copy of Playboy attests 
to the ongoing reversals, backflows, and adjustments that keep 
the hybrid of the fictionalized father/daughter relationship up 
and running. 
80 Kohner, Gidget Goes Hawaiian, 25.
the block of fame
146
There is a glancing thought at the start of Gidget in Love that 
Frederick Kohner kept living up through the Gidget figment: 
“Most kids I knew would simply die to have something mysti-
cal like Moondoggie happen to them.”81 The end in sight of the 
father/daughter writing fantasy is Gidget’s forever. “He was 
tanned all over and had exciting grace in his legs and limbs.”82 
Gidget’s surfer bond/bod is what Sontag carried inside. That he 
was her inner gay’s object of delectation had consequences for her 
career as a writer of fiction. But it allowed her to score realization 
of her wish to be a successful author of big ideas in the medium 
of midlife criticism and teen journal-ism. Shoot it Susan!
My Camp
According to the 1910 psychoanalytic consensus, as summarized 
by Freud in his essay on Leonardo da Vinci, the homosexual 
finds a way out of the incestuous bond with his mother not via 
repression or substitution but by identification. He loves his 
objects as his mother loved him. He was young then; his objects 
are as young now. The gay relationship to youth is an inside job. 
In her diaries, Sontag records the following lines of her dinner 
partner: “The past is completely unreal to me. I live only in the 
present + the future. Is that why I look young?” Sontag’s cap-
tion to the swish fantasy: “Dorian Gay.”83 Inside his attachment 
to youth, Oscar Wilde was forever, in relation to the youths he 
worshipped, the younger, less developed boy with both feet still 
in latency. What carried his identificatory desire forward was his 
recruitment, in reality or fantasy, by an older boy.
Falling victim to homosexuality is part of the act. In a 1962 
diary entry, Sontag notes her partner’s “fantasy of conducting, 
or more often, submitting to a medical examination – where 
the point is not to show sexual excitement as long as you can” 
(304). It is a fantasy in explicit contrast to the heavy breathing of 
81 Kohner, Gidget in Love, 11.
82 Ibid., 10.
83 Susan Sontag, As Consciousness Is Harnessed to Flesh: Diaries 
1964–1980, ed. David Rieff (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2012), 428. 
Subsequent references are given in the text.
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the “American idea of sex,” as she calls it, in other words hetero-
sexuality. A few months later she resists “love as incorporation, 
being incorporated” (307). But then, five days later, the medical 
exam fantasy is on her list of “sex fantasies of losing autonomy” 
(309). It’s hard to know whose fantasy it is. But for sure it is an 
afterimage of the counsel she received from the two slightly older 
teen boys with whom she visited Thomas Mann. In a 1949 entry, 
Susan writes that she heard it from F that he and E knew already 
the year before that she was probably a lesbian. It’s important 
that E, the object of merger, is absent but cited and summoned 
in what follows. Because next F tells her what to do before it’s 
too late. 
“Go out with a couple of men at the same time. Park and let 
them feel you + have their little pleasures. You won’t like it at 
all at first, but force yourself to do it […] it’s your only chance” 
(44). 
The in-group groping for a response against the reign of sexual 
identity imparts to Susan a hands-on object lesson. This ambigu-
ously straight milieu of recruitment is reborn with Susan as the 
inner world that would carry forward unto successful realization 
her wish fantasy of being an author of big ideas. 
By the slight alterations that Sontag adds to her souvenir, we 
are also inside the fantasy flashing on an identification-driven 
amalgam. In his diaries, Mann notes that three Chicago students 
stopped by to interview him about The Magic Mountain. It was 
an interview with young intellectuals, not a conversation with 
high school kids. No libidinal impression was left behind for all 
their college professionalism. He may also not have been avail-
able for E’s surfer charm because during this holiday period he 
was so distracted by son Golo’s boyfriend “Ed.” Several months 
later, he would be all over the pages of his diaries about the cute 
waiters in Switzerland. Some have the legs of Hermes, another he 
immediately falls in love with. 
As a kind of prelude to her first well-received novel, The 
Volcano Lover, Sontag renders in 1987 by metonymy and absence 
an unshared fantasy of teen heartthrob in the parlor of the 
eternal/internal adolescent. The Mann diaries were already out. 
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Sonntag played it straight with the other items of her memoir. 
The tender misunderstanding that attends the distance between 
Hans Castorp and North Hollywood High School graduates 
Farley and Ladd picks up heat between the lines. Both were icons 
of ambiguously straight attractions. While Ladd as Shane is as 
gender nonspecific as Lassie, beloved by all the children going 
into adolescence, Farley’s role in Rope is that of the straight 
enlisted by the more explicit or forthright friend. 
The foundation of an inner world must reach into early child-
hood. We saw that like Norman Bates she fantasied stealing and 
wearing the mother’s raiment, her very appeal. Then there was 
her missing father. While her mother didn’t tell her that it had 
happened until he was long gone, both parents were often gone 
to China, to the exotic place that would remain for Sontag the 
first address of fantasy. That the cause of his death was withheld 
so long from her, in part because tuberculosis held shameful 
associations, is identified (aptly I think) by Sontag’s German 
biographer Daniel Schreiber as the traumatic point of return for 
her study of the rhetoric of illness and the crux of her dedication 
to The Magic Mountain, the model for The Volcano Lover.84 
Sontag’s childhood inability to mourn her father’s disappearance 
amounts to the derealization, nonrealization of his death. 
In The Volcano Lover, the following passage refers to lost 
objects in the protagonist’s collection, but the inability to mourn 
is writ large upon a whole life:
To begin to mourn, one must get past the feeling that this is 
not happening or has not happened. It helps to be present at 
the disaster. […] Whatever does not happen before our eyes 
must be taken on trust. […] The Cavaliere mourned for his 
treasures. But a mourning that begins so posthumously, and 
under such conditions of doubt and disbelief, can never be 
fully experienced.85
84 Daniel Schreiber, Susan Sontag. Geist und Glamour (Berlin: Aufbau 
Verlag, 2010), 15–17.
85 Susan Sontag, The Volcano Lover (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1992), 254–55. Subsequent page references are given in the text. 
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Upon this melancholic foundation that Mann told to the moun-
tain rests an assemblage of charming confidence teens, like Felix 
Krull, the protagonist who followed more directly Mann’s elabo-
ration of the infernal contractual deadlines internal to an artist’s 
success. The good fortune of the impostor inherited the fateful 
aspirations of Faust.
When she first reads Kafka, Sontag confides to her diary in a 
binding flash of insight, that her former gold standards, Mann 
and André Gide, were now relegated to the inflation of mere 
reputation. But then she came down off the high (not in her 
critical standards but in her literary orientation). The lessening 
she learned, her badge of shame, gets sublated in fictionalized or 
internalized retrospective and, in her most successful novel, pro-
spectively revalorized as collection (another name for an oeuvre 
driven by cultural journalism). 
In The Volcano Lover, Sontag identifies her protagonist’s 
dedication to collection as allegory of her own developing realiza-
tion, which allowed California Susan to raise the consumerism 
of culture to the power of composition while drawing her own 
early antisocial attachment to books (and her murderous raging 
against her mother) through the loop of melancholia staggered 
and redeveloped unto art. 
However, if he is to obtain at auction what he must have 
and without feeling ripped off, the collector must “perform a 
whole theatre of being a little interested, but not immoderately; 
intrigued, yes, even tempted; but not seduced, bewitched. […] So 
the collector is a dissembler, someone whose joys are never unal-
loyed with anxiety. Because there is always more” (71–72). That 
he must get the next piece of his puzzling out of culture at any 
price reveals that the collector–impostor nevertheless remains in 
touch with a more basic impulse: “Every collector is potentially 
(if not actually) a thief” (73). 
Early on in her diaries, young Sontag anticipated an academic 
career as the best security for the life of a serious writer. But then 
a somewhat older Sontag scrawled across the entry: “Jesus!” This 
teen impatience with academia is, in the US setting, a remarkable 
refusal for an intellectual, a denial, in fact, since there is no intel-
lectual life in the United States off campus. This was brought 
home by the so-called structuralist controversy, which took place 
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at the Johns Hopkins University in 1966. Twentieth-century 
European thought was henceforward no longer an introductory 
offer, nor the trauma of a year abroad. The earlier niche market of 
representing European developments to a US readership, which 
Sontag shared with Frederick Kohner and Paul de Man, was soon 
beside the point. While the grafts of Foucault and Lacan, which 
had been applied beforehand, also benefitted, “deconstruction in 
America” was in the ascendant. At one point, Derrida declared 
Southern California the seat of deconstruction. What happened 
in America didn’t stay there. Only four years after the 1966 
convening of postructuralism, Roland Barthes’s reinvention of 
his method in S/Z reflected nothing closer to home than decon-
struction in America. In her book-length studies, Sontag did not 
adjust to the new proximity of European thought and thus her 
major works remained outside the ken of deconstruction. But off 
and on campus Sontag continued to score as cultural journalist. 
Before the retrospective of shame and only a few years after 
the charge that SF movies testified to an emotional failure, Susan 
Sontag discovered in “Camp” an alternative affective response 
to the sliding scale of high and low culture in a post-apocalyptic 
world. Her 1979 article on Hans-Jürgen Syberberg’s My Hitler 
provided the appropriate emotional response she had earlier 
found wanting in SF movies, but it was grief in the mode of 
distancing, internalization, and ironization, which in the mean-
time she had discovered for or inside herself in Camp. In writing 
“Notes on ‘Camp’,” she summoned her inner gay, the one once 
buoyed up by Thomas Mann’s tenderness toward Castorp urg-
ing merger with Merrill. The ready position that she introduces 
at the start of “Notes on ‘Camp’” to justify and protect her ability 
to read the sensibility of an in-group, what she identifies as a taste 
in emotion, goes to the position beyond ambivalence, but not 
for the shame of it: “I am strongly drawn to Camp, and almost as 
strongly offended by it. That is why I want to talk about it, and 
why I can.”86 
When Sontag reveals as essential camp the “ambition on the 
part of one man to do what it takes a generation, a whole culture 
86 Susan Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp’,” in Against Interpretation, 275–76. 
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to accomplish,”87 she identifies the hard shell of her inner cor-
respondent, the fantasy of teen prematurity, of genius-insight 
independent of reservation or confirmation over time. In other 
words, there is success in inevitable failure, a tender feeling, as she 
notes toward the end, which turns up the contrast to the more 
adult condition of being wrecked by success, together with its 
mass psychology of fateful identification with lost causes. Camp 
gets across not only as charming but also as “winning.” 
That Sontag wonders out loud in her 1996 afterword to a new 
edition of Against Interpretation that no one had as yet written 
on the camp phenomenon when she seized the chance thirty 
years before defers to the inner recruiter who remade adolescent 
journal writing into lucky art journalism. I once heard one of 
Sontag’s gay art journalist peers in New York express envy that he 
hadn’t written the Riefenstahl piece first. By the identification 
that brings about a reversal in time, the inner-outer gay trans-
mutes scooping out the mother’s creativity into omnipotent 
scooping and scoring of deadlines. 
Sontag’s first novel, The Benefactor, opens a season of inter-
nal metabolization of gay enrollment through the protagonist 
Hippolyte’s relationship to the writing of the novel itself. It all 
turns on his relationship to dreaming, which he commences 
revisiting and extending into daytime programming through 
his exchanges with a bona fide author, Jean-Jacques, who is also 
commercial gay trade. At one point Jean-Jacques even enlists 
Hippolyte for the one-time one-night stand. To the extent 
that his dreams are continuously summoned within waking 
fantasy, they drive the novel’s composition like the realization 
of daydream fantasies. Realization rather than fulfilment is the 
identificatory rapport with fantasy. As Hippolyte reflects: “The 
bridge which I built between my dream and my daytime occupa-
tions was my first taste of an inner life.”88 
In a 1972 diary entry, Sontag introjects parenthetically the 
history of her own initiatory seductions: “By the age of 16 on, 
women found me, […] imposed themselves on me emotionally 
87 Ibid., 284.
88 Susan Sontag, The Benefactor (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 
1963), 4.
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+ sexually. […] How grateful I am to women – who gave me a 
body, who made it even possible for me to sleep with men.”89 
And even made it possible for her, at least according to the leg-
ends of her early liaisons in New York, to sleep with gay men. 
Over time, same-sex seduction into a body, her integration of 
psyche and soma, let the gay man out and about.
In 1963 diary entries, Sontag reflects on her writing at the time 
of the appearance of her first novel: “My writing is always about 
dissociation” (319). Her novel, in turn, is a meditation on “dis-
sociative faits accomplis, their hazards + rewards” (ibid.). And 
again: “there are no people in what I’ve written. Only ghosts” 
(320). Sontag generated her second novel, Death Kit, out of this 
ghost of adolescence that malingers on in her suicidal midlife 
protagonist, Diddy:
Diddy, not really alive, had a life. Hardly the same. Some 
people are their lives. Others, like Diddy, inhabit their lives. 
[…] Eventually for such a person, everything is bound to run 
down. The walls sag. Empty spaces bulge between objects. 
The surfaces of objects sweat, thin out, buckle.90
Every time the word “now” appears in the novel, it appears in 
parentheses, at once a datemark, a trigger, and a site of circum-
vention.
Only by bedding her with “Alice in Wonderland” was Sontag 
able to write about Alice James, a true abject of identification, 
odd woman out in a household of male genius, a psychosomatic 
invalid who ended a cancer patient, an innate talent whose work 
remained her diaries. At the mad tea party held for the double 
Alice, the advice of women writers established in history jump 
starts Alice, bed-ridden by dissociation, on a tour of daydream 
fantasying whereby she conjures up a sojourn in Rome. 
Sontag confides in the Note appended to Alice in Bed that ten 
years earlier she dreamed up the play from start to finish. Again, 
89 Sontag, As Consciousness Is Harnessed to Flesh, 370–71. Subsequent 
references are given in the text.
90 Susan Sontag, Death Kit (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967), 
2.
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she prefers to address the extension of dreaming into waking 
rumination and reflection rather than daydream fantasy – the 
“triumphs of the imagination” rather than wish fulfillment.91 
However, when she concludes the Note with the assurance that 
“the victories of the imagination are not enough” (117), we are 
inside the frame of reference of waking fantasy. That the relation 
to a submerged reality, what Sontag refers to as “a real encounter 
with a representative of the world” (116), nevertheless leaves its 
mark is a basic feature of the genre of daydream fantasy. This 
mark of the present is still part of the fantasy, like the idealized 
past in Freud’s formula. Perhaps it is the ultimate fantasy, as Freud 
observes of the moment in Jensen’s Gradiva when the protago-
nist’s sense of reality is suddenly restored. As in D.W. Winnicott’s 
treatment of the dissociated daydreamer in Playing and Reality, 
it is by extending fantasying to what lies outside, dreaming and 
living as Winnicott puts it, that Alice could start over in form-
lessness. What she is free to catch up with, however, is the ado-
lescence of recruitment. Alice fantasies, then, not seduction and 
fulfillment, but recruitment and realization, and thus pries loose 
for a captured moment from her dissociated state. 
Protest rallies in Winnicott’s patient a dissociated self-refer-
ence in fantasying and sets a limit to the span of Alice’s respite. In 
Ulrike Ottinger’s 1979 film Bildnis einer Trinkerin – aller jamais 
retour (Ticket of No Return) the dissociation of daydreaming 
seeks a breach by the layering of fantasying in psychic reality or 
on screen.92 Like the returning point in the case of Winnicott’s 
suicidal patient, however, “protest” guards the dissociated state. 
The drinker can’t cut away from her protest. In a fantasy series 
of job interviews and job placements, which begins with the 
drinker’s performance of the Hamlet monologue on stage, each 
episode ends in failure, notably her dismissal when she takes her 
91 Susan Sontag, Alice in Bed (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1993), 117. Subsequent page references are given in the text. 
92 I wrote on this masterpiece in my study of the Ottinger oeuvre. See 
Ulrike Ottinger: The Autobiography of Art Cinema (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008). I began this reading of the film 
as the manifest of a crashed flight of fantasy in summer seminars I 
taught at European Graduate School.
the block of fame
154
refusal to stop or hide her drinking to the next level of acting 
out. Three fate-like allegorical figures of a sociological overview 
shadow these scenes and run their commentary on the sidelines. 
They hail from the film that Ottinger didn’t deliver, which ironi-
cally was her protest against the new norm that protest built. 
Protest doesn’t show up only the drinker’s scenes of self-help. It 
gives all her silent solo scenes the hook. 
Ottinger’s film opens with the heroine’s resolution to live out 
fully her “wishful drinking” and tour the alcoholic pit stops of 
split-off West Berlin. She decides to make a heroic effort within 
her dissociated lockdown in fantasying and go beyond the 
figment-future of fulfillment all the way to realization or reality. 
Upon her arrival at the airport, the internal demand for reality 
is transmitted out loud through the public-address system. In 
circumvention of inner reality, the flight of fantasy aims for outer 
reality. She goes to town from the airport on the bus advertising 
the travel agency Wahnfried, the Wagner express. 
The film follows the heroine’s commitment to finding a form 
for her drinking-thinking. The costumes the drinker wears are 
too architectural for us to ignore the innovation and invention 
going into their cutting out and assembly.93 In certain scenes, 
notably those in which the dwarf impresario joins the lady, we 
stand at the border to the poetic night dream. 
On her first cab ride at night in Berlin the lady drinker 
becomes the driver. The transposition is like early film illustra-
tions of daydreaming, which are funny, but here it is a jolting 
loss of boundary and defense, like the mishaps by bystanders 
cluttering her path already at the airport. While her immersion 
in alcoholic self-destruction doesn’t leave a smudge on her, she 
is nevertheless marked as the identified patient of every system 
she visits. Following the jolt of becoming someone she isn’t, the 
taxi driver knocks over the bag lady’s shopping cart – and the 
drinker-protagonist back into the passenger seat. From there 
she can see better the depressive position. But it’s tolerable even 
now, fascinating on the human side, and will grow on her, until 
the two film heroine stereotypes are knocking about together in 
93 Tabea Blumenschein, who on occasion acted for Ottinger, was an artist 
in mixed media, including clothing design.
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a relationship that becomes more differentiated in its range of 
affect than manic overvaluation and devaluation. 
After the relay of reality-test fantasies, the camera widens 
the spacing of its view of unidentified landscapes. It reflects for 
a spell the pull of the documentary perspective already on the 
horizon of this art film, a perspective that would ultimately sub-
sume Ottinger’s cinema. Ottinger’s juxtaposition of untenable 
exoticisms or stereotypes, pulled largely from the film culture 
of Europe before the impact or fact of Nazi Germany (like the 
Countess and the fish wife represented by the drinker and the 
bag lady), skips traumatization.94 Ottinger projected her first 
fantasy feature in 1977. Madame X: Eine absolute Herrscherin 
(Madame X: An Absolute Ruler) was a heroic adventure of 
piracy on Lake Constance and the China Sea unstuck in the 
grave of history. It was the idealized past gesturing toward the 
utopian-aesthetic future of fulfillment, but called back to local 
responsibilities by the trigger in the present. An unafraid tour 
critical of but not correct about history made in Germany, which 
we can follow in Ottinger’s fantasying films, cannot get past 
the protest culture of retraumatization. Entry upon uncharted 
landscapes in her documentary cinema could, however, proceed 
without trigger warning. 
Winnicott’s didactic and moral stance upholding the value of 
the night dream’s symbolism and poetry over against the fleeting 
fixity of daydreaming and its ongoing risk of dissociation cor-
responds to the Thomas-Mannian side of Sontag’s realizations, 
her fiction. His patient who guides the analyst down the path 
of a third term unto a fantasying of fantasy represents the side 
Sontag took in her cultural journalism. However, the transfer-
ential “mutual-daydreaming” collaboration of both sides in 
Winnicott’s case study meets denial. The very words daydream-
ing and wish fantasying don’t appear in Sontag’s writing though 
they are intimated in the recourse made to prolonging night 
94 Although she spent her early years in hiding with her Jewish mother in 
Constance, the closeness was doting and devoted (the only third person 
at this time was her other mother or grandmother). Her projection 
booth in the setting of traumatic history is the cozy corner of this 
deepened and extended dyad. 
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dreaming into waking reality. Only in Alice in Bed is there an 
integrated presentation of the two bookends of Sontag’s realiza-
tion of her early wish to be a big ideas author.
In Alice in Bed, the disruptive appearance of a burglar in the 
fantasy of Alice getting up out of bed is the datemark of a pres-
ent reality, the trigger of the fantasy pressing toward realization. 
The burglar tells Alice this isn’t a dream and asks why she doesn’t 
scream. “What I do is mostly not do things,” says Alice (105). But: 
“Sometimes I have such odd thoughts” (101). The burglar’s illegal 
entry, the encounter with bed-ridden Alice, and his theft with 
her blessing, comprise the play’s climax, as Sontag underscores 
in the Note. The thief is recruitable by Alice to get a rise out of 
her dissociative daydreaming. She’s not as old as he imagined, the 
thief tells Alice and acquiesces (92). In her Note Sontag avows: “I 
have been preparing to write Alice in Bed all my life” (117). 
In 1949, Sontag used her diary to compile lists of teen code 
words for gay identification and experience. It concludes the 
inside view afforded by her 1987 novelization of an ongoing 
encounter, call it intrapsychic, between the gay European midlifer 
she would become and her starting position, the ambiguously 
straight teen surfer with whom she merged. The following 
exchange, in which, California Susan notes, “real” means “gay,” 
throws a summary loop through recruitment unto realization:
“Are you for real?” “I’ll do until the real thing comes along.”95 
Chances with the Stars
Byrd Hoffman gave dance instruction to young Robert Wilson, 
which, by pulling his speech defect inside out through his body, 
provided successful therapy. In her name, Wilson carried forward 
his newfound access to non-linguistic reserves of language onto 
the stage of a new theater. While he commenced together with 
the “Byrd Hoffman School of Birds” first experiments in theater 
and performance, Wilson also worked as teacher and therapist. 
Chance or luck guided his early choices. He happened upon the 
plight of Raymond Andrews, who was being harassed by police 
95 Sontag, As Consciousness Is Harnessed to Flesh, 42.
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as recalcitrant juvenile not realizing, as Wilson recognized, that 
the boy was deaf. Deafman Glance, the silent opera immersed 
in the trauma time of a mute boy’s recollection of his murdering 
mother, was the result – with Andrews as one of the perform-
ers on stage. When Wilson adopted his muse and charge, he 
resolutely added choice to chance. It was the affirmation he again 
provided in the case of another discovery, Christopher Knowles, 
whose autism served as found resource for the poetry of Letter 
for Queen Victoria and Einstein on the Beach. 
Susan Sontag wrote Alice in Bed for Robert Wilson to stage 
at the Schaubühne in Berlin in 1993. She didn’t want collabora-
tion; she wanted regular collaboration. In 2000, she remembers 
to note the importance of Wilson “though he’s increasingly 
distracting himself with projects like doing the décor for the 
Guggenheim’s Armani show.”96 Sometimes Sontag was really 
clueless. While in the more distant past it was chance encounters 
that led Wilson to engage, for example, a Freud-lookalike off the 
street to perform in The Life and Times of Sigmund Freud, in 
time it was the chance of contact with the famous that drew his 
productions onward. Lady Gaga proposed to Wilson that he be 
her mentor. When she made contact with Wilson, she was fol-
lowing in the footsteps of her art heroine, Marina Abramovic, 
who by then had joined those lonely at the top. In 2010, visi-
tors to New York’s MoMA swallowed the Abramovic formula: 
endurance-testing control over the body is the mind’s Passion, 
which the artist imparts to her audience face-to-face. When in 
2007 Marina Abramovic commissioned Wilson to stage her 
funeral, her “death,” he agreed on the condition that her “life” 
also be party to the performance. That three years later, she even 
played the part of her idealized (and hated) mother belongs to 
Wilson’s therapeutic intervention. 
For his 2014 Paris exhibition, “Living Rooms,” Wilson made a 
series of video portraits of Lady Gaga, which reenacted artworks 
in the Louvre’s collection. In one gallery space, there were eleven 
video portraits based on the severed head in Andrea Solario’s 
96 Charles McNulty, “Sontag in Wonderland,” The Village Voice, October 
31, 2000, https://www.villagevoice.com/2000/10/31/sontag-in-
wonderland/.
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“John the Baptist on a Charger” (1507) and a single Ingres reenact-
ment. Lady Gaga as “Mademoiselle Caroline Rivière” (1805) was 
not chopped or cropped in close-up, but the face was accorded 
its due. What is faced in Ingres’s portrait is the adolescent girl’s 
death the following year. In another gallery – in the midst, this 
time, of the old masterpieces regularly on display – was a video 
portrait of Lady Gaga reprising Jacques-Louis David’s painting 
“The Death of Marat” (1793). The role of Marat seated expiring 
in his bath was a performance her face carried off above the single 
breast slipping out into view. 
In the beginning of her career, Lady Gaga masked her face, 
but then tended to displace the face-to-face through exhibition 
of her body, at once “perfect” and throwaway, just like a blank 
used for replication. Just add a face. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of faciality (in Mille Plateaux), the “aspect” 
that ranges widely across bodies or landscapes is ultimately the 
face of Christ. But Wilson’s face-saving intervention underscores 
that before the deposit can be thus redeemed what we face-to-
face is an object of identification dangling in the nothingness of 
finitude.
A living room is the stage on which we stand, sit, and stretch 
out, among other conjugations of “being.” Just as the word 
“standing” (for example) is historically related to “being” in 
Indo-European languages, so “mourning” in the same lexicon 
means to “to fall down” (in identification with the dead). 
The fall also rises in accord with the repeated throws of chance 
that initiate in the moment the itinerary or understanding of 
change. Wilson threw one Lady Gaga portrait out of the loop of 
reenactment into the center of “Living Rooms.” Wilson recon-
structed his residence at the Watermill Center in the Louvre as 
stage set for displaying a large sampling from his private collec-
tion. In the “bedroom,” there was an unidentified flying object, 
which turned out to be another Lady Gaga video portrait, one 
that did not refer to a work in the Louvre, however, nor did it 
belong to the Watermill collection. 
What we saw was her body articulated through shibari, 
the Japanese art of rope-bondage. Is the occluded face not 
re-inscribed on this “foreign” body lifted up from itself – like 
the view of her abdomen and womb that Baubo framed when 
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she pulled her dress up over her head? The flashing of the face 
on the exposed female body, the punch line whereby Baubo 
delivered Demeter from the stuck place of her melancholia, can 
be seen, Freud allowed in “A Mythological Parallel to a Visual 
Obsession” (1916), as the humorous aside to the infamous pros-
pect of Medusa, the face-to-face that turned some into their own 
gravestones, but also signaled heterosexual desire’s stiff compe-
tition. The bondage portrait dangled before us the prospect of 
a fall upward, which, like the throw of chance, like the body’s 
own tumescence in sexual arousal, reverses the pull of gravity (or 
grave).
The night of the vernissage, Wilson’s Lecture on Nothing 
opened the series of theatrical events at the Louvre, which 
framed and supplemented “Living Rooms.” John Cage’s 1949 
“Lecture on Nothing” is a beacon that Wilson followed early on 
in his own theatrical reclamation of disconnection (for example, 
speechlessness) as another form of connection. For a 2012 tribute 
to Cage exhibited at the Akademie der Künste in Berlin (at the 
time the production of “Lecture on Nothing” was in the works), 
Wilson contributed a page he inscribed with a recollection. The 
composer let him know following a performance of The Life and 
Times of Sigmund Freud that they were pursuing divergent paths. 
But disappointment gives way to reparation as Wilson writes 
on with affirmation that Cage’s Silence was his greatest inspira-
tion. In the course of his performance of “Lecture on Nothing,” 
Wilson focused on the irritability Cage admitted in passing: “If 
we are irritated, it is not a pleasure. Nothing is not a pleasure 
if one is irritated.” In Cage’s lecture, irritability was absolved by 
affirmation of “the pleasure of being slowly nowhere.” By turn-
ing up the volume on the irritation invoked and denied in the 
lecture, Wilson accorded ambivalence (“Yes and No”) to Cage’s 
outright dismissal of their affinity. 
Surrounded by excerpts from the lecture handwritten on ban-
ners, Wilson took Cage’s express invitation (that bored audience 
members should go to sleep) to bed on stage. Otherwise the stag-
ing made room for daydream association, ranging from an audio 
excerpt of Cage reading his lecture to the photo-based video 
images by Tomek Jeziorski of Cage and Alexander Rodchenko. 
At one point the other live actor (Tilman Hecker) looked over 
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stage and audience through binoculars from on high, no doubt 
a reference to Cage’s bird watching, but equally a seafaring 
image of finding the moment on the map. In an interview at the 
University of Iowa in 2008 Wilson noted: “My work has always 
dealt with a kind of space that allows one to daydream.”97 
In “Lecture on Nothing,” Cage narrated his decision to 
compose music out of deregulated sound in terms of taking 
the call he followed on a heroic quest. “Noises, too, had been 
dis-criminated against; and being American, having been trained 
to be sentimental, I fought for noises. I liked being on the side 
of the underdog.”98 That Cage makes Kansas the place name on 
the map of identification with the excluded suggests that it is the 
fantasy trajectory of The Wizard of Oz and not that of the com-
petition from the same year, Gone with the Wind, that beckons 
for a chance, a change. 
Both the heroic quest into the inner world and the fairy tale 
of development from primary narcissism to genital sexuality 
provide captions of legibility to daydream fantasy. Jean-François 
Lyotard’s reading of Hamlet’s active unfulfillment of every 
Oedipal task is the allegory of Shakespeare’s composition out 
of curtailed death wishes, in other words upon the crypts of his 
dead father and dead son.99 Mourning defuses the death wishes 
that melancholia projects, inverts, and staggers. One can add 
slowly being nowhere to this list of ways of disrupting the con-
sumerism of wish fulfillment to make room for a “wishing well” 
in daydreaming. 
97 Since the 2014 events in Paris, Wilson staged Faust I and II at the 
Ensemble Theater in Berlin. In the legendary translation scene, Goethe 
allegorized the advent of a German literary language through the 
momentum of Faust’s free translation of logos, moving on from the 
literal and historical options to arrive, fourth try, at the wished-for Tat 
(act or deed), which triggers the arrival of Mephistopheles. Wilson 
pulls out of the scene four Fausts (and three Margaretes), making it 
clear that “the wish” reaches further than “desire.”  
98 John Cage, “Lecture on Nothing,” in Silence (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1973), 117.
99 Jean-François Lyotard, “Jewish Oedipus,” trans. Susan Hanson, Genre 
10 (1977): 395–411.
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Wilson included in his staging of “Lecture on Nothing” a 
repro of a letter to Cage mis-sent to his own address. We could see 
that his assistant back then scrawled across the envelope: “Bob, I 
thought he was long dead.” If the letter always arrives at its des-
tination, then the death wish always comes true. In contrast, the 
ancient apparatus of I Ching, which Cage commenced applying 
to his compositions at the time of “Lecture on Nothing,” orga-
nizes “nothing” as coming attraction between chance and choice. 
In the light of the I Ching’s augury of chance and change, 
P.K. Dick looks at the local condition of schizophrenia as the 
Trauerspiel of integration. Klein tied the open end – the incom-
pletion or fragmentation – of integration to a sense or direction 
of irretrievable loss, the melancholic destiny of being broken up, 
lonely, but lonely together with one’s lonely parts and partings.100 
In “Schizophrenia & The Book of Changes,” however, Dick 
situates the dis-appointment with integration ineluctably within 
adolescence: 
A human child, at birth, still has years of a kind of semireal 
existence ahead of him: semireal in the sense that until he is 
fifteen or sixteen years old he is able to some degree to remain 
not thoroughly born.101
Entry into the shared world is the free gift that comes with going 
out on dates. But the earlier membership in the unborn state, 
which the pre-schizophrenic personality can’t let go, renders 
“asking out” already an unspeakable burden. The doomed 
personality defers the date request and instead gazes upon the 
cute prospect “for a year or so, mentally detailing all possible 
outcomes: the good ones go under the rubric ‘daydreams,’ the 
bad ones under ‘phobia’.”102 
100 See my reading of the lonely parts club convened in Klein’s “The Sense 
of Loneliness.” SPECTRE (Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2013), 
111–12.
101 Philip K. Dick, “Schizophrenia & The Book of Changes,” in The 
Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick: Selected Literary and Philosophical 
Writings, ed. Lawrence Sutin (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 175. 
102 Ibid.
the block of fame
162
Like the precog’s ability to view the near future of scientific 
hypothesis as a bank of monitored futures, the I Ching presents 
not what’s coming soon but the operative forces that determine 
the future. As such it intervenes at the limit of temporal experi-
ence, which Dick personalizes as that of the schizophrenic: “The 
schizophrenic is having it all now, whether he wants it or not; the 
whole can of film has descended on him, whereas we watch it 
progress frame by frame.”103 
While trying to reconstruct the chances and choices that led 
to the Lady Gaga video portraits, I kept running up against 
“James Franco.” I was following the throw of another link – to 
Mona Kuhn, whose photograph of a seated male nude seemed to 
promise illumination of the importance of “the sitting” within 
the conjugation of Being in Wilson’s “Living Rooms” – when I 
discovered, among the countless images available for searching, a 
spread of photographs Kuhn took of Franco, in which the first 
color photographs of Marilyn Monroe showing her intellectual 
aspect in the setting of her sex appeal shimmered through. I 
was at the art of wishing well. The report that Abramovic was 
making a film of Franco’s life, however, pulled up short before 
the asocial reservation of the daydream. But the Web, like the I 
Ching, neither tells the future nor fulfils wishes. It presents by 








On election day 2016, the faculty at the Academy of Fine Arts 
Karlsruhe voted not to renew my contract. The Germans have 
no idea of the law but only of the contract, the Guten Tag you 
have to pronounce and exchange right away before getting on 
to the business at hand. The dependency on the contract might 
be another reason why the allegory of German history tends to 
be Faustian, in other words infernal. Without a contract or a 
Guten Tag the German is free to jump into your face and lose 
it. I had been promised the same ten years my predecessor Klaus 
Theweleit had taught there, but no, not in writing. Who needs 
writing when buoyed up by the fluidum of heartfelt affability, 
the German version of/aversion to friendliness? But then the 
warning light “SILENCE” turns on over the door and you are left 
out of the production. 
To be fair, I was no longer interested in the Academy, which 
was undergoing a downgrade to teacher’s college in the course 
of adjusting to the Bologna educational reforms. We were a year 
into the irreversible transition that was being administered by 
a newly appointed colleague in pedagogy, a specialist in apply-
ing the reforms, who had pacified several schools already before 
moving on to Karlsruhe. Formerly a visual artist, she was in the 
meantime a Ph.D. proclaiming and performing in class and spe-
cial conferences the creativity of teaching. The administration of 
the Bologna reform has reversed the stigma that academics teach-
ing content courses at art schools were unable to obtain univer-
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sity positions by making it the requirement, forever separating 
the university from arts education. 
When a colleague in art history pointed out hopefully that 
the new appointment should be OK since she wrote not only 
academic papers but even fiction, I remember the alarm going 
off in my head; those who are adept at keeping apart fiction and 
non-fiction are the worst. I guess performance holds the parts 
together like some naive belief in vitality. 
The outside world really doesn’t understand upon watching 
Hitler give a speech how anyone could have fallen for him. Since 
we outsiders watched the German recent past on a small screen 
monitor in the classroom, Marshall McLuhan relieved us of the 
tendentious distinctions of national character study by arguing 
that if the Germans had watched the Führer on TV the spell 
would have been neutralized. But since then I’ve observed that a 
style of performance reminiscent of Hitler’s stumbling fumbling 
arousal to the occasion of speaking, reversing, and preserving 
castration for all to see and believe, continues to impress the 
Germans. 
Amateur hour attends every ideological changeover in edu-
cational institutions, something that has befallen the German 
system in rapid succession. This time it’s not National Socialism 
or Soviet Communism but a syndication of political correctness 
in the States that’s doing the changing. I was wondering why 
German colleagues had not reached for their own version of 
the so-called trigger warning since, although it introduces into 
the setting of teaching occupational therapy for psychotics, it 
also guarantees academic freedom. That’s when I recalled that 
Germans are excellent foresters and that any institutional change 
(for example in the pay scale) is never messily introduced across 
the board but resolutely put into effect in the new generation. It 
lessens the likelihood of protest. 
The new German educators are in training to protect a post-
historical utopia already realized in theory, in therapy. A student 
at the Academy in training to be an instructor at German high 
school in a few subjects, including art, for the first time brought 
me into contact with the new model of education, which at 
the time was kept out of the Academy proper by sending the 
prospective schoolteachers to attend the required coursework 
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at other institutions. I assigned him a research topic involving 
Jensen’s Gradiva, Freud’s reading of the novella, and Hitchcock’s 
Vertigo. He reported back to me that he had found the Gradiva 
Complex so fascinating because so alien. He couldn’t even imag-
ine a time when patriarchy was so dominant.
In class, after I showed Whatever Happened to Baby Jane 
(1962), I tried to stimulate discussion by suggesting that the 
Bette Davis role could be read as the artist figure and received 
in exchange vituperative reckonings with the plain text of child 
abuse. Like artists were never abused in childhood? When the 
press asked Bette Davis for a few words in memoriam of Joan 
Crawford, whose death was in the news, she pondered for a time 
and finally said: She was always on time. Honest thinking is 
cleaner than correct thinking.
Already at the onset of harassment investigation at the 
American university in the late 1980s, I argued that calling what 
was really therapeutic correctness “political” was misleading, cer-
tainly with regard to the kind of politics being advanced. What I 
witnessed at the Academy in Karlsruhe, then, was the establish-
ment of a new politically correct generation of secondary school-
teachers, for whom a distinction like that between amateur and 
professional is to be dismissed as elitist.
The closing scene of Michael Haneke’s Caché (2005), in which 
the sons of Georges and Majid meet and shake hands in the 
schoolyard, reflected not the shooting script but the director’s 
post-production decision to give a final twist that’s a twist-off 
forever concealing the agency behind the surveillance. The stu-
dents are speaking dialogue that Haneke wrote, but then decided 
not to publish, even enjoining his actors to keep their lines 
forever secret. It was at this point that unconsciously on or off 
purpose Haneke situated the film within the schoolyard of the 
Bologna reforms leading European education into the light of 
“transparency.” Haneke translates transparency, a naively benign 
surveillance concept, into the self-reflexivity of a film hovering 
between forgetting and the full stop of memory. 
Why is surveillance always plotting with thriller intrigue? Is 
it because belief system surveillance, as big as global-latinization, 
leads us though a controlling interest in evil into the light of 
redemption? The reversal of surveillance from the perspective of 
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its operator to that of the one observed gives the gist of Francis 
Ford Coppola’s The Conversation (1974). The protagonist, a sur-
veillance expert, is sidelined into crime detection when he listens 
in on a couple (= primal scene) conversing before a mime show. 
The latter is a reference to Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow-up, 
a resolutely Freudian film that concludes on an affirmation of 
play over wish in art making. In The Conversation, the Freudian 
subplot leads the technician to uncover the crime in a hotel room 
cleansed of its traces. But when he flushes the toilet out comes 
a body’s worth of disposed offal, a reference to Psycho, the first 
movie to show a toilet flush. 
His discovery of the crime scene cuts too close and goes 
nowhere. Now the surveillance he operated reverses itself and 
proves unstoppable. The ending shows the technician sitting 
in the ruins of his apartment, which he demolished to undo the 
surveillance that was turned around upon him. Everything he 
sees (through) sees him, too, and everything he talks through is 
an open mic that’s always on. The conclusion qualifies as eucata-
strophe in the philosophical version of Christianization. It’s a 
scene of Heideggerian laid-backness about the uncanny. Under 
the condition of being unhoused that’s as basic as being, the pro-
tagonist plays the saxophone, his greatest pleasure, for the first 
time not wearing his plastic slipcover raincoat. 
Haneke’s express concern with how the individual works 
through historical crimes carried by society is more meticulous 
than that. The closing scene is formatted like the unidentified 
surveillance footage that opens the film and regularly interrupts 
it. From the turning point of the playback of the first encounter 
between Georges and Majid, the surveillance is not only without 
borders but even coincides with the overriding perspective of 
the film.1 The second encounter isn’t recorded; Majid wanted 
Georges to be present at his suicide. But when he becomes the 
image of a mouth spurting blood, we follow the logic of a dream. 
Like the photographer’s snapping of pictures in Blow-up, the 
surveillance perspective looks into the middle distance, at times 
1 See Todd Herzog, “The Banality of Surveillance: Michael Haneke’s 
Caché and Life after the End of Privacy,” Modern Austrian Literature 
43, no. 2 (2010): 25–40.
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seeming to foretell what follows with a heft of wish fulfillment. 
What triggers the night dreams are the drawings from childhood 
delivered together with the surveillance tapes. Daydreamy amp-
ing up of reality as a revelatory environment alternates with the 
evidence of trauma in night dreams. 
There are epic fails (like the flexing of a death wish) in every 
childhood, which can be repurposed by and for the mystery of a 
secreted-away historical act of violence, in Caché the 1961 police 
beating and drowning of hundreds of French Algerian demon-
strators in Paris. Majid’s parents, who worked as farmhands for 
Georges’s parents on the family estate, were among the fatali-
ties. Was it to make amends that Georges’s parents decided to 
adopt Majid? Georges, intent on being the only child, did what 
comes naturally, and blocked the orphan’s adoption. Did he lie 
or amplify and take advantage of a cultural difference? In the 
“memory” or dream, we see Majid who just killed a rooster bul-
lying Georges with the axe. How would the six-year-old Georges 
have come up with the lie that he saw Majid coughing up blood? 
Haneke’s insistence that he wanted to leave the moviegoer alone 
with his or her conscience offers a stay to the explainathons pre-
ferred by institutes for ideational correction. 
On the evening of November 8, when I learned the local 
results of the faculty meeting, it was already clear that Donald 
Trump was winning in the States – and it crossed my mind: it’s 
the night of the evil clowns. It was a thought prompted by the 
closing pages of my text, “Leitmotif Siegfried,” or rather by the 
anxious facility with which the audiences on my US lecture tour 
had applied the reading of the clown to the candidate Trump. 
That in 2020 the incumbent ended up the loser but supported 
by over 70 million votes means that we should stop clowning 
around if we consider this the end of the Trump Movement. 
The American billionaire’s clownishness, however, was 
his inconsistency, the hallmark of American freedom that he 
monopolized for a term. I’ve known an ultra-conservative grand 
dame who, although otherwise intent on reversing Civil Rights, 
was given to remember with pride and affection the day her 
high school elected a Black class president. That’s how it works: 
Americans are inconsistent in their racism. Germans are consis-
tent.
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One inconsistency that quickly occupied the foreground 
was, given his social position, Trump’s openly admitted libidinal 
sketchiness, which is the clown’s joke on the counterculture. The 
puritanism of the Me-Too Movement is an inevitable adjust-
ment in lieu of the old hippy standard, a meaningless counter 
to Trump. That it is an available adjustment is something you 
can read up on in Henry James’s novels, in which the American 
expats are morally superior to their European hosts. And yes, 
barring the inconsistency he monopolized, Trump was the 
most European, in fact German, president in US history.2 His 
only consistency was the wish to undo the EU. It takes one to 
annul one, as Gertrude Stein argued in Wars I Have Seen. The 
eighteenth century was embodied and destroyed in Napoleon, 
the nineteenth century in Hitler.3 And the twentieth century was 
going down with Donald Trump.4 
The prevailing legacy of the twentieth century, its quin-
tessence, was by all accounts neo-liberalism, the policy that 
established at the end of history the gated community of a 
continuous “European” civilization. The showdown between 
Hillary Clinton and Trump marked a high point, the first time 
the powerful directly entered the ring forgoing their puppets. 
Although they were both unelectable, one of them had to win. 
That Trump surprised himself by winning gave him the career 
2 In 2016 Mark Featherstone proposed in “Trump, A Psy Fi Story: On 
American Germanicity,” CTHEORY, December 9, 2016, that rather 
than apply Frankfurt Schoolish readings to the rise of Donald Trump 
it was possible through my work to proceed more directly to the 
introjection of American Germanicity for which Trump is the poster 
boy. “Trump’s relation to Nazism is not simply inferred, or based upon 
the application of psychoanalytic ideas to his own peculiar pathology 
[...], but rather rooted in a long cultural history of what Rickels calls 
bi-coastality or the movement from Germany west to the land of the 
free.” Available online at https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/
article/view/16675/7054.
3 Gertrude Stein, Wars I Have Seen (London: Batsford, 1945), 8–9. 
4 Stein’s reading responded and belonged to the machine age. More than 
another war, therefore, something like the COVID-19 pandemic is the 
kind of game changer that better suits the digital era.
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idea that this was the first blow dealt neo-liberalism by one of its 
illuminati. 
Trump’s other consistency, his hatred of his predecessor 
Barack Obama, can be lumped together with all the above. 
Obama gave “European” neo-liberalism a hermetic embodiment 
which Trump calls on its face value as pretty and sexless. Trump 
besmirches neo-liberalism’s face-saving by bringing back the old 
counterculture, which he paradoxically embodies, but in reverse, 
inside the mainstream overflowing as charged by Me-Too pro-
ponents. 
Wasn’t there a rumor that Trump located with Putin’s help 
the Moscow hotel bed Obama had slept in and spent the night 
there pissing on it with his whore? True or not, it is the primal 
scene of the Trump Movement. 
In analogy with tax evasion charges against the mafia, Me-Too 
tracks down sexual indiscretions that can be reinterpreted as 
harassment to get at those otherwise protected by their posi-
tions of power. But the Jamesian sophistication of the moral 
charges can be a reach and the same plain-text attitude that 
Me-Too advertises in calling abuse abuse can topple their claims. 
Consider the 2018 controversy around Trump’s candidate for the 
empty seat in the Supreme Court. The counterculture’s harass-
ment charges were welcome to the Trump supporters, because 
they could be treated as throwaway simulacra of the candidate’s 
more serious legal trespasses. Charged with date rape at college, 
Trump’s candidate was of course appointed. 
One era’s denial is the next era’s weapon, and what goes for sex 
goes double for the digital relation. Although the Obama years 
coincided with a mass culture openly metabolizing the inroads 
of digitization, neo-liberalism was too fascinated by the end of 
history to recognize the historical changes the digital relation 
had already brought to bear. Stowaway in Derrida’s rereading of 
haunting in Specters of Marx as the return that returns was the 
premier reception of the digital relation. All the names and events 
of history were returning, but as entries in the digital archive. 
Whatever is back is recognizable but is no longer immersed in 
the aura of the old oppositions. 
A TV show like True Blood proved a syndication of the United 
States in the news with a Black president and an insurgent 
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Christian Right, among the many parts that seemed together 
again in a crowd of return engagements. Obama’s election was 
not so much the realization of the Civil Rights struggle, the reso-
lution at the end of the opposition for and against integration, as 
it was the return of that era in the midst of all the other returns. 
The era of hope didn’t imprint its liberal purpose upon the end 
of history. To view that which comes last or the last thing that 
happened as that which will last is a pre-digital fallacy. 
The prospect of Vladimir Putin undermining US elections 
through manipulation of the Internet is an atavistic non-com-
puterate plot allowed to run for a time so that when the Cold-
War thriller was discounted, the legal investigation of Trump 
and all it stood for could be disqualified too. You have to know 
something about the digital relation or at least be non-phobic 
about it to manipulate a symptom of the other side’s denial so 
effectively. Consider Trump’s cynical embrace of the Twitter of 
the gods, which is another first or finality: a US president who 
can’t be held accountable for what he says as long as it echoes 
within social media. Trump is neo-liberalism and he sees through 
it, seeking to take it out into the light of digitization, the new 
night of nothingness. 
The return of the return outside the original setting of oppo-
sition has consequences for dialectics but doesn’t mean that 
human suffering has given way to buffering. Violence in the US 
continues, spectacularly targeting Black lives like flotsam atop 
the tsunami of gentrification. The remainder of my reflections 
on the meaning of the Trump Movement will be on race, to 
which end I return to the Melanesian Cargo Cult, which in my 
first book guided the reading of aberrant mourning under mass 
media conditions.5 
5 Tom McCarthy worked the Cargo Cult into his Satin Island: A Novel 
(New York: Vintage Books, 2015), which in conversation he said was 
inflected by my interpretation in Aberrations of Mourning. Another 
tribute to my first book went into his earlier novel C, in which I could 
make out the amalgamation of my crypt rereadings of Freud’s case 
studies of his totemic patients, Rat Man and Wolfman. But in Satin 
Island I couldn’t readily discern my Cargo Cult reading. For one, 
McCarthy writes explicitly about the John Frumm movement, a WWII 
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That Melanesians saw in the first white man an ancestor 
back from the dead was the digest of what was originally a more 
eclectic and staticky perception of a possible monster, ghoul, or 
ghost. The re-setting of first contact on the Melanesian equation 
between white men and their own ancestral dead merited a pri-
mal scene, one that the Europeans too could recognize. Andrew 
Lattas tells the scene’s story through the internal recount of 
legend.
In 1991 an old man, Bowl, told me how one of his classificatory 
fathers had been down on the coast and saw, as a reflection in 
water, the first white man to come into the Kaliai area. Startled 
by this image, Bowl’s father turned to look behind him, and 
there he saw a German called Master Paris. [...] Seeing the 
first white man as a reflection in water was significant because 
tambaran, masalai, and the souls of the dead often reside in 
water. In the Kaliai area the word for soul, ano, is the same 
word for reflection; this means that from their earliest memo-
ries people saw whites as emerging from the reflective space 
of water, which in traditional culture is inhabited by the dead 
and masalai.6
Through many of the iterations of the white man arriving to 
boss the Melanesians around, the Cargo Cult reserved a primal 
language for communication with the ancestral dead: Djaman.7 
Pausanias revised the Narcissus legend, making it over into 
a scene of grieving misrecognition to get the motivation right 
for the image’s riveting impact. When the boy sought his reflec-
tion in the water, the apparition of his lookalike dead sister 
offshoot of the Cult that redirected its call for Cargo away from Europe 
and Australia toward the United States, the new home of the grateful 
dead, its otherworldly impression made utopian by the copresence in 
the US military of Black soldiers. The difference doesn’t disappoint, 
however, but inspires this renewed reading of the Cargo Cult.
6 Andrew Lattas, Cultures of Secrecy: Reinventing Race in Bush Kaliai 
Cargo Cults (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 21.
7 Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of “Cargo” Cults in 
Melanesia (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 80.
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stared back at him. In the primal scene of Cargo Cult, the black 
Melanesian sees in the water not his own reflection but a white 
man at the ghostly remove and return of the dead. While the 
Pausanias revision realigns narcissistic disturbance with an origin 
in melancholia, the Cargo Cult followers attribute disturbance 
and retention span to the Europeans blocking contact with the 
ancestors, the mourned dead. 
The Melanesians recognized that the white man’s Cargo, his 
techno-culture, turned on the gist of one single-minded innova-
tion: live transmission. If you can telegraph across long distances 
in one instant of sending and receiving, then you can commu-
nicate with the long distant, the dead. Cargo was the response 
to centuries of one-way discourse that the Melanesians had 
prayerfully addressed to their departed. The Europeans updated 
the system but rerouted all the return messages to their dead let-
ter office, refusing, like vengeful ghosts, to transmit the Cargo 
to the rightful recipients. The Europeans had brought along the 
prospect of direct contact of the living with the dead and then 
taken it all away. 
At the same time, some Europeans appeared to the 
Melanesians as their own recent dearly departed. Lattas gives a 
cross section of the topography of this ambivalence.
Indeed, villagers have been known to cry when seeing a 
new white man, for they believe they have recognized a lost 
relative. [...] The villagers were suspicious at what they saw 
as Europeans who were not expressing genuine grief at funer-
als; they also were suspicious of the flowers planted around 
European houses. Villagers also saw white bodies as similar 
to corpses. (21)
Unmourning is the fluidum of the Europeans, who like unquiet 
dead haunt the Melanesians, intercepting the messages and way-
laying the Cargo sent from the afterlife. 
The return of the mourned dead – or, in Daniel Paul 
Schreber’s lingo, the cleansed and tested souls – yields the nihil-
istic consequence that goes into Christianity’s wrap of resurrec-
tion not at the end but as the end of the world. The Cult started 
setting dates for the arrival of the Cargo-bearing ancestors. In 
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preparation, the followers had to trash, waste, get rid of all their 
possessions. To be sure, they had to make room for the Cargo 
but they also needed a clearing for the oblivion and nothingness 
of successful mourning. All the above, I argued in Aberrations of 
Mourning, is the Cargo Cult in theory and plain text. 
Cargo Cult tells it like it is: we are all the indigenous people 
of new technologies facing ghosts coming round the bend of 
the latest mediatic extension of our sensorium.8 We tend to see a 
cultural difference when animistic indigenous cultures turn the 
outward aspects of technology into props for worship and belief. 
To bring about live transmission, the Melanesians set up posts 
in imitation of telegraph poles, which they beat while the high 
priest summoning from his belly ventriloquy by the ancestors 
communicated with the afterlife in Djaman.
The Cargo Cult’s demand for live communication and 
contact with their dead was corollary to the larger demand for 
savvy, which of course refers to knowledge but also addresses the 
interest and cathexis imbuing the whites. When Cult followers 
dismissed their own pre-colonial culture and beliefs, bringing 
this world to an end to make room for the Second Coming of 
Cargo, they were responding in the first place to the perceived 
lack of savvy in their goods. 
Dorothy Billings documents one of the last upsurges of Cargo 
Cult, the spontaneous decision by Melanesians to vote for US 
President Lyndon B. Johnson. The 1964 election, which was to 
prepare the Melanesians for their own autonomous statehood, 
was just another episode in their schooling by Australians and 
Europeans. And the Melanesians continued to be frustrated by 
their missionary-style schooling, which withheld savvy: “Many 
of men have savvy about English, and what have they done? 
They know English for nothing, that’s all.” The performance of 
a turn toward America was in answer to the question, “Who will 
show us about everything?”9 
8 That the itinerary of ghosts tells us how far our mediatic sensorium 
reaches was Friedrich Kittler’s surprising insight. See Grammophon, 
Film, Typewriter (Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose, 1986).
9 Dorothy K. Billings, Cargo Cult as Theater: Political Performance in 
the Pacific (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 168. Subsequent page 
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Through a kind of free association with likely near-synonyms, 
Billings seeks to identify the Melanesian understanding of savvy. 
“When I was trying to make sure that I understood what Oliver 
meant when he said he ‘believed in’ America, he said, ‘Just like, 
like; it’s just like, like, that’s all’” (168). While America can’t be 
compelled to respond to or fulfill their wishes, just the same, 
Joseph, for one, wants to know, “Does America [...] want to 
love our wish to them?” (169). Billings instructs that in the local 
culture “public pronouncements concerning one’s wishes are 
often made [...], and they are considered final. It is expected that 
what a person wants will be treated as inviolable: ‘Like is a big 
thing,’ they often said” (ibid.). Liking, wishing, being a daydream 
believer all suggest that savvy translates as youthful innovative-
ness and cathexis appeal. 
Did the Black Melanesians see in the Black American service-
men the prospect of equality or did they recognize instead that 
the cool American demeanor, the adolescent energy among peers, 
the savvy imbuing the group was emanating from the Black 
men? That Americans are inconsistent in their racism goes into 
the spread of the foreign body of savvy, which the Melanesians 
recognized. Oppression and inequality didn’t contradict the 
pervasiveness of Black savvy. 
There’s another reason it was a good war. In the incubator of 
military service during WWII, being with it and being cool could 
be transmitted on the edge and badge of courage. Following 
Norman Mailer, it is possible to see the phenomenon of the 
American hipster as coming out of the war’s metabolization of 
what he calls the White Negro. While for some of us it didn’t 
hurt this much, the gist of Mailer’s exposition cuts close to the 
truth (perhaps because it implies his castration): 
Since the Negro knows more about the ugliness and danger 
of life than the White, it is probable that if the Negro can win 
his equality, he will possess a potential superiority, a superior-
ity so feared that the fear itself has become the underground 
drama of domestic politics. Like all conservative political fear 
it is the fear of unforeseeable consequences, for the Negro’s 
references are given in the text.
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equality would tear a profound shift into the psychology, the 
sexuality, and the moral imagination of every White alive.10 
The new White Man’s Burden in our day is that savvy has either 
absconded or been cast off. Louis-Ferdinand Céline’s plaint that 
the mixing of races always diminishes whiteness may be true on 
the palette, but whiteness today is a contact-low contaminat-
ing all the non-Black minority departments, from Jewishness 
and divergent orientation to being of color: brown gets around 
but doesn’t alleviate the malaise. Does the fracking for distinc-
tion across gender make it through this impasse? If so, Michael 
Jackson and his double claim on race and gender should be reas-
sessed as candidacy for sainthood.
Most white Americans no longer retain the neoteny of youth-
ful innovativeness. They grow older, lose the future, and become 
undifferentiated within the white population that is probably 
the blandest on Earth. In a Berlin subway car, the co-presence of 
white Europeans from different countries and cultures still sug-
gests a degree of diversity. In the new world, however, the white 
immigrants excelled at assimilation unto homogenization. A few 
diacritical accent marks might denote an American region, but 
that’s all. Hence white resentment toward fellow citizens, who 
don’t let go of the distinction of being hyphenated Americans.
However, those once schooled in adolescence still know how 
to ad-lib their wish without the projective machinery of fulfill-
ment. Having no script is no problem if they have a common 
understanding, which in the Trump Cult is that they are bereft 
of savvy. Neo-liberalism is an alien symbol, one that belongs to 
the Europeans and educated elites who learned how to function 
according to a European mindset. Brexit inspired them and 
10 Norman Mailer, “The White Negro: Superficial Reflections on the 
Hipster,” Dissent Magazine (Fall 1957): 291. There is much that 
must be bracketed out in Mailer’s essay before one can even read it. 
The symptom arc is given by the open disdain for psychoanalysis, 
although Mailer would appear to have been familiar only with its New 
York headquarters. Knowledge of D.W. Winnicott on the antisocial 
tendency would have honed his reading of psychopathy, making it less 
a provocation and more of an intervention.
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Trump’s efforts seem aimed only when they undermine Europe. 
In the absurd situation of the celebrated triumphs of the Civil 
Rights movement, they found it easy to make an absurd sugges-
tion. The vote for making America great again offered a perspec-
tive on reality that pleased the Cult followers, and the script 
grew. They found a way to play all the leading roles instead of 
the dull parts assigned them by the history of their assimilation 
and adjustment.
In our time, the rallying of white Americans for white cathexis 
passed from the awkwardness of the Tea Party movement to 
the Heil saluting and Heil bringing Trump campaign. How 
soon we forgot that the last hurrahs of white savvy were made 
in Germany. Beginning with The Sorrows of Young Werther, 
the Passion of white adolesence has been pitched and tossed in 
German (Djaman). One current landed in Southern Cal (see 
Beach Blanket Bingo) until the counter-tide of Helter Skelter’s 
projected influence cut in. National Socialism channeled the 
main current of the lost cause of white savvy, pitching it against 
the melting plot. Just the same, Nazi ideologues had to adapt to a 
world of difference that already extended into the constitution of 
the Axis. So, they acknowledged that there were other races that 
were equally pure (but not equally equal). It followed that it was 
possible to be Nazi and to accept former colonial subjects, non-
whites, as honorary Aryans. While Aryan was the purest white, 
“honorary” made it another name for the teen legacy of Werther. 
The contradiction that couldn’t be metabolized goes into liter-
ary conceits like the Schwarzkommando in Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow.
Watching Halloween with German subtitles you can see how 
indelibly black is deposited in the German folk tradition (in the 
relative absence of historical contact with Africa). The bogey-
man (or boogie man) that the babysitters and their charges refer 
to appears in German as “der Schwarze Mann.” The boogieman 
isn’t the object of racism. Funk, the “spark” adopted for all 
techno-broadcasting terms in German, has always and already 
received the African funk by the unconscious rebound of folk 
etymology. The Aryan-African cathexis, which Dick misrecog-




Leni Riefenstahl wasn’t just following her own agenda 
when she alternated in Olympia between the triumphs of Black 
America and scenes of Aryan jocks getting hot together in the 
light of Antiquity. Our focus gets blurred when we assume 
that every conquered populace fraternizes with the enemy and 
always to the same degree. German women fell for the (Black) 
American GIs, because they recognized them crossing the finish 
line of the race that Riefenstahl projected between the agents of 
Black savvy and the Germans bearing the torch of Greek primary 
narcissism. By then the Siegfrieds were gone. But while the race 
was still being run German soldiers were hot properties for the 
non-German women of Fortress Europe.
Get Out (2017) goes one step further than Frontière(s) (2007) 
– the concession to a stopover in melting-plotting with the new 
brown that fortifies the reproductive strain of neo-Nazi psy-
chos – and treats the Black American as physical specimen pure 
enough to carry forward for the white folks the diminished lives 
of their ancestors. Preliminary to the surgical or literal enactment 
of possession, the TV hypnosis controlling the Black carrier is set 
on the same ambivalence toward parental guidance that lodged 
the old folks back home inside their servants’ younger Black bod-
ies. When the Black mark hits bottom in the TV hypno-therapy, 
a depressive position instrumentalized by the white therapist as 
vacancy for the next white life extension, he begins to heed the 
need to mourn, which will lead him out of the weekend from 
integration hell. The white brain lives on in the stolen Black 
body by enslaving the brain stem that carries and sparks it. The 
light flash of the camera-phone rallies the stem (Stamm, which 
in German also means tribe or race) to rise up against the white 
parasite. Each flash episode is short-lived but, when strategically 
deployed by the survivor at the end, decisive.
What About Blob?
In Germany: A Science Fiction, I charted a genealogy suspended 
between the repression and return of a high point of science 
fiction: Fritz Lang’s double feature, Metropolis (1927) and Frau 
im Mond (1929). However, the films were not carried forward, 
indeed became untenable rehearsals or repetitions once the 
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Third Reich traded in fiction for science faction. From televisual 
live transmission (including video telephony) to Gleichschaltung, 
the alignment and conformity of the socius, the future world in 
Metropolis became agenda. Outside the murk of doubling and 
mass psychology, there was the clear text of the invention and 
take-off of the first rockets. War over, and the traumatic recent 
past of a Nazi future came under repression, and the science fic-
tion genre had to start over as a Cold War exclusive. Blade Runner 
took the look of Metropolis into the future world it projected in 
1982, the datemark of the return of German science fiction to the 
big screen. 
While American culture continued to benefit on a scale from 
B to A, innovation in production and reception of cultural 
phenomena was long gone in Germany. After its repackaging in 
the Third Reich as superego, adolescence was hard to relocate 
in post-war Germany. In the settings of globalization (including 
animism, on which Joseph Beuys set his interventions), excep-
tions to the German destiny could still be tried out. However, 
when Joseph Beuys declared before his German audiences that 
everyone was an artist, this was his paradoxical intervention in a 
sorry state. 
P.K. Dick first began exploring the bicoastal dialectic between 
California and Germany within its underworld, the alternate 
history of The Man in the High Castle (1962). The Axis won the 
war but what occupies the foreground is Japan’s colonization of 
the West Coast. That the Japanese dead are being addressed in 
the mode of mourning is made clear enough by the Nazi plans 
to obliterate them (again) with more of the same bombs. Dick’s 
novel engages what was on hold in post-war Germany, mourn-
ing, unmourning, and haunting. Instead, adolescent industry 
was riveted to the economic miracle and the silver-aligning of its 
production and profit with restitution or reparation, which for 
former perpetrators of psychopathic violence or their heirs is pre-
liminary to a work of mourning that for the latecomers will be 
collective or not at all. By showing the remote learning of griev-
ing as the German human condition, Hans-Jürgen Syberberg’s 




D.W. Winnicott saw the atom bombs of WWII withdraw the 
rationale for preparing youth to close ranks. Effective means 
of contraception meant that the teens cut loose from military 
training looked to mass culture to see themselves containing sex 
and violence even as the sole content of their lives. Winnicott’s 
understanding of the antisocial tendency in its relationship to 
psychopathy and adolescence doesn’t have to be true. But by 
conditions analogous to those operative in the future post-war 
worlds of American science fiction, Winnicott’s theorization 
describes a world that is explicitly post-WWII. 
Winnicott’s paradoxical interpretation of delinquent behav-
ior as signaling hope delivered our relationship to psychopathy 
from the dead end of an ongoing failure of interpretation. 
Bordering on psychopathy, even passing through it but only 
to leave it behind, adolescence functions as inoculum. It is the 
conduit for rescuing the inventiveness of omnipotence from the 
close quarters of passing cohabitation with psychopathy. The 
opening era of daydreaming, adolescence is the phase we grow 
out of (like the past or posting of “dear diary” journal-ism) into 
the “autonomy” of publication, art or the social relation. 
This replay of positions reintroduces The Blob, a 1958 
American B-movie mixing horror fantasy and science fiction, of 
which I made an example in Germany: A Science Fiction.11 Like 
George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead ten years later, it 
was an independent production filmed in the Pennsylvania 
backcountry that proved to be a blockbuster. To sum up quickly 
its exemplary value: the transitional objective of containing the 
menace of psychopathic violence through its passing likeness to 
adolescent acting out falls short of the emergency military solu-
tion at the film’s conclusion, its displacement and confinement 
to the North Pole. But the teen protagonist concludes that all’s 
well as long as the arctic cold lasts. Only the Cold War can con-
tain the psycho violence, the blob that rebounds from the recent 
past of WWII. 
Taken together as a staggered series, like Romero’s first three 
living-dead films, the original The Blob can be seen to comprise, 
11 See my close reading of The Blob in Germany: A Science Fiction (Fort 
Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2014), 38–40.
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together with its 1972 and 1987 sequels, a trilogy, in which the 
topical application of allegory illuminates the changes going into 
group psychology decade by decade. In the 1972 sequel, Beware! 
The Blob (a.k.a. Son of Blob, Son of the Blob, and The Blob 
Returns), Robert Walker, heartthrob of American television in 
the 1960s and 1970s, takes Steve McQueen out on an update.12 
He’s the couplified and real popular regular-guy who neverthe-
less belongs to a counterculture in-crowd, a mutation in group 
psychology since 1958, which lodged the metabolization of the 
anti-war movement. Although his girlfriend brushes his offer 
aside as unhelpful when Walker proposes at one point that they 
get “wrecked” to assuage her anxiety about the blob, it’s not only 
the hippies and rock-and-rollers in their group who are stoners. 
She’s upset because she walked in on a Black neighbor, Chester, 
being consumed by the pink goo while watching the 1958 classic 
on TV. 
The film opens inside the suburban home of Chester, who’s 
recently back from his gig in the North Pole working on an oil 
rig. They struck upon some unidentified substance, a sample 
of which was entrusted to him to take back for lab testing in 
California. But why is there a tent set up in the living room? Why 
is he compelled to re-enact the site up north? A post-traumatic 
reaction to the time spent in non-US territory tells the other 
story of the Vietnam War. He’s “gone fishing” without leaving 
the house. His wife is wonderful about humoring him, which 
attests to the social pervasiveness of welcoming psycho soldiers 
back home. Chester placed the sample for the time being in the 
freezer. But while she tolerates his souvenirs in the living room, 
his wife won’t have the ectoplasm of his traumatic recent past 
in her workspace. She removes the sample from the freezer and 
places it on the counter. That’s right, it’s a piece of the 1958 blob 
gradually thawing out. 
Only in the sheriff’s concluding remarks before the TV cam-
eras after the menace has been contained is it named “the blob.” 
Seconds later, the lights that the camera team placed on the 
flash-frozen mass in the ice-skating rink begin thawing it out, a 
12 Directed by Larry Hagman, the movie was rereleased in 1982 with the 
tagline: “The Film that J.R. shot!”
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trickle encircling the sheriff’s feet. “The End” bears a question 
mark. While the 1972 version continues to develop the “same” 
blob that was kept on ice up north, in other words in the setting 
of the Cold War, now the location from which it is sprung stands 
for Vietnam and its post-traumatic impact threatens the group 
psychology that has integrated the adolescent counterculture 
and the Black couple next door.
A one-time contributor to the Nightmare on Elm Street fran-
chise directed the 1987 sequel. The horror fare in the local theater 
is no longer “spook” movies, as in 1958, but slasher films, to which 
the pre-teens are in thrall against their parental guidance. But the 
odd couple of teens in the foreground of this version exchange 
banter that’s a slasher-movie giveaway. For example: “I feel like 
fucking Hansel and Gretel here.” And then the boy mentions 
the missing breadcrumbs. Usually this fateful line is followed by 
the couple commenting that it’s not a good sign when a third 
person shows up wearing a mask. This portion is spoken in the 
slasher film within the science-fiction movie: “It’s not hockey 
season,” the guy on screen says to his date about the masked man 
bearing a chainsaw. “Isn’t it late to be cutting the hedges?” 
The sister of one of the slasher-consuming preteens, a good 
girl, allies herself with the “bad” outsider, who is the quintes-
sence of “cool” (a typical 1980s reinterpretation and marketing 
of earlier protest looks, but without the politics). Their coupling 
is the fantasy resolution of the split between the “bad” or “cool” 
delegates of the Teen Age, who are still embodying by their act-
ing out the inoculum with and against psychopathy, and the 
high-school mainstream that marches cheerleaders and jocks 
down the aisle of a spousal relation that never forsakes the peer-
group milieu. 
The good girl, indeed a cheerleader, meets the outsider while 
on a date with a football star, a date that goes bad. When they 
find an old man afflicted by the blob, they transport him to the 
hospital while bad boy, who was also there, is compelled by the 
jock to come along as witness. In the hospital, the girl, upon wit-
nessing the blob completely absorb the first victim and then her 
date, escapes with the bad boy, her new friend on a motorbike. 
In 1987, the plot doesn’t involve outer space but only looks 
like that for a time. It’s a bio-weapons experiment that went awry 
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in a satellite. When the crashed container cracks open, what spills 
out, something like the liquid essence of zombieism, starts con-
suming the locals on contact. From the 1972 to the 1987 sequel, 
we can follow the bouncing blob like a chip off the old “Black.” 
The mad scientist heading the squad clad in white insulating 
outfits that look like updates of KKK attire is Black. In Night of 
the Living Dead, the only survivor, who then ends up collateral 
damage in the “mopping up” of the epidemic by a posse in earshot 
of Vietnam, was the Black American Ben, a natural-born leader. 
This unmotivated conclusion, which was soon a wrap with the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, prompted Romero to draw 
the first film through the loop of political allegory, which the two 
sequels in the trilogy openly addressed. In 1987, according to The 
Blob, integration spells reversal: why shouldn’t the corrupt and 
powerful now be Black, too? But reversal is also peristaltic, an 
unending blob-like reversal of reversal. 
The showdown with the blob is framed by the words of 
another Black American, who owns a repair shop where the teen 
protagonist updating the McQueen and Walker figures as total 
outsider finds support. There is talk about the unreliability of 
snow, and the repairman counters that the winter will bring it. 
You just have to have faith. He repeats the line about faith at the 
happy end, which the snow-making machine delivers in front 
of the church that offered the survivors sanctuary. Outside the 
frame, however, there is a brief spot that keeps open the possibil-
ity of another sequel. The psycho priest, who grabbed a sample of 
the blob earlier on in the film, has become an Evangelist dooms-
day preacher in a circus tent. Although he is white, his revivalism 
is pitched to a largely Black congregation. When a member of 
the flock asks if the preacher can reveal to her when the end is 
coming, he says “Soon, soon” while gazing at his prized relic, the 
contained specimen of the blob. 
That the movie ends on the prospect of another apocalyptic 
outbreak fits a tendency in splatter films to evaluate criteria for 
survival. In Romero’s second and third living-dead movies, Dawn 
of the Dead (1978) and Day of the Dead (1985), the outcome is 
an occasion for terroristic cleansing of the social body.13 All those 
13 See my reading of Romero’s undead trilogy in The Psycho Records 
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outdated by the apocalyptic transformation of the environment, 
any person stuck on racist, sexist, even proprietary tendencies, 
qualifies for exitus. 
In 1987, the blob carries forward this calculation of progress 
through elimination. When a member of the scientific team pro-
claims that the unforeseen mutation that the biological weapon 
underwent means the Cold War is over, another member cor-
rects him: most of the world as we know it will be gone, too. 
Pre-blob, the late 1980s town exemplified what Freud forecast 
as the impoverishment of groups: Christian Mass psychology of 
mutual identification in the absence of object relations in love or 
mourning.14 At the end, there is a coupling of self and other, the 
cheerleader and the bad/cool boy, which is the innovation that’s 
the blob catastrophe’s silver lining. 
The Good Ship Wish Fantasy
The term blob designating a new monster was a somewhat ran-
dom choice in 1958. In the shooting script it was “the mass” and 
finally, by metonymy, absence, and association, it replaced “the 
glob,” which had been chosen for the title but then discovered 
to be already in use. Even a throwaway word has an etymology. 
Blob is linked to blubber, which was historically harvested in 
whales and, in a word, counted as the ellipsis for whale blubber. 
American literary A-culture originated in an industry as vast as it 
was unsung prior to Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, the “Great 
American Novel.” To be sure, there was a prehistory of legend 
surrounding whales and whaling, which Melville documents and 
speculates on. The novel is at the same time a treatise on, as the 
subtitle announces, “The Whale.” But the jump cut from that 
prehistory to the mid-nineteenth-century business of digging 
oil out of countless dead whales for the all-night illumination 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1916).
14 Sigmund Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” in 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XVIII (1920–1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group 
Psychology and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna 
Freud (London: The Hogarth Press, 1964), 134. 
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of New York circumscribes a political unconscious in which the 
prehistory of the Web is also inscribed. 
The missing link that pulled up short before the arrival of the 
digital relation could be glimpsed, as we saw, in the gathering 
of greater stores of data for research into our cognitive capital, 
like the investigation of daydreaming beginning in the 1960s via 
an ongoing collection of questionnaires or like the recording by 
parapsychologists even of the near misses in telepathy experi-
ments. Although the collections became as outdated as concor-
dances, in each case the data became the medium transmitting 
new knowledge not by proof but by default. 
Perhaps because of the proximity to “hypertext,” online 
you can find “hypersea” borrowed for marketing certain digi-
tal developments. However, the term originally belonged to a 
supplementary evolutionary theory developed by a couple of 
scientists, who began the long process of testing and formula-
tion on the campus of UC Santa Barbara. The theory of hypersea 
posits a geophysiological entity conjoining organisms on land 
and symbiotic fungi.15 It allowed the survival of our evolutionary 
ancestors precariously ascending from the sea to become land 
based. By hypermarine upwelling the expansion of hypersea led 
to the increase in the diversity of species and global biomass.
The ease of metabolizing nutrients under water had to find 
an alternative for the relative complexity of sustaining life on 
land. The result: life on land displays an extraordinary degree 
of connectedness. Throughout the Gidget novels, the So-Cal 
teen delves into her negative transference and identifies all the 
machinations of parental guidance as “fungous.” In the final 
novel that ends in marriage, Gidget Goes New York, our heroine 
and her co-tenants complain to the landlord about the fungus 
in the bathroom. He’s also a poet and instead composes at the 
bar across the street a “Hymn to a Fungus.”16 The truth arrived 
at UC Surfing Beach: without fungi, lifeforms could never have 
come ashore.
15 Marc McMenamin, Hypersea: Life on Land (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996).
16 Frederick Kohner, Gidget Goes New York (New York: Dell, 1968), 70.
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There’s the universal problem of excretion: how sustainable 
is life as the excrement of death? (the Nietzschean question). 
The hypersea means that life doesn’t decompose without at the 
same time diversifying within its connective network. One of 
the earliest and largest results of this life process was coal and its 
role in the history of fuel supplies. The theory of the hypersea 
adds an ecosystem adjustment to our understanding of natural 
resources. That cybernetics translated all vital flows into trans-
mission of information is a good reason to look upon hypersea 
as mapping successors to psychic reality on a scale of evolution 
based on radically divergent technologies. 
In Moby-Dick, the conceit basic to science fiction – that the 
discovery of the new world was the first step toward the prospect 
of final frontiers in outer space – delves into the other deep space: 
“the sea […] an everlasting terra incognita, so that Columbus 
sailed over numberless unknown worlds to discover his one 
superficial western one.”17 That the unknown conduits of new 
worlds – in other words, the sea and all that it holds – signifies 
outer space is an ancient equation (which C.S. Lewis plied in his 
“Space Trilogy”). It belongs to the belief system that Melville’s 
narrator attributes to a Pacific Islander serving under Captain 
Ahab’s command: “not only do they believe that the stars are 
isles, but that far beyond all visible horizons, their own mild, 
uncontinented seas, interflow with the blue heavens” (1304). 
The narrator earlier compared the Pacific Islander’s alien situa-
tion in New England to that of someone “thrown among people 
as strange to him as though he were in the planet Jupiter” (847).
Moby-Dick drops archival moorings to float its boat in a 
sea of fantasying, the underworld of its inspiration: “for here, 
millions of mixed shades and shadows, drowned dreams, som-
nambulisms, reveries; all that we call lives and souls, lie dream-
ing, dreaming still” (1308). The prologue lists the etymologies of 
“whale” and then proceeds to a compilation of “whale” refer-
ences from many great books. The whales are also subsumed as 
books: “According to magnitude I divide the whales into three 
17 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick or, The Whale (New York: Library 
Classics of the United States, 1983), 1086. Subsequent page references 
are to this edition and are given in the text.
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primary BOOKS (subdivisible into CHAPTERS), and these shall 
comprehend them all, both small and large” (936). 
In the relay of tomes culminating in Melville’s novel, there are 
two heroic agonists. The titular hero, Moby Dick, is one of the 
“famous whales” enjoying “great individual celebrity” and there-
fore “admitted into all the rights, privileges, and distinctions of 
a name” (1010). The other hero is Captain Ahab, who, outside 
the mania of his heroic will and purpose, is immersed in another 
profundity, fantasying unto dissociation. 
Ahab pronounces: “What I’ve dared, I’ve willed; and what 
I’ve willed, I’ll do!” (971). The narrator takes this below when 
he decides to make a rough draft of his will. It’s his fourth time. 
But he adds, “of all men sailors” are so fond of the “diversion” of 
“tinkering at their last wills and testaments” (1036). Ahab’s will is 
the way but before they are words (or commands), his thoughts 
lead a separate existence as wish fantasies or daydreams. Over and 
again, Ahab “would throw himself back in reveries” (1006) and 
walk “the deck in rolling reveries” (1346). Thus, when the teen 
sailor Pip is traumatically split off from his former persona and 
goes beyond “the joyous, heartless, ever-juvenile eternities” of 
daydreaming to enter upon “wondrous depths” (1236), Ahab is 
the one to know one and follows: 
“Now, then, Pip, we’ll talk this over; I do suck most wondrous 
philosophies from thee! Some unknown conduits from the 
unknown worlds must empty into thee!” (1358) 
The bulk rate of whaling carries blubber, from which oil is read-
ily extracted, while, as Melville quipped in a letter, he sought to 
derive poetry from it, which was the more precarious endeavor.18 
The significance of the whale, which begins with its corpse, 
overflows, very much like a blob, the bookish equations that pro-
mote the metaphysical comforts of literary self-reflexivity. The 
narrator meticulously catalogues item by item all the component 
parts of the defeated whale, which are preserved, carved, cut out, 
or peeled off already on board the ship to use or bring home as 
trophies, souvenirs, or luxury items. One such item, the very skin 
18 Melville to Richard Henry Dana, Jr., May 1, 1850.
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of the animal, “resembling the thinnest shreds of isinglass, only it 
is almost as flexible and soft as satin” (1119), slips over the relay of 
books that would comprise “The Whale.” 
I have such dried bits, which I use for marks in my whale-
books. It is transparent […] and being laid upon the printed 
page, I have sometimes pleased myself with fancying it exerted 
a magnifying influence. At any rate, it is pleasant to read about 
whales through their own spectacles, as you may say. (ibid.) 
The narrator studies his books on whales and whaling. But the 
final flourish interrupts his studies by fantasying. 
The influence of magnifying that triggers this bare-bones edi-
tion of literary self-reflection bears association with the fire echo-
ing inside the word magnifier and which the magnifying glass in 
fact produces. In The Psychoanalysis of Fire, Gaston Bachelard 
argued that gazing upon flames is not only a stimulus for rev-
erie but must even count as the primal onset of philosophy and 
poetry.19 That fire and water are not opposed but can even be 
conjoined as in “fire water” was the primal scene of homosexual-
ity’s prohibition that Freud speculated on in his reading of the 
introduction of the Promethean flame. Men must not follow the 
innate desire to form a circle jerk and urinate upon the fire, rub-
bing flame against flame unto the fire’s extinction.20 
Literary self-reference interlaced with the narrator’s meticu-
lous cataloguing of all the tiny bits of detritus of dead whales also 
metabolizes the whale in larger format, in a blob-like subsum-
ing modus. Intact body parts recall now Shakespeare’s forehead 
(1164), now Goethe’s expansive chest (1195). The tilt of the ship 
brought on by the dead whale strapped to its side must be cor-
rected by adding to the other side a second whale corpse. The 
19 It is the introductory premise of La psychanalyse du feu (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1985). I hear the fire in magnifier in earshot of Derrida’s 
reading of photography in Droit de regards (Paris: Minuit, 1985).
20 Sigmund Freud, “Zur Gewinnung des Feuers,” in Gesammelte Werke, 
ed. Anna Freud, vol. 16 (London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1950). 
Newcomers to Melville’s novel are often taken aback by its nonphobic 
acceptance of homoeroticism as fact for life.
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narrator compares the balancing to that between Locke and 
Kant that some minds seem to require. But “throw all these 
thunder-heads overboard, and then you will float light and right” 
(1143–44). Only knowledge of the whale counts: “For unless you 
own the whale, you are but a provincial and sentimentalist in 
Truth” (1155). A reference to Novalis follows and we are in the 
eddy stirred up by the German Romantic transmission filling 
the gaps in UK medievalism and restoring Shakespeare to illusory 
continuity in English letters. 
In Moby-Dick, the gap in reception is rerouted as American 
literature’s claim to the very language of Shakespeare. Among 
the archival moorings that keep the book on the course of the 
will in a sea of wish fantasy we find the following footnote to a 
word, “gallied,” still in use on board this book: “It is an old Saxon 
word.” It “occurs once” in Shakespeare’s Lear (the other main-
stay alongside Macbeth of the story of Ahab’s will or testament). 
Otherwise, outside this book, the word is obsolete. “Much the 
same is it with many other sinewy Saxonisms of this sort, which 
emigrated to the New-England rocks with the noble brawn of 
the old English emigrants in the time of the Commonwealth. 
Thus, some of the best and furthest-descended English words 
[…] are now democratised, nay, plebeianised – so to speak – in 
the New World” (1204n). The dispersion of near-extinct main-
stays of European A-culture saves the best for what’s going to 
last: new word literature.
Among the authors referred to in Moby-Dick there’s Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1248), who finds his niche as the author of 
reveries, which roll in Melville’s novel, above and throughout the 
sea. That François Rabelais is also cited (ibid.) attends the blob-
like (or zombie-like) consumerism that the image of magnifica-
tion illuminates. Choice cuts of whale meat are also eaten and it 
is the successful harpooner’s special request that he enjoy such a 
steak as his prize. 
That mortal man should feed upon the creature that feeds his 
lamp and […] eat him by his own light, as you may say; this 
seems so outlandish a thing that one must needs go a little 
into the history and philosophy of it. (1112) 
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But the aside quickly concludes that landlubbers are caught up 
in the blubber or blob of auto-cannibalism: 
Look at your knife-handle, there, my civilized and enlightened 
gourmand dining off that roast beef, what is that handle made 
of? – what but the bones of the brother of the very ox you are 
eating? And what do you pick your teeth with, after devour-
ing that fat goose? With a feather of the same fowl. (1114) 
Rescue from this morass comes not with rationalization but 
swings ‘round “the spine” of the book into wish fantasying’s 
last word and origin. The only parts of the whale’s spine that are 
lost are the smallest ones that the children stole “to play marbles 
with. Thus we see how that the spine of even the hugest of liv-
ing things tapers off at last into simple child’s play” (1279). The 
round trip through the poetics of the daydream is complete. 
Hitting bottom in the all-consuming blob of self-reference 
means to rebound from playing in childhood through fantasying 
or reverie, its adolescent legacy.
There It Blows Up
Although remarks and sharks don’t make literature, in Ernest 
Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea (1952), his ticket to the 
Nobel Prize, the sharks that in Moby-Dick are massacred when 
they gather to feed on the dead whale strapped to the ship cannot 
be defeated by the old man alone when they come to feast on 
the marlin he caught and killed. Sharks undo the triumph of the 
man’s will and take the story out of heroic fantasy and deliver it 
to literature, making it the modern heir to Moby-Dick. All that 
remains of the old fisherman’s marlin at the end is the skeleton in 
the harbor. His catch is lost again in translation when the waiter 
is misunderstood by an America tourist, who marvels that a 
shark could have such a beautiful tail.21 
21 I follow Melissa McCarthy in using the shark as a tool for rereading. 
See Sharks, Death, Surfers: An Illustrated Companion (Berlin: 
Sternberg Press, 2019).
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What floats the narrative up to the shark attack is not heroic 
fantasy alone. The old man, more like Queequeg than Ahab, is 
immersed in animist respect for the animals he kills, a respect that 
extends to the firmament (but not to sharks). “I do not under-
stand these things, he thought. But it is good that we do not have 
to try to kill the sun or the moon or the stars. It is enough to live 
on the sea and kill our true brothers.”22
If it’s true that for Hemingway the sharks were the literary 
critics who had declared him dead in the water ten years before 
he wrote this prize-winner, then he owes to the shark waters 
of a mediocre literary establishment the impetus that yielded a 
short novel so bare bones in its language that it became the disc 
jockey standard of American discourse. There follows a break in 
reception, which ultimately delivered a cinematic lineage stuck 
between the old-timey movie adaptation Moby Dick in 1956 and 
the lost at Bluescreen 1958 movie The Old Man and the Sea. 
When Peter Benchley pitched two ideas for a novel he would 
write on contract, one of which he based on local reports of shark 
attacks in the 1960s, Doubleday commissioned the latter and, 
although the result wasn’t great literature, it was a 1974 bestseller 
that quickly attracted the movie option in which the projection 
of Moby-Dick would be stowaway.
The bulk rate of Benchley’s Jaws can be characterized as a 
slasher novelization. In the book the local Black boy asks his 
father for a shark story instead of Peter Pan.23 The all-whiteness 
of slasher fare retrofitted for beach wear scores the boy’s outsider 
identification with the killer engine – or Ingin, whose god alone, 
according to Queequeg, could make sharks (1116). In the 1975 
Steven Spielberg movie Jaws, the musical score follows the beat 
of the Psycho sound track, but a different bummer. It wasn’t Jack 
the Ripper we’re told as the music plays; it was a shark. When 
the sheriff’s young son cuts himself he says or fantasies that he 
was bitten by a vampire. The switch away from secular horror to 
occult horror means that on screen the shark, largely unseen and 
22 Ernest Hemingway, The Old Man and the Sea (New York: Scribner, 
2020), 28.
23 Peter Benchley, Jaws (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), 106–7.
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unknown, will qualify as a metaphysical menace, one that can, 
however, be destroyed. 
Only in the closing section of the novel, when Quint opens 
a field of combat against the great white, does literary self reflex-
ivity summon the great American novel. Don’t know if any of 
them read the book but I bet Spielberg and his screenwriters, 
including Benchley, did see the John Huston movie. A scene 
was planned in which Quint, laughing maniacally, watched the 
closing scene of Moby Dick. Although Gregory Peck vetoed the 
citation, Huston’s film informs the movie Jaws throughout, the 
Spielberg adaptation that reflects as much of Benchley’s novel as 
can pass through its closing Quint section. 
The great white shark in the movie is evil incarnate but, unlike 
the great white whale in Moby-Dick, can be destroyed (but only 
by taking along Quint, which cites Captain Ahab’s demise). 
Quint, however, dies heroically, accomplishing his mission. 
What that mission looks like fits the prehistory Quint relates in 
the movie only. During World War Two he was on the good ship 
that delivered the Hiroshima bomb. But then a Japanese sub-
marine sank it and the crew took a dip in shark-infested waters. 
Only one third survived. “Anyway, we delivered the bomb.” 
Sheriff Brody confirms his share in the heroic saga at the end. 
This arc was established early on in the film by the Dolly Zoom, 
the visual effect, as we saw, introduced in Hitchcock’s Vertigo to 
convey the protagonist’s disorder by showing us what he sees 
when he looks down. In Jaws we look through the lurching visual 
effect at the sheriff staring at the convulsions of the victim and 
the blood spout concluding the shark attack. It is through Brody 
that we can identify with Quint. At the end, then, Brody takes 
over where Quint left off and blows up the shark. This bomb 
and the atom bomb are not in the novel. 
Jaws adapts Moby-Dick via Huston’s film as a fantasy picture 
with a happy end that coincides with the end of World War Two. 
Jaws was the biggest grossing film in history until (only two years 
later) there was Star Wars. It is possible to read Spielberg’s film 
through the Heimat of the blockbuster that George Lucas’s 
movie fully illuminated. In Jaws the borderland has been modi-
fied. The fantasy heroic saga plays out in a contemporary setting 
in which World War Two jumps out of the recent past. And the 
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saga abuts on what it denies, the secular horror central to the 
novel. The present tense and the secular are otherwise the input 
of science fiction. The modifications fit the arrival of Melville’s 
Moby-Dick across a sea that is a firmament. The movie Jaws 
inherits the Great American Novel by unconsciously repurpos-
ing and realigning the temporal paradox of its crypt.
In Moby-Dick, the narrator reflects on the sea’s tranquil 
aspect that belies the “remorseless fang” lying beneath, which 
triggers fantasying about the Westward-Ho transport across the 
new world from sea to shining sea: 
The distant ship […] seems struggling forward, not through 
high rolling waves, but through the tall grass of a rolling 
prairie […]. You almost swear that play-wearied children lie 
sleeping in these solitudes […]. And all this mixes with your 
most mystic mood; so that fact and fancy, half-way meeting, 
interpenetrate, and form one seamless whole (1317). 
The narrator gives Ahab the floor. He pronounces that just as 
there is “a storm for every calm” so “there is no steady unretrac-
ing progress in this life” (1318). In the recycling that he charts 
adolescence is pivotal: 
We do not advance through fixed gradations and at the last 
one pause: – through infancy’s unconscious spell, boyhood’s 
thoughtless faith, adolescence’ doubt (the common doom), 
then scepticism, then disbelief, resting at last in manhood’s 
pondering repose of If. But once gone through, we trace the 
round again; and are infants, boys, and men, and Ifs eternally. 
(ibid.)
Whereupon Ahab asks: “where lies the final harbor, whence 
we unmoor no more?” (ibid.). The safe harbor can’t be “man-
hood’s pondering repose of If,” from which we flash back upon 
a development already passed through but which this time lacks 
“adolescence’ doubt (the common doom).” The redoubt of fan-
tasying circling in upon itself between fancy and fact – between 
“what if?” and “as if!” – lowers its common doom upon the 
work of publication between wish and will. 
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But exceptionally, a novel rises up from the blob of this 
impasse. For if, as Ahab concludes, “Our souls are like those 
orphans whose unwedded mothers die in bearing them” taking 
with them “the secret of our paternity” (ibid.), it is a conclu-
sion that turns around again upon the narrator’s sole survival 
as “another orphan” (the last words of the novel) and as author 
of Moby-Dick, his safe harbor of narration of traumatic history 
through allegorization of fantasying’s datemarks.
The wonder and wounding of deep meaning in Moby-Dick 
sets coordinates against a contrast that again calls up the novel’s 
affinity with the other genre of unknown worlds: “And some 
certain significance lurks in all things, else all things are little 
worth, and the round world itself but an empty cipher, except 
[…] to fill up some morass in the Milky Way” (1253). The ships 
of the whaling industry explore, like space ships brought down 
to earth, final frontiers. The whale-ship is extolled as “pioneer in 
ferreting out the remotest and least known parts of the earth. She 
has explored seas and archipelagos which had no chart, where no 
Cook or Vancouver had ever sailed” (909). 
One contribution by whale-ships to the charting of the 
unknown occurred in 1819 whereupon “the great Japanese 
whaling ground first became generally known” (1267). The mid-
nineteenth-century novel announces an opening up of Japan’s 
harbors coming soon for which the whale-ship was the stimulus: 
“If that double-bolted land, Japan, is ever to become hospitable, 
it is the whale-ship alone to whom the credit will be due; for 
already she is on the threshold” (911). 
The ship Ahab commands was once before nearly wrecked in 
a storm off the coast of Japan and had to be repaired on location. 
When the narrator first encounters the ship, he chronicles the 
repair work and then fancies a comparison from another world, 
another time: “Her masts – cut somewhere on the coast of Japan, 
where her original ones were lost overboard in a gale – her masts 
stood stiffly up like the spines of the three old kings of Cologne” 
(867). The book that turns on these spines charts a “history” like 
wish fulfillment in fantasying belonging only to the future it 
approximates in the mode of an encrypted augury. 
The showdown with the great white whale takes Ahab back 
to the recent past of his ship, which in the repair of its masts 
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had already breached Japan’s double bolts. The recent past is 
the most repressed time zone. It counts as prehistory, which can 
only return in the mode of catastrophe. Our hypothetical use of 
the near future represses it. Encryptment is strung along from a 
series of recent pasts up through a series of near futures. After 
penetrating “the heart of the Japanese cruising ground” in pur-
suit of his whale (1317), Ahab must withstand a typhoon: “It will 
sometimes burst from out that cloudless sky, like an exploding 
bomb upon a dazed and sleepy town” (1329). 
The ship with the replaced masts makes it through the repri-
sal of its Japanese history, but the “exploding bomb” is a storm 
warning issued through the temporal paradox of the crypt. In a 
novel characterized, perhaps exotically, certainly homoerotically, 
by utopian race relations, the detonation has no other place to 
resound. The novel’s conscious relationship to Japan is situated 
between the recent past of large-scale blubber hunting and the 
near future of its obsolescence. The forced opening of Japan’s 
harbors by the American fleet only a few years following the 
completion of Moby-Dick was propelled by the exigencies of the 
whaling industry. By then, blubber-hunting had started going 
into decline. Whale oil was a nearly exhausted resource and fossil 
fuels, which were becoming readily available, offered an expedi-
ent replacement. 
While the first era of the imposed modernization of Japan 
organized itself ultimately around the import of European fas-
cism, the double atom bombing inaugurated a second era orga-
nized around identification with American popular culture, the 
by-product of another forced opening of Japan’s double bolts. 
That the atomic catastrophe did not block innovation in this 
forced reception has many reasons, no doubt specific to Japanese 
culture. If we once more look at Godzilla, the scenes of the roll-
ing destruction of the monster’s “atomic breath” or death, a wrap 
that, since possible only in the medium of motion pictures, was 
also a sublime blob of self-reference, we get a sense of acceptance 
of an event without end or turning point. 
From the US perspective, what’s wrong about the bombings 
doesn’t involve the tallying of victims. Ask non-Japanese East 
Asians or Pacific Islanders: their imperialism was so ruthless 
that the Japanese were, as we say, asking for it. What was of dire 
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consequence, however, was that the decision to use the weapon 
against Japan was willy-nilly, a whim outside history. The atom 
bomb was Germany’s bomb; it was developed by scientists in 
the United States, including German Jews who had escaped, in 
informed realization that they were engaged in a contest with the 
weapons industry of the Third Reich, an industry that special-
ized in weapons as miraculous as the hoped-for final victory. That 
the Germans surrendered before the bomb could be used against 
them doesn’t motivate the decision to drop the same bomb on 
Japan. Yes, the war against terror belongs to the symptom picture 
of this “rogue” decision.
There is a YouTube post, the interview of a bystander – inno-
cent, ironic, or psycho – at an anti- or pro-Trump demonstration. 
Since topical application marks the onset of allegory we come 
full loop with his deranged or inspired insistence that “Trump 
is going to complete the system of German idealism.”24 The only 
way that would work is by dropping the bomb where it belongs. 
Wanting Bombs to Explode
We don’t have the backstory of loss in the case of Spider-Man 
that we’re given in the histories of Superman and Batman. But 
we have a more thoroughly deprived young person at the start of 
his superhero career. As low-maintenance charge in the care of 
an aged couple (Uncle Ben and Aunt May), he’s known as Petey. 
He flunks all the initiation tests of the Teen Age. Not every-
one can be a dream-butt letter-sweater jock like Flash, a.k.a. Mr. 
Popular, and leader of the in-group. But Petey’s a “bookworm” 
and, since he can’t dance, a “wallflower.”25 These are characteriza-
24 I rehearsed my reading of the Blob trilogy and Moby-Dick in writing 
about Alexander Nowak’s online series Blob (my essay appeared in the 
online journal KubaParis). One of the episodes in the series included 
the post from YouTube mentioned above. A recurring character in a 
spaceship is the Hypersea Fisherman. This was my impetus for reading 
up on the theory of hypersea. 
25 I consulted the first volume in the collection of facsimile editions of the 
comic books: Amazing Spider-Man (New York: Marvel, 2014). I give 
the title of the comic book and the original pagination: “Introducing 
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tions that signal disturbance in relations to the body, that is, to 
the maternal body (and the body of the group) and demarcate 
graves secretly kept inside the Peter Parker story. 
Upon entering the science exhibit on Experiments in 
Radioactivity, Peter Parker is “transported to another world – 
the fascinating world of atomic science.”26 A tiny spider descends 
from the ceiling, takes a direct hit of a “fantastic amount of radio-
activity” and, “in sudden shock, bites the nearest living thing, at 
the split second before life ebbs from its radioactive body” (ibid.). 
Once he realizes that his body is super he earns an easy hun-
dred by staying in the ring with Crusher Hogan. He arrives in 
superhero drag, which sparks hilarity. He’s a “little masked mar-
vel” and, thus, a “sucker.”27 But when he wins (and thus passes 
a TV producer’s audition), the costume angle is considered great 
showmanship. Soon Spider-Man is on national television. He 
overturns the sorry reception of the superheroes in the Teen Age 
as long-underwear midlifers and losers.
While he says goodbye to the reporters and his fans he sees a 
thief, chased by a policeman calling for Spider-Man’s assistance. 
But Spider-Man does nothing to impede the crook passing by 
him. When the cop confronts Spider-Man, it’s Peter Parker who 
answers from within the recess he is enjoying from bullying: 
“Sorry, pal! That’s your job! I’m thru being pushed around – by 
anyone! From now on I just look out for number one – that 
means – me!” But then Uncle Ben is murdered. Spider-Man is 
roused to avenge his uncle’s death and tracks down the perpetra-
tor. He recognizes in the murderer the man of steal he allowed 
to pass. 
Peter can support his aunt only in the guise of the Spider-
Man who steals the show and walks off with the cash. But now 
the owner of the theater will pay Spider-Man only by check “so 
there’s a record for taxes.” This bouncing reality check cannot 
be cashed. The superhero may be younger now, but his setting 






The local newspaper magnate J. Jonah Jameson has mounted 
a campaign to outlaw Spider-Man: a masked identity is a menace. 
But the bad press gives the teen superhero constant coverage that 
requires more and more photographs. Now Parker can step in 
as mild-mannered photographer to benefit from his Spider-Man 
connection without giving it away. 
The headlines of Jameson’s campaign call forth a double, 
Mysterio, who shows up several psychos down the line during 
Spider-Man’s first year. Mysterio starts out committing crimes 
for all to see dressed like Spider-Man. This doubling hits Parker 
hard. Could it be that he is “becoming a split personality?? Like 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde?? Perhaps – Perhaps I did it in my 
sleep – without knowing?!”28 He is becoming a teenager. His 
consultation with a psychiatrist in his Spider-Man costume and 
persona is short-lived. The teen does not trust in or count on 
confidentiality to withstand the dare to break it. 
Press photographer Peter Parker secretly attaches a spider-pin 
or bug to Mysterio, when the new hero is being celebrated in 
Jameson’s office for delivering society from Spider-Man’s juvenile 
delinquency. Both spider as “bug” and wallflower as “plant” can 
be reclaimed for the covert operation of tracking down Mysterio’s 
identity. 
It turns out Mysterio is a stuntman who constructed his super 
body and sensorium out of the latest in military technology – 
radar, sonar, and jamming devices – which he learned to apply to 
special effect working in television and film. Their showdown in 
the studio breaks through the walls of one set into the midst of a 
science-fiction movie in progress. 
Spider-Man takes photos and gets the criminal’s tale on tape. 
He obtains money as Peter Parker and vindication as Spider-
Man. But then in the Spider-Man persona he strings up Jameson 
for laughs – and leaves him hanging. “You masked menace!” 
Jameson cries out.29 Walking the prank of pleasure, he finds an 
outlet for his earlier awkwardness on the stage of the teen age. 
Spider-Man finds the rub in his rejection as Peter Parker by 
Mr. Popular, aka Super-teen Flash, currently the president of the 
28 “The Menace of Mysterio,” in Amazing Spider-Man, 3.
29 Ibid., 22.
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Spider-Man fan club. At the end of the Mysterio adventure, the 
joking tension with Flash leads Parker/Spider-Man to imagine 
telling Flash his identities and watching him “explode.” 
Peter Parker’s Flash fantasy is a prospect already detonated 
“over there.” The bombs code-name-dropped Little Boy and Fat 
Man made waves and went under, part of our second nature in 
the 1960s. In the story of Spider-Man, the collateral damage of 
fallout heightens the Teen Age from the outsider on in, all the 
way to the libidinal dream bomb. The two atom bombs were 
sketchily modeled by the gangsters in The Maltese Falcon (1941) 
who are engaged in a tug of war with the heterosexual contin-
gency for one gleaming/dirty prize. 30 “Fat Man,” the nickname 
of the main gangster, Kasper Gutman, forms and breaks alliances 
with Joel Cairo (Peter Lorre, a delegate of German science fic-
tion). Fat Man’s young and slight American sidekick and male 
gun moll doesn’t need a nickname. He is Little Boy, the denied 
partner in a fantasy of or about homosexuality, and the first atom 
bomb dropped in history. Fat Man, the second bomb, was first 
tested under the name Gadget. 
The detonation targets not sexual identity but psychosexual 
reality in which there is always a homosexual component, the 
slack in the primal scene of sexual identification that allows 
every combo to be imagined or novelized. Freud contemplated 
the destiny of homosexuality in heterosexuality in the unlikely 
setting of Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness. Only wild 
analysis would see Schreber’s psychotic break as breaking out of 
the closet. Sex is sexuality for dummies. When released from the 
asylum with his adult rights fully restored, Schreber continued 
to contemplate from the safe haven of his marriage the content 
of his former delusion – that he was the consort chosen for 
conceiving by divine rays a new survivor species – no longer as 
happening event that excludes the reality of others but as article 
of his private faith. 
After the stage of heterosexual object-choice has been reached, 
the homosexual tendencies are not, as might be supposed, 




done away with or brought to a stop; they are merely deflected 
from their sexual aim and applied to fresh uses. They now 
combine with portions of the ego-instincts and, as “attached” 
components, help to constitute the social insitincts, thus 
contributing an erotic factor to friendship and comradeship, 
to esprit de corps and to the love of mankind in general. How 
large a contribution is in fact derived from erotic sources (with 
the sexual aim inhibited) could scarcely be guessed from the 
normal social relations of mankind.31
While it is tempting to historicize Freud’s discovery as specific 
to the priority of same-sex contact with socialization in his own 
time, you still tend to send yourself and your gender into the 
heroic sagas that transform private wish fulfillment and open the 
social relation.32 There couldn’t be gender dysphoria otherwise.
Melanie Klein’s “Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Tics” 
was centered on the case of Felix, which under-cover was the case 
of her son Hans. The physical aspect of fantasying that is Klein’s 
topic is flexed by her novelization of the analysis of her own son, 
which gives rise to the overdetermined gestures of confidential-
ity pervading the essay. “His mother mentioned only by the way 
that for some months he had had a tic, which appeared only 
occasionally and to which she – and for that matter I too, at least 
for a period – did not attach special importance.”33
31 Sigmund Freud, “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XII (1911–1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique 
and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1958), 61.
32 This applies to both sexes but with differences that need to be 
accounted for. I’m focusing on the homosexual disposition in the 
male. The incorporation of someone of the other gender contains the 
differences but abridged to fit inside melancholia. That’s how I get 
around including Melanie Klein without elaborating the vantage point 
or investment of her gender in her schoolboy reading. 
33 Melanie Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Tics,” in Love, 
Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945 (New York: The Free 
Press, 1984), 106. In an earlier footnote in the first volume I noted that 
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In her young patients Klein in fact promoted masturbation 
over the acting out of repressed masturbatory fantasies, but in the 
case of Felix/Hans she ruled out its mutual enactment because it 
was diverting his attention from the analysis. Klein’s signature 
equanimity about incest allowed her to probe instead for her 
own place in the tic-rebus of fantasying. Like Ernst Simmel after 
her, Klein decided Hans was a closet straight. The essay in which 
Klein first used the term “object relation”34 came back to haunt 
her when Hans died a young man in a climbing accident, always 
a possible cover for undeclared suicide. She fictionalized her grief, 
trying to give it a rest in theory in “Mourning and Its Relation to 
the Manic-Depressive States.” 
In the fictionalized account of her analysis of Hans, Klein sees 
the preliminary condition of fidgeting enact wishes that the tic 
condenses. Klein interrupts the analysis of Felix/Hans to address 
the case of an exogamous patient, Werner, whose fidgeting fol-
lowed Tarzan. 
He told me that he fidgeted about Tarzan’s animals. The mon-
keys are walking through the jungle; in his fantasy he walks 
behind them and adapts himself to their gait. Associations 
showed clearly his admiration for his father who copulates 
with his mother (monkey = penis) and his wish to participate 
as a third person. This identification, again with both mother 
and father, also formed the basis of his other numerous “fidg-
eting” thoughts, all of which could be recognized as mastur-
bation fantasies. (118). 
Fidgeting is clear text. In other instances as well, Werner’s rou-
tines were based on “imitation of certain movements, in this case 
those of winding up the gramophone and of the needle moving 
over the disc” (119). Werner: “Fidgeting is fun, but it isn’t always 
fun, you can’t leave off when you want to – as, for instance, when 
for the sake of my study’s focus I am disregarding the distinct spelling 
(and meaning of) “phantasy.” Subsequent page references are given in 
the text.
34 See Phyllis Grosskurth, Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work 
(New York: Knopf, 1986), 96. 
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you ought to do your lessons” (118). The restlessness takes the 
place of masturbation and masturbation fantasies. When Felix 
lies, specifically his avowal during a lull that he has completely 
overcome his masturbatory preoccupations, he doesn’t grow 
wood but instead the tic returns with increased severity. 
Gidget’s night dream of being in love with Moondoggie is the 
sublime cliffhanger that in the relay of novels is awash with the 
daydreaming and wish fantasying that drive the near misses and 
reach back behind the book covers to the father’s fictionalizing, 
his fantasying. The night dream wasn’t triggered by a conscious 
wish. However her night of feverish dreaming does follow at 
least three hours of riding the surf “bareback”35 on Moondoggie’s 
shoulders. 
I rode in on his back and boy, was it a blast. He must have 
had a great time himself because he said, “Let’s go out again, 
Gidget.” So we went out again and waited for another good 
hump and when it came he did another “standing island” – 
meaning he didn’t spill and I had my hands around his head 
and felt just great. 
The old heat just pounded down on us. My skin started 
blistering but we went out again and again because you just 
can’t loll around and shoot the breeze and lie to the sun when 
a set of waves is going like it did that afternoon.36 
“Don’t fidget Gidget,”37 Moondoggie told her before their “bare-
back ride”38 folding denial into word play alongside the name 
that’s his innovation. 
The foundation for the fidgeting of Werner and Felix was a 
narcissistic turning back on the self as a loved object. Klein recog-
nizes the narcissistic turn in Werner’s fantasies of a “Little One” 
who proves more skilled than a “Big One” (119). “The ‘Little 
One’ is not only the penis but he, himself, in comparison with 
his father; and the admiration for himself, which he expressed 
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in this way, showed the narcissistic disposal of his libido” (ibid.). 
The turn, prompted by castration anxiety following adoption of 
a feminine attitude, results in fantasying that at the same time 
represents the defense against that attitude. This counter and 
counter-counter must be hit over and again in the primal game. 
Werner produced a fantasy about a jazz band, the sounds of 
which he imitated, and said that he was “fidgeting” about it. 
He showed me how the trumpeter plays his instrument, how 
the leader conducts and the man with the big drum beats. On 
my asking him what in this connection he was “fidgeting” 
about, he replied that he was taking part in all these activities. 
(119–20)
Peter Parker or Petey turns into Spider-Man. Even when under-
cover, he’s still super powerful on the inside but on the outside 
the potency fits inside Petey. Sometimes even the superhero is 
known as Spidey. His super-powerful body secretes the means 
for advancing swiftly through the city like Tarzan swinging 
through the trees. Their movement, which follows animals, 
could be compared to fidgeting. Spider-Man and Gidget are tiny 
shiny gadgets through which midlifers Stan Lee, born Stanley 
Lieber, and Friedrich Kohner partake of the Teen Age. While in 
Rome Gidget notes that her “daydreams” are “slightly soiled.”39 
No One Can Know His Name
At the end of the series of radioactive doublings, Peter Parker sets 
off an explosion in Flash by flashing his own secret name. This 
is his inner stomping ground: like Rumpelstiltskin he dances 
around his flaming all the while chanting that no one knows its 
name. That the queen’s messenger passes by and overhears his 
name, however, has to happen, like the confidentiality breach 
Spider-Man equated with the analytic session. 
Edmund Bergler addressed the significance of the Grimm fairy 
tale as “anti-male manifesto” in the setting of the analysis of one 
39 Frederick Kohner, Gidget Goes to Rome (New York: Bantam, 1963), 61.
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of his patients.40 When one day he asks the patient whether she 
has dreamed in the nights since her last appointment, she answers 
that she doesn’t recall any but that thoughts of Rumpelstiltskin 
have been crossing her mind (67). 
Bergler prompts her to re-tell the tale as she remembers it. 
Although she leaves out many telling details, she gladly includes 
the final castration. He concludes: “The ‘condensation word,’ 
Rumpelstiltskin, contained her whole inner conflict in an 
unconscious innuendo” (ibid.). A “condensation word,” Bergler 
clarifies at the end of the article, conveys a reproach by the 
superego (70). Obfuscated by the “unconscious ego” through 
an intermingling of defenses and arrested by the ego in the 
midst of the word’s publication, the result is meaningless and 
for the ego painless. I would add that the condensation word 
Rumpelstiltskin also resembles, in the setting of Freud’s first 
system, the alteration of an antisocial daydream preliminary to 
its going public, stopping at midpoint, like a memory stopping 
and restarting it, or like joint daydreaming that makes it mutual. 
In the fairy tale, a father, wanting to look good, boasts to 
the king that his daughter can spin straw into gold. It sounds 
like fantasying out loud. It’s mutual to be sure when the king 
takes him up on it, locking up the girl in his castle so she can 
work her magic for him. Twice she is aided by the poltergeist 
Rumpelstiltskin. The third trial is a charm because the king 
assures her that they will be wed if she pulls it off one last time. 
When Rumpelstiltskin again helps her out, he asks in exchange 
for her first born. She gives away her unborn child and becomes 
queen. 
A year later, she is sitting pretty with a baby on her lap when 
he returns. She offers anything at all in the realm instead but 
nothing is as good, he says, as something living. At this point he 
is phallic power incarnate, Bergler points out, but at the limit; 
he can make gold or money (= feces) but not a living child (66). 
The poltergeist either pities her or can’t overlook an opportunity 
to play another round. He offers her a way out, gambling that 
40 Edmund Bergler, “The Clinical Importance of ‘Rumpelstiltskin’ as 
Anti-Male Manifesto,” American Imago 18, no. 1 (Spring 1961): 65–70. 
Subsequent page numbers are given in the text.
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in three days time she will not discover his name. She sends an 
envoy to collect all possible names in the kingdom. On the third 
day of his mission, he passes by a little man dancing and chant-
ing around a fire and overhears his name. When the next day the 
queen utters the name Rumpelstiltskin he tears himself in two, a 
castration, says Bergler, that counts a pair of breasts (66).
The child is jealous of the mother’s creativity (65). But in 
the first place, the focus is on the breasts and Bergler nominates 
breast envy the bigger one. The girl takes hope by equating her 
clitoris with the nipple of the breast in spe. The boy equates his 
penis with the breast and adopts a “He-man” attitude that deval-
ues women (ibid.). At this point Bergler refers the reader to his 
book Counterfeit Sex on the treatable illness of homosexuality.
The essay on Rumpelstiltskin, published in the year of his 
death, is Bergler’s testament. In the first sentence, he announces 
that the fine points of the fairy tale have so far been overlooked. 
His patient has come to him for a second round of analysis. She 
was analyzed for five years, in part inside a sanitarium, for a pre-
senting problem of depression which she acted out sexually. The 
first analysis, which Bergler reconstructs, overlooked the fine 
points of her case. 
The former analyst saw her identifying both with her father 
(who wasn’t high fidelity) and his extra-marital women. The 
outcome seemed successful enough. She married a man many 
years her senior and had three children in swift succession. But 
then her husband died in a car accident and she moved with 
her children to the vicinity of her parents’ home, renting a fur-
nished apartment with books on the shelves, including several 
by Bergler, which she read. She was convinced that she was the 
poster girl of “psychic masochism” and contacted Bergler, fulfill-
ing for a moment his abiding wish for fame. 
Bergler sees that the patient’s conflict “in inner reality” was 
“pre-Oedipal, centering around unresolved masochistic attach-
ment to the mother image” (67). The former analyst succeeded 
in warding it “off with an Oedipal blind” (68). Bergler focuses 
instead on the patient’s recollection that when she was five years 
old her mother announced that she would have left her philan-
dering husband if not for the existence of their child. 
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At the sanitarium, the patient’s first response to Oedipal 
explanation was to fill her “half-promiscuous” (67) behavior 
to the brim. She had affairs with anyone available including the 
“half-psychotic” inmates (68). She was living out two “curious” 
defenses. The more emotionally unimportant the men, the more 
she insulated herself against her real feelings for the father (= 
analyst). And she hoped to become pregnant because then, she 
felt, she could commit suicide. When there was improvement 
after all, she terminated the treatment and shortly afterwards was 
married.
Bergler’s analysis of the patient, like his interpretation of the 
fairy tale, subsumes the efforts of his precursors as defenses cover-
ing the deeper problem, which he alone recognizes. The case, a 
referral from his books, covers the terrain in which Bergler staked 
his claim to fame through reversals of standard receptions. 
Her analysis clearly demonstrated that the patient had been 
desperately trying, all her life, to admit to “the lesser intrapsy-
chic crime” (Oedipal) in order to cover up her “real crime” 
(psychic masochism around mother). (68)
Bergler finds “proof” in the “paradox” that all her affairs left her 
infertile while in her marriage she was remarkably fecund. He 
imagines that during her promiscuity she flexed “spasm of the 
tubes, a well-known phenomenon in neurotic infertility” (69).
The answer to the paradox lies in family history. It turns out 
there was a scandal older than the father-and-daughter acting-
out team. In the father’s family an infamous mother flagrantly 
bore a generation out of wedlock, which I guess means that no 
one knew the patronymic. The patient’s father had compensated 
for the family blemish by marrying a woman from higher social 
circles. If the patient had succeeded in becoming pregnant in one 
of her sketchy liaisons she would have fortified her mother’s com-
plaint, proving that the father’s family history had forwarded 
its blemish. But the patient didn’t want to give her mother the 
satisfaction. While a cursory look on this score recognizes hatred 
of the mother, that’s a defense covering the patient’s real aim: “to 
keep the suffering mother in her position as the suffering model 
for identification” (69).
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What then was the mother’s “crime,” the crime to which 
the patient, as “innocent victim,” became a party? It was the 
mother’s capacity to have children in the first place. (ibid.)
The patient’s plan while in the sanitarium to conceive bastards 
and then commit suicide was in thrall to the “unconscious fan-
tasy” that her mother was capable of killing her unborn child 
(ibid.).
The patient’s massive depressions did not pertain to being 
unloved or rejected, not to her superficial Oedipal guilt. The 
depressions were shifted to these deposits in order to cover up 
the real source: masochistic attachment to the mother. (ibid.)
What about the husband, her first dead other? Bergler overlooks 
his role just as he skips the death wish stirring the depression 
“deposits” of blocked mourning.
The family blemish goes back, according to Bergler, to the 
patient’s great-grandmother, who had two illegitimate children 
and stood by her unmarried status, even turning down the 
father’s subsequent offer of marriage. There is a generation, then, 
that is not accounted for, as in the case of Peter Parker. He is 
being raised by his uncle and aunt who look old enough to be his 
grandparents. The name of the mild-mannered wallflower and 
bookworm cites and summons the well-known tongue-twister, 
Peter Parker picked a peck of pickled peppers. It blocks access like 
the scramble-ditty Ben Reich memorized to keep the peepers out 
of his head in Bester’s The Demolished Man. The pickled pep-
pers like the stilt propping up the poltergeist’s name suggest an 
abused phallic symbol. In German, spinning (Spinnen) is linked 
to the spider (Spinne), a maternal symbol. To say that someone 
spins in German can also mean the person is a fantast, even crazy. 
For Peter Parker the lost generation, the underworld that inspires 
his fantasying, helps him spin his wallflowers into superpowers. 
A poltergeist can be an emissary of the dead. In Bergler’s case the 
lost generation symbolizes his own removal of his precursors. 
Rumpelstiltskin on his patient’s mind was lodged transferen-
tially against him. But that’s not all, Bergler assures us. The origi-
nal superegoic reproach that the condensation word scrambled 
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was that his patient was wrong to think she had outgrown her 
masochistic attachment by giving birth and earning the right 
to devalue men. Bergler lets the superego speak through him: 
“Nobody wants you for your own sake, but only because you can 
provide gold (parental wealth). You are still – Rumpelstiltskin” 
(70). So is Bergler: she wants his analysis and gives him her gold 
because he wrote the books that were lying around, yesterday’s 
books used for furnishing a rental.
Space Race
In More Than Human (1953), Theodore Sturgeon assembles out 
of assorted defectives bearing tele-gifts an evolutionary inheri-
tance of the earth. Around the saga of an in-group of five para-
normals becoming the Homo Gestalt of the future, Sturgeon’s 
novel allegorizes disparate themes of “psychic evolution” that 
cold-war science fiction explored between the limit states of psy-
chosis and psychopathy. 
First there was Lone, a telepathic idiot, who “learned very 
slowly to give ideas the form of speech” because ideas, which “are 
in themselves formless,” “were transmitted to him directly.”41 
According to the inside view of Lone’s telepathy-enhanced idi-
ocy, it seems rather that he carries a psychotic break that is also 
the basis for an alternate psychic apparatus.
He lived inside somewhere, apart, and the little link between 
word and significance hung broken. […] He carried another 
thing. It was passive, it was receptive […]. This was a thing 
which only received and recorded. It did this without words, 
without a code system of any kind. (3–5)
The broken “link” hanging in there summons Wilfred Bion, 
who offered “linking” for thinking about the relationship to 
function rather than to the object subserving a function.42 What 
41 Theodore Sturgeon, More Than Human (London: Gollancz, 2000), 
26. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
42 Wilfred R. Bion, “Attacks on Linking [1959],” in Second Thoughts 
(London: Karnac, 1984), 102. 
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Melanie Klein termed the “paranoid-schizoid” position is home 
to what Bion revalorized as “attacks on linking.” 
If it is borne in mind that the patient has a part-object rela-
tionship with himself as well as with objects not himself, it 
contributes to the understanding of phrases such as “it seems” 
which are commonly employed by the deeply disturbed 
patient on occasions when a less disturbed patient might say 
“I think” or “I believe.” When he says “it seems” he is often 
referring to a feeing – an “it seems” feeling – which is a part 
of his psyche and yet is not observed as part of a whole object. 
The conception of the part-object as analogous to an ana-
tomical structure, encouraged by the patient’s employment of 
concrete images as units of thought, is misleading because the 
part-object relationship is not with the anatomical structures 
only but with function, not with anatomy but with physiol-
ogy, not with the breast but with feeding, poisoning, loving, 
hating.43 
The feeling of “it seems” can stitch up the seams of a new address 
for structuring functions. That an aggregate can restore func-
tion is one of the truths of social media. On Facebook, “friends” 
overcome public fears like writer’s block post by post, the baby 
steps that lead from a lonely incapacity into the public sphere 
of “liking,” I mean linking. The Homo Gestalt inherits the psy-
chotic borderline through its amalgamation into a new unit of 
tele-abilities that go beyond compensation for shortcomings. 
Sturgeon spins his tale of tele in a tight spot. As the pages 
of More Than Human turn, Lone assembles the first Homo 
Gestalt, a prosthetic conjoining of part-subjects each augmented 
by various tele-capacities. Janie, a telekineticist, arrives at Lone’s 
cave together with Bonnie and Beanie, the twin teleports. Lone 
alternates between the Gestalt and his contact with humans on 
the periphery of the Gestalt’s formation. Because he flashes on 
his foster mother’s charity and generosity toward him in the 
recent past, he can reverse his rejection of Janie and the twins and 




Lone makes first human contact with a girl in flight from a 
household of abuse. “He began to move – he who had never 
called nor been called, nor responded before. He moved toward 
the thing he sensed and it was a matter of will, not of external 
compulsion” (9). But while “the currents of their inner selves 
surged between them” (16), the girl’s father, alerted by her older 
sister, who can’t get enough of his whip handle, catches them, 
kills the girl, nearly kills Lone, and then commits suicide. A 
couple discovers the contact-traumatized youth and adopts him. 
Under the caring conditions at the farm, as he begins to find lan-
guage and is asked his name, he stammers out “all alone,” which 
is understood as “Lone.” Although it looks like he’s beginning to 
recover from the traumatized condition, what’s observed is really 
the onset of his human development. When a baby is on the way, 
he goes back to the wilderness to spare them the pain of telling 
him to go. 
On a later visit to the farm, Lone discovers that his foster 
mother died giving birth to a mongoloid baby while the deranged 
husband barely hangs on waiting for her return. Lone takes the 
infant to the Gestalt, his new home. Janie, who alone can com-
municate with “Baby,” as he will remain henceforth in name 
and constitution, recognizes that he is like an “adding machine” 
(69). Baby explains through Janie that he is “a figure-outer brain” 
while she is the “body,” the twins the “arms and legs,” and Lone 
the “head”: “He says the ‘I’ is all of us” (76). If Baby, who remains 
always the same, could be replaced, in other words, if he could 
die and be replaced, then the Homo Gestalt would be immortal.
Lone continues to go to the farm to help his foster father. 
Because the truck keeps getting stuck in the mud, which stops 
work when Lone isn’t there to help, Baby, on Lone’s request, 
invents a helpful device for lifting the truck’s stuck end, which 
turns out to be a miniature anti-gravity generator. This unlikely 
overskill gadget hiding out on the soon abandoned farm is the 
potential catalyst for “wingless flight and escape to the planets, 
to the stars, perhaps” (196).
More Than Human is also the allegory of its “fix-up” compo-
sition, a trait it shares with many other American science fiction 
novels, like those by A.E. van Vogt. Sturgeon’s novel is a compila-
tion of earlier short stories, which become different parts of the 
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novel, different histories, which begin to communicate after the 
fact in the course of the psychoanalysis of one of the members of 
the Gestalt, Gerry. Under treatment for oblivion, Gerry tells the 
story of how when Lone died in an accident he replaced him as 
the head. With Lone gone, Gerry goes to the surviving sister of 
Lone’s first human contact. She would take care of the Gestalt, 
Lone advised him, because she owes him. In analysis with Dr. 
Stern, Gerry remembers that he murdered her to protect the 
Gestalt against normalization, which would have yielded “ninety 
per cent short-circuited potentials and ten per cent juvenile 
delinquent” (143). 
Dr. Stern interprets the unique and unprecedented Homo 
Gestalt as indeed alone, and therefore in need of “something” his 
patient does not “know anything about” and that, if he told him, 
wouldn’t mean anything to him. “It’s sometimes called moral-
ity” (145). Gerry concludes that the shrink is merely afraid of 
their new entity and then erases Dr. Stern’s memory along with 
the tapes of their sessions. “Much funnier than thinking about 
him being dead” (146). 
The narrative attends to any sign of improvement in the psy-
chopathic profile of Gerry, the nickname for the “German.” His 
integration in the Homo Gestalt, which remains iffy, is neverthe-
less a big part of making the new group ego a viable candidate for 
the position of new poster norm of evolutionary change.
Janie takes over where the sessions with Dr. Stern left off by 
helping Hip out from under his oblivion. While an engineer in 
the US Air Force, Hip stumbled upon the remains of the anti-
gravity device while looking into odd test results on the anti-
aircraft practice range. Hoping to spark his interest and draw 
him out of his slump, Janie alerts Gerry to Hip’s discovery. Gerry 
is a psychopath and his energy was carrying the Gestalt forward 
until he succumbed to manic-depression (205). He had become 
convinced “that he didn’t need to prove anything to anyone” 
(ibid.). Gerry’s intelligence didn’t get a contact high from Hip’s 
“mathematical recreation” (206). Instead he wasted Hip’s life 
out of envy, a “kind of childishness” that “was pretty vicious” 
(205). When Hip “shared his discovery,” Gerry “suddenly smiled 
at him, pulled the lever, let a wrecked truck and a lifetime dream 
fall upward into the sky” (198). Gerry added to the injury the 
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oblivion that Janie is helping lift (206). What lifted off with the 
anti-gravity device could have led “to the addition of one more 
item to the United Field – what we now call psychic energy” 
(206–7). 
Janie picks up this lack by leading the Gestalt, through accep-
tance of “morals,” which are a “coded survival instinct,” toward 
a “psychic evolution instead of the physical” (220). She integrates 
those figures of humanity on the periphery of the constitution 
of the Gestalt who had not yet been included within its history. 
The only thing Janie knows about moral systems is that if they’re 
violated, one feels ashamed (215). So, she’ll start with that by 
bringing Hip into the Gestalt: Gerry must “learn something that 
a computer can’t teach him. He’s got to learn to be ashamed” 
(214). 
Gerry thinks that the ethos he’s been learning is too small a 
concept to cover the how and why of humanity’s existence, which 
Homo Gestalt will inherit. Then he gives the only formulation 
of morality that is recognizable. It’s the utilitarian valorization 
of sacrifice, which acquits the Gestalt of the crimes of “Gerry.” 
“Here was the withheld hand as thousands died, when by their 
death millions might live” (233). That Hip becomes the Homo 
Gestalt’s new function, its conscience, shifts the “awesome 
Watcher in the sky” in Gerry’s thoughts, making room for “a 
laughing thing with a human heart and a reverence for its human 
origins” (ibid.). The novel concludes on Gerry “humbly” rejoin-
ing the Gestalt’s inheritance of the earth.
That the orphan teleport twins who join in the Homo Gestalt 
are Black, another mark against them in their 1950s setting, which 
they, however, zip past, is a good intro for considering Wild Seed 
(1980), a novel by Octavia E. Butler, whose oeuvre lies between 
fantasy and science fiction in ways compatible with Ursula Le 
Guin’s diplomacy. By going Black to the future, Butler’s work 
could be adopted as Afrofuturism, a concept that took off by the 
late 1990s and hit blockbuster culture with Black Panther (2018). 
In Afrofuturism, you go to the future not to deny the past but to 
change its reception, its recent passage. Wild Seed “changes” the 
traumatic history of slavery by redirecting its course in the service 
of a new psychic constitution akin to that of the Homo Gestalt.
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When the author as a young girl saw the SF movie from the 
UK, Devil Girl from Mars (1954), she knew that proximity to 
science fiction, rather than only to fairy-tale fantasy, in which she 
was already dabbling, was the ticket. The borderzone between 
fantasy and science fiction was as open to newcomers as the recy-
cling bin and has-been. It was other. And its open sesame was 
bolstered at that time in the United States by a new inclusion of 
all pupils and a newly fostered accessibility of science through the 
educational reforms and funding that the space race had brought 
about. 
The lead players in Wild Seed are shape-shifters, with the 
difference that Goro, an immaterial spirit, steals bodies and 
consumes the lives of the former occupants, while Anyanwu, a 
clairvoyant healer, can become or re-member with her own pli-
able substance any life-form with which she made contact. 
Goro believes in mastery and collects for his long-term breed-
ing assignment candidates marked by special psychic talents. 
He picks up Anyanwu who goes along with the master plan. A 
healer or witch for hundreds of years, she is compelled by the 
aloneness of the unique talents Goro collects to buffer them in 
the new communities she works to establish. 
In the time of individual development, each tele-talent goes 
through a pubescent process of transition, in which the paranor-
mal ability is stabilized and can henceforth be used selectively – 
or extend into madness, psychopathy, and self-destruction. 
The spirit or ghost inside Goro calculates that control of these 
extra-sensory talents, who alone could see through the deception 
of his being “immortal,” insures his continued survival. Those 
he doesn’t select are killed off by the uncomprehending in any 
event. Then it becomes clear that he, too, enacts the tele-transi-
tion in the process of body theft. Toward the end of the novel he 
makes an experiment: he pulls back from the termination phase 
during his stranglehold on Anyanwu and they relish instead ulti-
mate contact, the fulfillment of transition. Thus, the suicidality 
to which these near-immortals, like Anne Rice’s vampires, were 
turning for respite from their longevity, their long goodbyes, can 
be stayed. 
The two African superheroes span in the centuries of their 
relationship the trek from eastern regional civilization (Goro 
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means “the east”) to the new west (and its new metaphysics of 
science fiction). The book chronicles the westward momentum 
from within the history of forced African migration across the 
sea. Goro and Anyanwu meet in seventeenth-century Africa, and 
the novel ends with Anyanwu’s relocation with her community 
from Louisiana to California on the eve of the Civil War. Goro, 
whose mastery is uncompromised by the debasement of the 
history of slavery, simply finds the slave trade a waste from his 
perspective of breeding. The African contribution is the foun-
dation. Body-based primary narcissism, which is not broken by 
machine relations, is what the slave trade that comes from Africa 
carries forward. But not for the whites, who are atrophied by the 
degradations they perpetrate. 
Goro is always sizing up how much wear is left in his current 
body, so he can select his next victim. Otherwise his metabolism 
would decide for him and he would have to consume the one he’s 
with. That, too, would be a waste. Goro cannot flex the special 
powers of the person he replaces, but he can pass them on when 
he uses the borrowed body to contribute to the breeding circle. 
Goro was just another killer as old as the slaughter trough of 
history. But before the prospect of a new world he fully entered 
upon the melting pot experiment by setting his metabolism 
on choice and selection. It’s not the European fit with survival 
(White Man’s Burden) drawing Goro onward, but instead the 
prospect of a new species endowed with paranormal abilities and 
increased lifetime. 
Like Butler, visual artist Arthur Jafa concluded: the space race 
c’est moi. The artist’s day job, Hollywood cameraman, brought 
him to the set of Stanley Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut, his work 
ending with the jolt of the director’s death. Jafa’s work of mourn-
ing was framed within the eidetic memory he flashed back on: 
seeing 2001: A Space Odyssey as a pre-adolescent Black boy in 
Mississippi. Like Butler, he was interested in science fiction 
against the contemporary backdrop of the space race. Before 
seeing Kubrick’s film, he had been following its progress on the 
pages of Popular Mechanics. In Cinema 2, Deleuze argues that 
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when we watch Kubrick’s films we are in contact with his brain.44 
Jafa recalls his primal viewing of Kubrick’s SF movie:
First, there is the absolute whiteness of the context (both 
figuratively and literally). All of the characters are Caucasian 
and they are, in their demeanor, both archetypically and ata-
vistically white. This is a whiteness that’s sterile, creepy and 
ultimately seductive (I’d guess Kubrick’s background, a Bronx 
Jew, is relevant here). […] And second, there is the absence 
of both Black people and/or any apparent sign of Blackness. 
This absence is misleading. Ultimately, I came to recognize 
the film’s highly repressed and anxiety-ridden preoccupation 
with Blackness.45 
After the fact, Jafa concluded that “the obsession with/suppres-
sion of Blackness” in Kubrick’s SF movie was “atypical of the 
genre only with respect to the elegance of its construction” (16). 
This retrospective judgment was passed following the instruc-
tion he took down from Alien and Star Wars, which he introjects 
parenthetically: “(Have you noticed that 2001’s monolith, Darth 
Vader’s uniform/flesh, and H.R. Giger’s alien are all composed of 
the same black substance?)” (15). 
Skipping the racist caricatures trolling around in Lucas’s first 
Star Wars films,46 Jafa fixes his focus on the Vader crypt as the 
44 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 206.
45 Arthur Jafa, On the Blackness of Blacknuss: My Black Death (Hudson: 
Publication Studio Hudson, 2018), 14. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text.  
46 The trajectory of integration on board the good ship Star Trek went 
into retrograde with the racist caricatures crowding the first Star Wars 
films. In the course of tracking the phases of integration in the occult 
horror genre in The Psycho Records, I pointed out that the Black 
American allergy to Lucas’s first round of science fantasy gave this 
electorate a unique immunity to President Reagan, who wrote the 
recycled propaganda of Star Wars on the banner of his politics (13). 
Since Independence Day, a remake of the basic group psychology of 
Star Wars, Will Smith provided continuity correction. Moving from 
the television of rerun to the digital relation of return of return, science 
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clear text of denied Blackness. He allows that the destruction of 
“Vader’s crib,” the Death Star, attacks “the engendering Black 
womb,” which is “a diminished, and more overtly nihilistic, 
replay” of the concluding sequence in Kubrick’s movie. When 
the butt plug pops out of John Hurt’s chest in Alien only the 
Black actor, Yaphet Koto, isn’t thrown back in shock, but leans 
into the recognition scene/seen. 
“The Blue Danube” waltzes the transatlantic flights con-
necting New York and London in 1968 up through the solar 
system. The US diplomat in charge of covering up the monolith’s 
excavation on the moon has an English-accented daughter at the 
other end of the line. What does she want for her birthday? First 
choice: a telephone, which the father discounts as superfluous 
since they inhabit that transmission. Then she chooses instead “a 
bush baby,” a term that cites the idiolect of the British Empire’s 
White Man’s Burden. The English girl’s second choice is, then, 
colonial and out of Africa. But we’re in the future and, in any 
event, a doll or pet lodges an immediacy of affection second only 
to live transmission. 
At the film’s conclusion, the Saturn station is a palatial intro-
ject of the French eighteenth-century style befitting a luxury 
hotel chain but still bearing the datemark of the Enlightenment. 
The monolith on the moon transmits to one astronaut stand-
ing alone in this room while the allegory of the ages of man is 
performed. Out of one dying old man issues the Star Child, the 
afterlife in outer space. The ultimate fantasy jump cut in the his-
tory of cinema – from the prehistoric weapon hurled against the 
monolith in Africa to the spaceship of the future traversing the 
Black continent of outer space – sets off a series of evolutionary-
mutational leaps forward that culminates in the closing mystery 
sequence of rebirth. Jafa: “2001’s white/star child is engendered 
by a black sentient body, subliminally, and desperately, positing 
the possibility of pure white being issuing forth from all encom-
passing dark matter. A manifestation of white fear of genetic 
annihilation by the (Black) other” (ibid.). 
fiction’s poster boy of integration could still inherit the era of Night 
of the Living Dead but outside the original setting of opposition or 
sacrifice. 
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In the setting of the Pax Americana this sci-fi bogie of 
Blackness is the ill-fitting and backfiring adaptation to Faustian 
Europe’s White Man’s Burden. And yet outside the tired straits 
of repression, Jafa’s Blackness is another word for savvy, which 
stirs the opposition in the Cargo Cult. Because of the adolescent 
turbulence that the Homo Gestalt undergoes through Gerry 
and his morals charge as well as the growing pains that in Wild 
Seed rehearse the inheritance of the tele gift, we cannot end the 
Space Race at the finish line of reproduction. Like Schreber’s 
rays-inseminated inception as transgender and cyborg bringing 
forth a new survivor species, the science fiction that Jafa aligns 
with white racism in fact fulfills the ultimate teen wish to get past 
reproduction and death. We close therefore instead before the 
prospect of an Inner/Outer Space that’s as old as the concise his-
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